United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
DARRIN W. SHATNER, Plaintiff,
MICHAEL ATCHISON, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL, United States District Judge.
case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and
the supplements to the motion. (Docs. 120, 124, 125).
Darrin Shatner (“Shatner”) is an inmate of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), and
Defendants are IDOC employees. Shatner has been an inmate at
various IDOC correctional facilities since he entered
IDOC's custody in 1993, but the events that give rise to
this litigation occurred in 2012 while he was at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”). Shatner
transferred from Menard to another facility in January 2013
but returned in May 2016 (Doc. 96-1 at 83; Doc. 120 at 1).
23, 2013, Shatner filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Doc. 1). The case was previously assigned to
Senior District Judge J. Phil Gilbert, who screened
Shatner's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(see Doc. 9) and allowed Shatner to proceed in this
action on two claims:
Count 1: Defendants McDonnough, Dunn, Cowan,
Dilday, Atchison, Harrington, and Godinez confiscated
Shatner's personal property on August 14, 2012, in
retaliation and in violation of the First Amendment Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses;
Count 2: Defendants Fedderke and Nagel
confiscated Shatner's personal property on September 15,
2012, in retaliation and in violation of the First Amendment
Free Exercise clause.
September 28, 2016, the Court granted partial summary
judgment and dismissed Defendants Harrington, Atchison, and
Godinez because they were not personally involved in any
allegedly unconstitutional conduct (see Doc. 128).
At that time the Court also dismissed Defendant Nagel because
Shatner withdrew his claims against him. Counsel was then
recruited to assist Shatner at trial on the retaliation and
First Amendment Free Exercise and Free Speech claims against
Defendants McDonnough, Dunn, Cowan, Dilday, and Fedderke. As
set forth above and in the Court's September 28
Memorandum and Order, those claims relate to the confiscation
of Shatner's personal property at Menard in September
31, 2016, Shatner filed a motion for injunctive relief, which
he supplemented on July 12 and July 26, 2016.
to the Shatner's motion, the following events occurred
earlier this year: On May 11, 2016, correctional officers
searched Shatner's bodily cavities upon his arrival to
Menard in a humiliating manner. On May 12, 2016, Defendant
Cedric McDonnough said, “Good, you're back. Now
I'm going to fuck you up worse than last time.” On
May 14, 2016, Officer Purdon referred to Shatner as the
“king of lawsuits” and a “devil
worshipper” and denied Shatner his property upon his
transfer. On May 19, 2016, when Shatner went to retrieve his
property and informed Officer LaFond that his religious
materials and art supplies were missing, Officer LaFond
unstrapped his mace, instructed Shatner to return to his cell
emptyhanded, and told Shatner that “he didn't care
about many lawsuits [Shatner] filed, that [he] wasn't
getting any devil shit or oil paint boards, pastels, or any
other legal property.” On June 30, 2016, Shatner
returned from a court writ and found that Officer LaFond
removed additional art supplies from Shatner's property
box. On July 22, 2016, a chaplain confiscated Shatner's
medallion (See Doc. 120). Shatner also alludes to
death threats from correctional officers in a vague manner
throughout the motion and alleges that Defendant McDonnough
threatened to kill him in 2012. Shatner requests an order for
the return of and continued access to tarot cards, silver
chain and star medallion, legal property, and art supplies.
Shatner further requests an order to secure Shatner's
physical safety or for a transfer to another facility.
purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is ‘to
minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate
resolution of the lawsuit.'” Platinum Home
Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722,
726 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Faheem-El v. Klincar,
841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988)). “In [the Seventh
Circuit], the standards for a TRO and a preliminary
injunction are functionally identical.” Crue v.
Aiken, 137 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1082-83 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
“In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
moving party must show that: (1) they are reasonably likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law
exists; (3) they will suffer irreparable harm which, absent
injunctive relief, outweighs the irreparable harm the
respondent will suffer if the injunction is granted; and (4)
the injunction will not harm the public interest.”
Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Illinois, 378
F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir. 2004).
court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to
preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until
the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit's
merits.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470,
471 (8th Cir. 1994). “Thus, a party moving for a
preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party's
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.”
Id. “A preliminary injunction is appropriate
only if it seeks relief of the same character sought in the
underlying suit and deals with a matter presented in that
underlying suit.” Welch v. Tritt, No.
15-CV-191, 2015 WL 6971312, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2015)
(citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43
(11th Cir. 1997)). “[A] District Court does not have
jurisdiction to award a preliminary injunction for an injury
unrelated to any cause of action found in the
complaint.” Johnson v. City of Rock Island,
Ill., No. 4:11-CV-4058-SLD-JAG, 2012 WL 5425605, at *2
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2012) (citing Stewart v. U.S.
I.N.S., 762 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also
Lake v. Robert, No. 13-CV-0198-MJR-SCW, 2014 WL 3610405,
at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 22, 2014); Jackson v. Welborn,
No. 12-CV-961-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 1287369, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar.
has not demonstrated a relationship between the allegations
in his motion and those in the complaint. Although his motion
for injunctive relief asserts the same type of claim
as those remaining in this case, it focuses on
conduct three years removed from that described in
the complaint. While the motion and the complaint both
pertain to events at Menard, Shatner resided at other
correctional facilities from January 2013 to May 2016. And,
with the exception of a passing mention of Defendant
McDonnough, the motion asserts allegations against
individuals who were ...