United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
OPINION AND ORDER
L. Ellis, Judge
Plaintiff Darryl Chester, the old adage “snitches get
stiches, ” rang painfully true. After correctional
officers publicly called Chester a “snitch, ”
beat him, and caused another inmate to attack him for being a
“snitch, ” Chester filed this lawsuit against
Lieutenant Earl Tucker, Deputy Marquis Beauchamp, Cook County
Sheriff Tom Dart, Cook County, and Unknown Cook County
Correctional Officers (“Defendants”) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising from
incidents with the correctional officers on March 18, 2013
and April 9, 2013, and a subsequent altercation on May 22,
2013, with another inmate. Chester also seeks state law
indemnification pursuant to the Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 10/9-102. Defendants move to dismiss  Chester's
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) because he has
insufficiently pleaded his claims, failed to exhaust them,
and the statute of limitations bars them. The Court denies in
part and grants in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Because the Court lacks information at this stage to
determine whether the statute of limitations bars
Chester's claims or he has failed to exhaust them, the
Court denies the motion to dismiss with respect to Counts I
and IV. The Court finds, however, that Chester has
insufficiently pleaded his Fourth Amendment and
Monell claims, and dismisses Counts II and III
March 18, 2013, Chester was at the barber shop at the Cook
County Jail. Defendant Tucker entered the shop with
approximately ten other correctional officers and told
Chester to “get his ‘Stool Pidgeon [sic] ass'
out of the barber chair.” Doc. 23 ¶ 10.
April 9, 2013, Tucker and approximately seven other unknown
correctional officers took Chester out of his cell,
“aggressively battered” him, searched his cell,
and confiscated permitted items. Id. ¶ 11. At
this time, Tucker yelled to the day room that Chester was
wearing a wire and working with the Criminal Intelligence
filed an inmate grievance regarding the April 9th
incident on April 18, 2013 and requested that jail officials
process the grievance as an emergency grievance. Platoon
Counselor Puckett acknowledged the grievance when Chester
filed it and informed him that Chester would “have
problems” because he was complaining about the actions
of correctional officers. Id. ¶ 14.
22, 2013, another inmate, Alex Arroyo, attacked Chester
because Tucker and Beauchamp had told inmates that Chester
was a “snitch.” Id. Chester received
injuries during the attack that required medical attention.
That same day, Chester filed an inmate grievance regarding
the attack. After Chester filed this grievance, Internal
Affairs and an Assistant State's Attorney contacted
Chester regarding the May 22nd incident, but no
further action occurred regarding the grievance. Chester also
alleges that Tucker or Beauchamp destroyed this grievance at
some point to prevent an investigation.
15, 2015, Chester filed the present suit. On April 18, 2016,
he filed the FAC, which Defendants now move to dismiss.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510,
1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts
in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor.
AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th
Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint
must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim's basis but must also be facially plausible.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
Statute of Limitations and Exhaustion
argue that Chester's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations because he filed his initial complaint more than
two years after the May 22, 2013 incident. The statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that need not be
anticipated in the complaint in order to survive a motion to
dismiss. United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842
(7th Cir. 2005). But that is not the case where “the
allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything
necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a
complaint reveals that an action is untimely under the
governing statute of limitations.” Id.;
see also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
2009) (considering statute of limitations defense on motion
to dismiss where relevant dates were set forth in the
§ 1983 claims are governed by the forum state's
statute of limitations for personal injury claims, in this
case, two years. Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928,
931 (7th Cir. 2001); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202.
Additionally, federal courts borrow the state's tolling
rules, including equitable tolling doctrines. Johnson v.
Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001). Under the
relevant Illinois tolling statute, the statute of limitations
is tolled when there is a statutory prohibition against
filing the case. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-216. Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
(“PLRA”), a prisoner may not bring a case under
§ 1983 until he has exhausted his available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
Johnson, 272 F.3d at 521. Therefore, the statute of
limitations is tolled while a prisoner pursues his
administrative remedies. Johnson, 272 F.3d at 522.
Further, although the statute of limitations is borrowed from
state law, federal law determines when a § 1983 claim