Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Suggss v. Lashbrook

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

November 21, 2016

QUENTIN SUGGS, Plaintiff,
v.
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, BETSEY SPILLER, CHRISTINE BROWN, and DR. SHAH, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          MICHAEL J. REAGAN United States District Judge.

         Plaintiff Quentin Suggs is currently incarcerated at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center in Pinckneyville, Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Proceeding pro se, Suggs has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that medical staff and prison officials at Pinckneyville have failed to provide proper treatment for his chronic hemorrhoid condition from at least 2015 to the present. (Id. at 5-7.) Suggs seeks punitive and compensatory damages. (Id. at 6.)

         This matter is now before the Court for a review of Suggs' complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government entity.” During the § 1915A review, the court “shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, ” if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.”

         Background

         According to Suggs' complaint and the grievances he attached to it, Suggs has been incarcerated at Pinckneyville since at least 2015. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.) From early 2015 to June 2015, Suggs met with Dr. Shah about his chronic hemorrhoid problem, and while Dr. Shah did not completely ignore his problem during those visits, he persisted in the use of “medication and hemorrhoidal creams” and other treatment that had no effect on his condition. (See Id. at 3-4.) Dr. Shah's attitude towards treatment evidently continued into late 2015-Suggs saw Dr. Shah again on October 19, 2015 and reported that his hemorrhoids were flaring, and Dr. Shah told Suggs that the next time his condition flared up that he should “stick [his] but[t] in the toilet.” (Id. at 6.) Suggs told Dr. Shah that he could not fit his backside into the toilet, but Dr. Shah suggested a sitz bath and then told Suggs that he could leave. (See id.)

         On January 28, 2016, Suggs saw Dr. Scott, another physician at the prison, and told him that he had not received the medications that Dr. Shah had prescribed for some time and that the medications that he had received were not working. (Id. at 1.) Suggs also told Dr. Scott that he had requested through Dr. Shah to be sent to an outside hospital, but that request was denied. (Id.) Dr. Scott gave Suggs the medications that Dr. Shah had previously prescribed and he was slated to see Dr. Scott again in February 2016. (Id. at 2.) Suggs saw Dr. Scott two more times and, when Suggs told Dr. Scott that the medications still were not helping him, Dr. Scott wrote a “note for general surgery.” (Id.) On March 7, 2016, the order for general surgery was denied by unspecified officials at Pinckneyville. (Id.) On October 19, 2016, Suggs saw Dr. Shah again, and while the complaint is a bit vague about the content of that meeting, Suggs apparently complained to Dr. Shah about the pain caused by his hemorrhoid condition, his need to have surgery to treat his condition, and the ongoing ineffectiveness of the medications that had been used to date. (See Doc. 1 at 5.) Again, while the complaint is unclear, it appears as if surgery was denied again by Dr. Shah and that there was no change in treatment. (See id.)

         Throughout his tenure at Pinckneyville, Suggs claims that he filed grievances concerning his hemorrhoid care. (Id. at 4.) Unsatisfied with the prison's response, he filed suit in this Court on August 24, 2016. Before the Court could conduct a threshold review of his complaint, the Court advised Suggs that his complaint could not be assessed because it was unsigned. (Doc. 7.) Suggs has since submitted a signed complaint, so his case is ready for threshold review.

         Discussion

         The Court begins its § 1915A review with a note about the parties at issue in this case. In the grievances attached to his complaint, Suggs references the conduct of Dr. Scott, who seems to have provided some treatment for Suggs in early 2016. Because Dr. Scott is not listed in the caption or the defendant list, he will not be treated as a defendant in this case, and any claims against him should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendants must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).

         Turning to the substantive allegations in Suggs' complaint, the Court finds it proper to divide the claims in the complaint into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

COUNT 1: From 2015 to October 2016, Dr. Shah failed to properly treat Suggs' hemorrhoid condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
COUNT 2: From 2015 to October 2016, Lashbrook, Spiller, and Brown failed to properly treat Suggs' hemorrhoid condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

         Suggs' complaint begins with allegations linked to Dr. Shah's medical care, so the Court will start there (Count 1). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars the cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners, and prison officials violate this proscription “when they display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2005). To bring an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a prisoner has two hurdles to clear: he must first show that his medical condition is “objectively” serious, and he must then allege that the medical professionals that he has named as defendants acted with the requisite state of mind. Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002).

         For screening purposes, Suggs has alleged the existence of an objectively serious medical condition. An objectively serious condition is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001). Factors that indicate a serious condition include “the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.