Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Dailey v. Enloe

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

November 23, 2016

ALKEYYUM DAILEY, Petitioner,
v.
DONALD ENLOE, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

         This matter is before the court on Petitioner Alkeyyum Dailey's (Dailey) pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Section 2254). For the reasons stated below, the Petition is denied.

         BACKGROUND

         In December 2011, Dailey was convicted in a bench trial for aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. On December 19, 2014, Dailey's conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. Dailey then filed a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) with the Illinois Supreme Court, and the PLA was denied on November 25, 2015. In December 2013, Dailey filed a petition for relief from judgement in state court. The petition was denied, and the record does not reflect that Dailey appealed the denial of the petition. On January 11, 2016, Dailey filed the instant Petition. Respondent has filed an answer and opposes the Petition.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         An individual in custody pursuant to state court judgment may seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Section 2254, which provides the following:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The decision made by a state court is deemed to be contrary to clearly established federal law “‘if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'” Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). The decision by a state court is deemed to involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “‘if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.'” Emerson, 575 F.3d at 684 (quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).

         DISCUSSION

         This court has liberally construed Dailey's pro se filings. See Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating that “[a]s [the plaintiff] was without counsel in the district court, his habeas petition [wa]s entitled to a liberal construction”); Greer v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001)(indicating that a court should “liberally construe the pleadings of individuals who proceed pro se”). Dailey asserts in the Petition: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Claim 1), (2) that his fifteen-year sentence is excessive, contending that it violates the Eighth Amendment (Claim 2), (3) that his sentence is excessive, contending that it violates the Illinois Constitution (Claim 3), and (4) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider his sentence (Claim 4).

         I. Claim 1

         As indicated above, Dailey argues in Claim 1 that there was insufficient evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Dailey contends that the evidence showed that he acted in defense of another. In assessing a sufficiency of evidence claim in a habeas petition, the court should view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, ” and find that the evidence “is sufficient to support a conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jones v. Butler, 778 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2015)(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)); see also Kubsch v. Neal, 838 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2016)(stating that a “state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)).

         In the instant action, the record reflects that there was ample evidence upon which to convict Dailey. Although Dailey claimed that he acted in the defense of another, there was extensive witness testimony presented at trial and a videotape that contradicted Dailey's version of events. The fact finder clearly had a sufficient basis to find Dailey guilty based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. See Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2012)(indicating that “[s]tate court findings, including credibility determinations, are presumed correct on federal habeas review, unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with clear and convincing evidence”). Contrary to Dailey's depiction of the events that led to his conviction, there was a plethora of evidence presented at trial showing that there was no imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to Dailey or anyone else that would have justified his actions against the victim. See 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a)(stating that a person is justified in the use of force “only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony”). Nor has Dailey shown that the Illinois Appellate Court applied the wrong standard on direct review when concluding that there was sufficient evidence to convict Dailey. Therefore, Claim 1 lacks any merit.

         II. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.