United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE, United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
of United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly (Doc. 47).
Judge Daly recommends that the undersigned deny
Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctive relief
(Docs. 7, 10, and 33). Plaintiff filed a timely objection
(Doc. 55). For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS Judge
Daly's Report and Recommendation in its entirety.
Steven Curry, an inmate currently incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”), filed this action
alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary and
injunctive relief in the form of a transfer to another prison
facility for failure to protect and deliberate indifference
to his safety pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he has
received threats from members of the Black Disciples, a
prison gang. The first incident occurred in January 2015,
when Plaintiff received an unaddressed threatening letter;
the next incidents occurred in February 2016, when Plaintiff
was involved in two separate altercations with members of the
Black Disciples; the final incident occurred in March 2016,
when Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with another
inmate. All three altercations resulted in Plaintiff
is currently located in disciplinary segregation until August
2017. Other than the alleged threats and the three isolated
altercations, there have been no incidents of inmates
attempting to harm Plaintiff. Following an evidentiary
hearing on Plaintiff's motion, Judge Daly issued her
Report and Recommendation.
Report and Recommendation sets forth the nature of the
evidence presented by the parties as well as the applicable
law. Judge Daly considered the evidence presented and
concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish the elements
required to obtain a preliminary injunction (see
Doc. 47). Specifically, Judge Daly found that Plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment
claim is low because he cannot show that the Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to his serious needs. Judge Daly
also found that Menard Officials have repeatedly investigated
Plaintiff's concerns regarding his safety and assessed
that a prison transfer was not warranted.
undersigned must undertake a de novo review of the
Judge Daly's recommendation to deny Plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction because a timely objection
was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago
Heights, 824 F.Supp. 786, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see
also Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.
1992). De novo review requires the district judge to
“give fresh consideration to those issues to which
specific objections have been made” and make a decision
“based on an independent review of the evidence and
arguments without giving any presumptive weight to the
magistrate judge's conclusion.” Harper,
824 F.Supp. at 788 (citing 12 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3076.8, at p.
55 (1st ed. 1973) (1992 Pocket Part)); Mendez v. Republic
Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court
“may accept, reject or modify the magistrate
judge's recommended decision.” Harper, 824
F.Supp. at 788.
preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by
a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The
purpose of such an injunction is to minimize the hardship to
the parties pending the ultimate resolution of the
lawsuit.” Fahenm-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712,
717 (7th Cir. 1988). In order to obtain a preliminary
injunction, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that:
(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim; (2)
he has no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Planned
Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm'r of Indiana State
Dep't Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012),
citing Am. Civil Liberties Unions of Ill. v.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2012).
context of prisoner litigation, the scope of the Court's
authority to enter an injunction is circumscribed by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012).
Under the PLRA, preliminary injunction relief “must be
narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct
the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be
the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also
Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (noting the PLRA
“enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court
in cases challenging prison conditions: prisons officials
have broad administrative and discretionary authority over
the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
generally objects to Judge Daly's finding that he is not
in imminent danger. He contends that Defendants have not
shown any facts or proof that Plaintiff took part in the
alleged violations. Plaintiff further asserts that if a
preliminary injunction is not granted, he will likely be
harmed at some point by other inmates.
there is no evidence that Plaintiff will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is not granted. Plaintiff is currently
housed in disciplinary segregation and will remain there
until August 2017. There have been no incidents since March
2016. It is well-established that preliminary injunctions are
an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” requiring
the movant to demonstrate its justification by a clear
showing. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden.
also challenges Judge Daly's findings that he was an
active participant in the three altercations. During
Pavey hearings, a court can make findings of fact
and credibility assessments of witnesses. See Pavey v.
Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2011). Magistrate
judges stand in the best position to assess a witness's
credibility because they have the opportunity “to
observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses .
. . [including their] reactions and responses to the
interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of
voice, eye contact, posture and body movements.”
Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (7th
Cir. 1995). The Court finds no reason to second-guess Judge
Daly's factual determinations. Goffman v. Gross,
59 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The district court
is not required to conduct another hearing to review the
magistrate judge's findings or credibility
determinations”). After thoroughly reviewing the record
before it, the Court agrees with Judge Daly's analysis
foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS Judge Daly's Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 47). Plaintiff's motions for