United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
PHIL GILBERT DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary
judgment. Plaintiff filed a Motion (Doc. 72) for Partial
Summary Judgment on Count I and the defendant filed a timely
response (Doc. 85). Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. 88) which
states exceptional circumstances as required by Local Rule
7.1. As such, the Court will consider plaintiff's reply.
Defendant filed a Motion (Doc. 75) for Summary Judgment and
the plaintiff filed a timely response (Doc. 86). Defendant
also filed a reply (Doc. 91) which states exceptional
circumstances and the Court will consider defendant's
second amended complaint (Doc. 30), alleges that the
defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”),
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,
et seq. (“ADA”), and the Illinois Human
Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101, et. seq.
(“IHRA”). Specifically, the second amended
complaint states that the plaintiff was employed by St. Clair
County in the small claims division from May 2013, until her
termination in January 2015. Plaintiff claims she was
terminated after she requested leave under FMLA and that the
defendant failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's
judgment must be granted, “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels
Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000).
The reviewing court must construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);
Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir.
2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396.
initial summary judgment burden of production is on the
moving party to show the Court that there is no reason to
have a trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323;
Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir.
2013). Where the non-moving party carries the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of
production in one of two ways. It may present evidence that
affirmatively negates an essential element of the non-moving
party's case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A),
or it may point to an absence of evidence to support an
essential element of the non-moving party's case without
actually submitting any evidence, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(B). Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25;
Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169. Where the moving party
fails to meet its strict burden, a court cannot enter summary
judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party
fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion.
Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party
may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the
pleadings, but must present specific facts to show that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322-26; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57;
Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1168. A genuine issue of
material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of
“some alleged factual dispute between the parties,
” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material
fact exists only if “a fair-minded jury could return a
verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence
presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
is moving for partial summary judgment on Count I of her
Second Amended Complaint. Count I alleges that the defendant
interfered with the plaintiff's Family and Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”) rights in violation of 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1) by terminating her employment.
general, the Family and Medical Leave Act
(''FMLA'') provides leave for qualified
employees who must be absent from work for family or medical
reasons. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; Price v.
City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir.1997).
Specifically, the FMLA seeks to provide up to twelve weeks
employment leave within a twelve-month period for an eligible
employee who suffers, or who has a family member who suffers,
from a serious health condition. The FMLA defines
''serious health condition'' as ''an
illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition
that involves--(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or
residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing
treatment by a health care provider.'' 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(11); see Price, 117 F.3d at 1024.
FMLA specifically allows the covered employee to take such
leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule when
medically necessary, even though the employer may not agree
to such arrangement. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1).
''Intermittent leave'' encompasses leave
taken in separate blocks of time because of a single illness
or injury, rather than leave taken for one continuous period
of time. It also may include leave in periods from an hour or
more to several weeks. 29 C.F.R. ' 825.205(a).
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1-2) makes it unlawful for any
employer, “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided
under this subchapter” or to “discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against ...