United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
CARLOS R. PIKE, Plaintiff,
PREMIER TRANSPORTATION & WAREHOUSING, INC., ET AL. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. ROWLAND, United States Magistrate Judge
Carlos R. Pike brings this personal injury action against
Defendants Premier Transportation & Warehousing, Inc. and
Daniel M. Duben, Sr. (“Duben”), alleging that
Duben was negligent in operating a semi-trailer truck. The
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United
States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and this case is set for trial on November 14, 2016.
filed a Motion to Exclude Causation Opinions of C. Brian
Tanner (“Motion”). (Dkt. 50). Defendants retained
Mr. Tanner to analyze the accident and the movement of Mr.
Pike in his car to determine whether his exposure in the
accident was consistent with causing his reported injuries.
(50-4). Plaintiff does not object to Mr. Tanner testifying at
trial or to his qualifications as a biomechanical engineer.
(53 at 2). Instead, Plaintiff seeks to bar testimony by Mr.
Tanner about the cause of Plaintiff's injuries. (50 at 3;
53 at 2).
reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589,
113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993), the requirements of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 must be met before an expert can testify. As
the Seventh Circuit has explained:
“(t)he purpose of the Daubert inquiry is to
scrutinize proposed expert witness testimony to determine if
it has ‘the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field' so as to be deemed reliable enough to present to a
jury. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). A
Daubert inquiry is not designed to have the district
judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate issues of
credibility and accuracy. If the proposed expert testimony
meets the Daubert threshold of relevance and
reliability, the accuracy of the actual evidence is to be
tested before the jury.” Lapsley v. Xtek,
Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2012).
courts have broad discretion to determine the admissibility
of expert testimony. EEOC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., No.
10 C 6139, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135083, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sep. 30, 2016). The party seeking to admit the expert
has the burden of showing their expert meets the requirements
of Rule 702 and Daub-ert. Id. at *4.
Because “there are many different kinds of experts, and
many different kinds of expertise, . . .the gatekeeping
inquiry must be ‘tied to the facts' of a particular
case.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 150 (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
Courts review each conclusion of the expert individually in
relation to the expert's education, skill, and training.
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Tanner's Opinions
asked Mr. Tanner to “perform an analysis of the
accident to determine the speed change and acceleration of
the Nissan as a result of the contact by the truck (and) of
the kinematics and kinetics of Mr. Pike within the Nissan to
determine whether his exposure in the accident was consistent
with causing his reported injuries.” (50-4 at
Mr. Tanner's report (the “Report”) contains
his conclusions. Id. at 10-11. Of Mr. Tanner's
conclusions, Plaintiff objects to the following
“causation opinions” (50 at 4-5):
3. The longitudinal and lateral change in the speed for the
Nissan in the subject accident was less than 2 miles per
4. The maximum average acceleration of the Nissan in any
direction during the impact was well below 1 g.
5. There is no mechanism in the subject accident to cause any
acute injury to the knees or any aggravation of a
6. There is no mechanism from either direct contact or from
over extension or stretching that could cause an acute