United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
matter is before the court on Juan Reyna's (Reyna) motion
to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (Section 2255). For the reasons stated
below, the Section 2255 motion is denied.
August 12, 2008, in case number 06 CR 928, Reyna pled guilty
to Count One of the indictment, which charged Reyna with
unlawfully possessing a firearm after previously sustaining a
felony conviction. On December 3, 2008, the court found that
Reyna was subject to the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence
in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §
924(e), and the court sentenced Reyna to 15 years
imprisonment. On July 28, 2016, Reyna filed the instant
motion. The Government opposes the instant motion.
2255 provides that “[a] prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The relief sought in a
Section 2255 motion “is an extraordinary remedy because
it asks the district court essentially to reopen the criminal
process to a person who already has had an opportunity for
full process.” Almonacid v. United States, 476
F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007).
argues that his sentence should be vacated based on rulings
in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133
(2010) and Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243
(2016). The ACCA provides the following:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this
title and has three previous convictions by any court
referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such person shall be
fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen
years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a
probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the
conviction under section 922(g).
18 U.S.C.§ 924(e)(1); see also United States v.
Haney, 2016 WL 6298695, at *1 (7th Cir. 2016)(stating
that “[i]n Johnson, the Court declared
unconstitutionally vague the ACCA's ‘residual
clause, ' i.e., a part of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) that
defined violent felonies as offenses involving ‘conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another'”). The ACCA further provides the
the term “violent felony” means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or
any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying
of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an
adult, that--(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another . . . .
18 U.S.C.§ 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson, the
Supreme Court “invalidated the ACCA's residual
clause as unconstitutionally vague.” United States
v. Rollins, 2016 WL 4587028, at *1 (7th Cir.
2016)(finding that “Johnson's
constitutional holding applied to the residual clause
in” the sentencing guidelines); United States v.
Hurlburt, 2016 WL 4506717, at *3 (7th Cir.
2016)(explaining that the portion referencing a crime that
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another” is the
Reyna relies upon Johnson, Reyna was sentenced under
the ACCA based upon three separate felony convictions for
burglary. Reyna was not sentenced under the residual clause
in the ACCA and thus Johnson is not applicable in
this instance. Reyna argues that the court should not take
such a limited view of the holding in Johnson.
Neither the Court in Johnson nor the Seventh Circuit
in interpreting Johnson have indicated such a broad
holding in regard to the ACCA. See Dawkins v. United
States, 809 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2016)(holding that
the petitioner could not “show that his sentence
violates Johnson” because “the sentence
was” not “based . . . on the residual
clause”). This court declines to expand the holding of
Johnson in such a manner.
also relies upon Mathis as a basis for his Section
2255 Motion. The record does not indicate that Reyna raised
Mathis during his direct appeal and he has waived
that argument. Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693,
698 (7th Cir. 1995)(referencing “the well-settled rule
that a motion to vacate or modify a sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct
appeal”). The Seventh Circuit has indicated that
Mathis did not make a rule retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review. Dawkins v. United
States, 829 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 2016)(making a
finding in regard to application for successive petition).
Reyna has not shown a valid legal basis for declining ...