United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
CHEYENNE C. BUNETA and TERRY BUNETA, Plaintiff,
FAIRMONT CITY, ILLINOIS, TERESA SUAREZ, ROJAS VEGA, FRANCISCO BARAJAS, PANLINO ROSAS and MIROSLAVA JUAREZDE BARAJAS Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE United States District Judge
Cheyenne Buneta and Terry Buneta filed this action in the
Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois seeking damages
against Defendants Fairmont City, Illinois, Teresa Suarez,
Rojas Vega, Francisco Barajas, Panlino Rosas, and Miroslava
Juarezde Barajas. Defendants Fairmont City and Teresa
Suarez removed the action to this Court asserting federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Now
pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
(Doc. 7). Defendants Fairmont City and Suarez filed an
Amended Notice of Removal (Doc. 8) and a response (Doc. 9).
Defendants Francisco Barajas, Panlino Rosas, and Miroslava
Juarezde Barajas filed consents to removal (Docs. 11, 15).
For the following reasons, the motion to remand is DENIED.
rent space and sell soap at a flea market operated by
Fairmont City. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Suarez,
Vega, the Barajas and Rosas are their competitors at the flea
market. Plaintiffs, who are Caucasian, allege that
Defendants, who are “non-white Hispanics, ” have
committed acts of battery and assault upon Plaintiffs, but
Fairmont City has failed to do anything. In Count I of the
Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against the Fairmont City
Police Department pursuant to the Illinois Civil Rights Act
of 2003. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff
Cheyenne Buneta was wrongfully arrested by Defendant Teresa
Suarez, a police officer employed by Defendant Fairmont City,
for allegedly utilizing racial slurs. Plaintiffs deny using
racial slurs, but assert that even if Cheyenne Buneta did,
she had a fundamental Constitutional right to do so. In Count
III, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Suarez arrested
Cheyenne Buneta without probable cause. In Count V,
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired together to
tortuously interfere with Plaintiffs' soap business at
the flea market in violation of Illinois law.
district courts have original jurisdiction of “all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In assessing the propriety of removal based on federal
question jurisdiction, the district court applies the
well-pleaded complaint rule which provides that such
jurisdiction exists “only when the federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint.” Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan,
Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1486 (7th Cir. 1996).
do not deny that the Complaint presents federal questions.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Suarez, an
officer of the Fairmont City Police Department, unlawfully
arrested Cheyenne Buneta for disorderly conduct on the
purported basis that she used racial slurs. Plaintiffs assert
the arrest was in violation of their freedom of speech
protected under the First Amendment as incorporated against
the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs
also assert that no probable cause existed for the arrest.
These claims fall under the Court's original
the Court can exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs' state law claims against the remaining
Defendants. A court has supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims “that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
“Claims form part of the same case or controversy when
they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”
McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674,
683 (7th Cir. 2014). This standard is not particularly
demanding, and a “loose factual connection between the
claims is generally sufficient.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
“[d]ifferent causes of action between the same parties
that arise from the…the same events will ordinarily be
part of the same case or controversy. Id.
Plaintiffs' state-law claims arise out of the same set of
facts as plaintiffs' federal claims: Plaintiffs have
allegedly been subjected to harassment and discrimination,
including an unlawful arrest, by the Defendants while trying
to sell soap at a flea market operated by Fairmont City.
Thus, all of Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same
common nucleus of operative facts, which gives the Court
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law
sole argument is that Defendants Francisco and Miroslava
Barajas, Vega and Rosas did not consent to the removal.
Plaintiffs are correct that removal is only proper if all
defendants who have been served at the time the removal
notice is filed consent to the removal. See Shaw v. Dow
Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1993)
(internal citations omitted). At the time Defendants Fairmont
City and Suarez filed their notice of removal, Defendants
Rosas, Fransciso Barajas, and Miroslava Barajas had been
served. The original notice, however, did not have the
requisite consent of all served Defendants. However, a
defendant may freely amend the notice of removal for thirty
days after a defendant receives a copy of the state court
complaint, or is served, whichever comes first. See
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). After Plaintiffs filed their motion
to remand, Defendants Fairmont City and Suarez filed an
amended notice of removal in which they received the consent
of all served Defendants. The amended notice of removal was
filed within thirty days of the original notice of removal.
Moreover, Defendants Rosas, Fransciso Barajas, and Miroslava
Barajas filed separate consents to the removal within the
required time period (see Docs. 11, 15).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' argument is rejected and the
motion to remand is denied.
 Defendant Miroslava Juarezde Barajas
is incorrectly named as Miroslava Juarezde Baragos. The Clerk
is DIRECTED to correct Ms. Barajas ...