United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
M. Dow, Jr. United States District Judge
LaMonta Willis (“Plaintiff”) brings this §
1983 suit against Defendants Ricardo Tejeda
(“Tejeda”), Randy Pfister
(“Pfister”), Stephen Duncan
(“Duncan”), the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), and unknown officials,
officers, and employees of the Lawrence Correctional Center
(“Lawrence”) and the Illinois Prisoner Review
Board (“IPRB”) to seek redress for alleged
violations of Plaintiff's constitutional right to due
process and deprivation of his liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Before the Court is Defendant Tejeda's motion
 to dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint
. For the reasons stated below, the motion  is
was formerly an inmate at the Shawnee Correctional Center
(“Shawnee”). His sentence included two years
parole. He was released from Shawnee on parole on January 22,
2013. His sentence was to conclude on January 22, 2015.
January 2, 2014, a warrant was issued for Plaintiff's
arrest and on January 22, 2014, Plaintiff was taken back into
custody. On January 31, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to
the Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”)
to await a hearing before the IPRB. Defendant Tejeda is a
Warden at Stateville. Defendant Does 11 through 20 are
unknown officials, officers, and/or employees of the IPRB.
Tejeda and all of the other individual defendants are
employed by Defendant IDOC. Plaintiff received a hearing
before the IPRB on March 12, 2014. The IPRB determined that
Plaintiff would be required to spend the remaining time of
his parole in IDOC custody.
March 14, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence.
Defendant Duncan is the Warden at Lawrence and Defendant Does
1 through 10 are unknown officials, officers, and/or
employees at Lawrence. Plaintiff alleges that at Lawrence,
“he received a false calculation for his remaining
incarceration.”  at 3. Plaintiff specifically
alleges that “Lawrence calculated that Plaintiff was to
be released on October 2, 2014, ” but that this
“was erroneous because it gave Plaintiff no credit for
his time on parole from September 1, 2013 through January 2,
2014, ” when a warrant was issued for his arrest.
Id. at 3-4. According to Plaintiff, January 2, 2014
was “the correct starting point to calculate his
remaining time to serve” and if Lawrence “had
calculated [his] release date correctly, the release date
would have been set for July 22, 2014, rather than October 2,
2014.”  at 4.
March and May 2014, Plaintiff filed multiple grievances
challenging the calculation of his release date,
“including one to Defendant Tejeda.”  at 4.
Specifically, on March 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance
with “Counselor Ray” at Lawrence. Id.
Plaintiff received a response on May 27, 2014. According to
Plaintiff, the denial did not “determine or even
consider the miscalculation of time.” Id. On
April 21, 2014, Plaintiff “communicated his concerns to
Stateville, which wrongfully failed and refused to calculate
Plaintiff's remaining incarceration time by giving him
credit for time served before the warrant was issued.”
Id. On May 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance
addressed to the IPRB and the Administrative Review Board
detailing the alleged sentence miscalculation. On May 13,
2014, Plaintiff filed another grievance with IDOC. IDOC
responded on May 27, 2014. According to Plaintiff, IDOC's
response was “woefully inadequate and deficient”
and did not “address the substance of his
grievance.” Id. Instead, IDOC “directed
Plaintiff to file the grievance with the Administrative
Review Board, which Plaintiff already had done” two
weeks earlier. Id.
September 10, 2014, Plaintiff received a response from the
Administrative Review Board. The response, which was dated
July 12, 2014, “failed and refused to address the
substance of Plaintiff's concerns and incarceration
miscalculation, ” and instead “instructed
Plaintiff [to] direct his concerns and complaints to the
[IPRB].”  at 5.
alleges that, as a result of “the delays” and
“deficient responses” of the IPRB, the
Administrative Review Board, Stateville, and IDOC, he was
“denied any remedy for the miscalculation of his
remaining sentence.”  at 4. Plaintiff was released
from Lawrence on October 2, 2014.
November 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed a pro se
complaint  against Salvador Godinez, the then-director of
IDOC; the IDOC Administrative Review Board; the IDOC Prison
Review Board; and Tejeda. Upon its initial review of the
complaint, the Court dismissed all defendants except Tejeda
. The Court subsequently recruited an attorney to
represent Plaintiff  and Plaintiff's counsel filed a
first amended complaint on June 25, 2015 . The first
amended complaint was brought against Tejeda and Gladyse C.
Taylor, (“Taylor”) a former acting director of
IDOC. Tejeda's moved to dismiss the amended complaint.
See . The Court granted in part and denied part the
motion. See . The Court denied Tejeda's motion to
dismiss Counts I and II of the first amended complaint but
struck Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief on
those counts, on the ground of mootness. The Court also
dismissed Taylor as a defendant due to Plaintiff's
failure to serve her with the amended complaint. The Court
granted Plaintiff until February 22, 2016 to file a second
amended complaint consistent with its opinion.
filed his second amended complaint  on February 22, 2016.
The second amended complaint contains two claims. Count I
alleges a “violation of due process for
unconstitutional processes.”  at 6. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights by
“refusing to respond [to], ignoring, [and]
misdirecting” him and “interfering with [his]
ability to obtain a fair, constitutional grievance
process.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that
“Defendants' internal grievance processes are
fundamentally flawed and unconstitutional in the manner by
which they: (a) purport to calculate remaining incarceration
time to be served following an arrest for parole violations;
and/or (b) purport to provide remedies to inmates who seek to
appeal or challenge the calculation of remaining
incarceration time to be served.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that he “could not have
obtained a writ of habeas corpus due to the delays
and deficient responses by Defendants.” Id. As
a result, Plaintiff alleges, he was “deprived of his
liberty and incarcerated for months beyond his correct
release date.” Id.
II alleges a “violation of due process for
miscalculation of incarceration time.”  at 7.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “miscalculated
Plaintiff's remaining incarceration time and then failed
and refused to address the miscalculation despite multiple
grievances filed by Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff
further alleges that there were “no procedures to
remedy Defendants' delays” and that he “could
not have obtained a writ of habeas corpus due to the
delays and deficient responses by Defendants.”
Id. As a result, Plaintiff alleges, he was deprived
of his liberty and incarcerated for months beyond his correct
release date. Id. Plaintiff requests compensatory
damages on Count I and compensatory damages, costs, and fees
on Count II, in addition to any further relief the Court
deems just and appropriate. Plaintiff has removed his request
for injunctive relief, as directed by the Court in its order
granting in part and denying in part Tejeda's motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint.
Tejeda moves to dismiss the second amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff's
complaint must allege facts which, when taken as true,
‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief, raising that possibility above a speculative
level.'” Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway
Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773,
776 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court “accept[s] all
well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences
in plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 600 (citing
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 52 ...