United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MARK CAMERON, BRIAN CLEMENTS, BRIAN HOLSAPPLE, STEVEN KERLEY, RICHARD PISONI and DARREN LINDSEY Plaintiffs,
STATE OF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, GREG ROBINSON, JOSEPH KOLLINS, SCOTT KOERNER, ROB HALEY, LANCE HINKLE, CRAIG DEMERAT and CHARLES TOLBERT, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE DISTRICT JUDGE.
bring this consolidated action alleging violations pursuant
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,
28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Doc. 53).
Defendants moved for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76) and
Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 92). For the following
reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED
to the Statement of Facts filed by Defendants (Doc. 76-1) and
adopted by Plaintiffs (Doc. 92-1), Plaintiffs were employed
as members of the Illinois State Police South SWAT Team
(“SWAT”) until mid-2011 when they voluntarily
transferred to other positions (Doc. 76-1, p. 5-4 and p.
52-53). Prior to 2010, SWAT operations consisted primarily of
the execution of search warrants (Id. at p. 12). In
2010, Illinois State Police command officers determined that
SWAT team members should be trained for special operations in
order to respond to terrorism and other critical incidents
(Id. at p. 15). The military-style techniques and
new training procedures demanded faster speeds which
Plaintiff Clements (SWAT team leader) and Plaintiff Cameron
(SWAT assistant team leader) felt compromised safety
(Id. at p. 15-16). Around that time, Clements
adopted a more authoritative attitude towards the team he led
(Id. at p. 18) and at times was successful in
slowing the team operators to a safer speed (Id. at
p. 16). On some occasions, Clements felt that team operators
circumvented the chain of command by discussing such matters
with Defendant Kollins instead of Plaintiff Clements.
end of 2010, the team had become divided (Id. at p.
17). Plaintiffs Pisoni and Cameron testified at deposition
that they heard Defendant Robinson state that the way to get
rid of operators in the military was to isolate them
(Id. at p. 29). Defendant Tolbert developed a plan
to speak to team leadership only for work purposes, and
several Plaintiffs testified at deposition that Tolbert
stated “you are either with us or against us”
(Id. at p. 30-31). Plaintiffs Kerley and Holsapple
did not join in Tolbert's plan (Id. at p. 31).
Pisoni recalled Tolbert referring to him and Clements and as
“old bosses” in the fall of 2010 and believed
that this phrase was in reference to the command staff
(Id. at p. 32). In his deposition, Plaintiff
Holsapple testified that Tolbert used the phrase “old
guys, ” but Holsapple did not ask for clarification as
to whether Tolbert was referring to operators over the age of
included in the undisputed statement of facts is Plaintiff
Lindsey's deposition testimony regarding a team meeting
on June 15, 2011 at which Plaintiffs Kerley, Cameron and
Clements were not present but non-team members Defendant
Kollins (lieutenant) and Koerner (captain) were present (Doc.
92-12, p. 6). During the meeting, Tolbert and other operators
stated that “SWAT wasn't a retirement home”
and that “some of the older guys just need to move
on” (Id. at p. 8-10). Lindsey further
testified that a team member stated that younger guys would
like to “climb the ladder” (get promoted) but
could not as long as the older guys were on the team
(Id. at p. 11-12).
I through VI of Plaintiffs'Joint Second Amended Complaint
are brought under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, against Defendant
Illinois State Police. In particular, Plaintiffs Cameron,
Clements, Pisoni and Lindsey claim they were victims of age
discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiffs Kerley and
Holsapple claim they were subjected to retaliation because
they refused to participate in discriminatory
conduct. All Plaintiffs claim Defendants'
actions created a hostile work environment.
VII through XII are civil conspiracy claims wherein
Plaintiffs allege that each of the seven individual
defendants, in an effort to force Plaintiffs to leave SWAT,
entered into an agreement to target older members of SWAT.
Plaintiffs further allege that, as a result of this agreement
and “tortious conduct, ” they suffered adverse
employment actions, severe emotional distress and impairment
of future employment opportunities.
Counts XIII through XVIII, Plaintiffs bring claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) against each of the seven individual
defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the
intentional acts of the individual defendants in carrying out
their plan to push Plaintiffs out of SWAT caused depression,
emotional distress, sleep disruptions and anxiety.
Additionally, Plaintiff Pisoni alleges in Count XVII that he
incurred medical expenses for treatment of his depression and
anxiety, including medication and treatment from a
cardiologist. Defendants move for summary judgment on all
judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels
Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000).
Where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden of
proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving
party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant
evidence in response to the motion. Cooper v. Lane,
969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party
may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the
pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Johnson v. City of
Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine
issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere
existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the
parties, ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986), or by “some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only
if “a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the
[nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. While all facts and
inferences are taken in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, the nonmoving party cannot survive summary
judgment if it is unable to establish an essential element of
their claim on which it will bear the burden of proof at
trial. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th
Discrimination and ...