United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. DARRAH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
Lauren Cheatham filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
which was removed to federal court. Plaintiff then filed a
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against the City
of Chicago and Police Officer Yesenia Medina, alleging
violations of her civil rights pursuant to § 1983 and
several violations of state law. Yesenia Medina filed a
Motion to Dismiss  the state-law claims against her. City
of Chicago (the “City”) filed a Motion to Dismiss
 the Monell claim and the malicious-prosecution
claim against the City. For the reasons discussed more fully
below, Medina's Motion to Dismiss  is granted in part
and denied in part; and City of Chicago's Motion to
Dismiss  is granted in part and denied in part.
Cheatham is a resident of the City of Chicago. (SAC ¶
1.) The City of Chicago is a municipal entity created and
authorized under the laws of the State of Illinois.
(Id. ¶ 2.) Medina was, at all relevant times,
an officer with the Chicago Police Department. (Id.
February 22, 2015, Cheatham and her cousin, Dan Bailey, were
stopped at a Burger King in the City of Chicago.
(Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff and her cousin are African
Americans. (Id.) Several plain-clothes officers,
including Medina, approached the vehicle and told Cheatham
and Bailey to get out of the car. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Cheatham and Bailey were placed in separate police vehicles.
(Id.) Medina asked Cheatham about drugs and whether
Bailey was selling drugs. (Id. ¶ 9.) Cheatham
informed Medina that Bailey was not selling drugs.
(Id. ¶ 10.) Medina told Cheatham that she had
been driving on a suspended license but that she would let
Cheatham go if Cheatham would tell her about the drugs.
(Id. ¶ 11.) Cheatham again told Medina that
Bailey was not selling drugs. (Id. ¶ 12.) The
officers did not arrest Bailey, and no drugs were ever found.
(Id. ¶ 13.)
was arrested and brought to the station. (Id. ¶
14.) Medina questioned Cheatham about drugs, cursed at
Cheatham, and told Cheatham that she was lying. (Id.
¶ 16.) Cheatham's hands were handcuffed to the
table. (Id.) After a male officer left the room and
shut the door, Medina slapped Cheatham on the face, causing a
tooth to come out. (Id. ¶ 17.) Cheatham
reported Medina to the Independent Police Review Authority.
(Id. ¶ 19.) Charges were filed against
Cheatham, including aggravated assault and resisting and/or
obstruction of the performance of a police officer.
(Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was found not guilty on
all charges. (Id. ¶ 22.)
12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must
allege enough facts to support a claim that is
“plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). Facial plausibility
exists when the court can “draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). All well-pleaded allegations are presumed to be true,
and all inferences are read in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park,
734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013). This presumption is not
extended to “legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Alam v. Miller Brewing
Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)).
A plaintiff is not required to “plead the elements of a
cause of action along with facts supporting each
element.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of
Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 517
(7th Cir. 2015). Rather, the complaint must provide a
defendant “with ‘fair notice' of the claim
and its basis.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526
F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)
and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
moves to dismiss three state-law claims brought against her
in the SAC. Count I alleges assault and battery; Count VI
alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”); and Count VII alleges negligent
infliction of emotional distress
argues that the NIED claim is barred under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act, which immunizes officers from negligence
liability. A police officer “is not liable for his act
or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless
such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton
conduct.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2-202. It is not
disputed that Medina was executing or enforcing the law.
Plaintiff alleges that Medina, “in assaulting and
battering Plaintiff, was careless and negligent as to the
emotional health of Plaintiff and caused severe emotional
distress to Plaintiff.” (SAC, ¶ 111.) The NIED
claim is barred by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, as it is
based on negligence. See Miller v. Womak, 2010 WL
2522994, at *1 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (“a negligence claim is
barred by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act”).
Medina's Motion to Dismiss is granted with prejudice as
to Count VII.
argues that the claims in Counts I and VI are time-barred
under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. Under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act, tort claims against a government entity or its
employees have a one-year statute of limitations. 745 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 10/8-101 (“No civil action may be commenced
in any court against a local entity or any of its employees
for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from
the date that the injury was received of the cause of action
accrued.”) The statute of limitations began to run when
Plaintiff received her injuries, February 22, 2015. Plaintiff
filed her original Complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook
County on February 18, 2016. The FAC was filed on February
22, 2016; and summons and the FAC were served upon the City
of Chicago and Defendant Unknown Police Officer on February
29, 2016. The case was removed to federal court on March 10,
2016. Medina was first named as a Defendant in
Plaintiff's SAC, which was filed on April 29, 2016.
argues that her claims against Medina are not time-barred
because the SAC, in which Plaintiff first identified Medina,
relates back to the filing of the original Complaint in state
court on February 18, 2016. Where an amendment changes the
party or the name of a party against whom a claim is made,
that amendment relates back to the original complaint
“if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for
serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in
by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it
will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii)
knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper
party's identity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C).
Previously, the Seventh Circuit consistently held that
“‘relation back' on grounds of ‘mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party' does not
apply where the plaintiff simply lacks knowledge of the
proper defendant.” Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
469 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing King v. One
Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir.
2000); Eison v. McCoy, 146 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.
1998); Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701,
704 (7th Cir. 1998); Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d
1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993)). This is known as the John Doe
rule. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538
(2010), the Seventh Circuit, in Joseph v. Elan
Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555 (7th Cir.
[t]he only two inquiries that the district court is now
permitted to make in deciding whether an amended complaint
relates back to the date of the original one are, first,
whether the defendant who is sought to be added by the
amendment knew or should have known that the plaintiff, had
it not been for a mistake, would have sued him instead or in
addition to suing the named defendant; and second, whether,
even if so, the delay in the plaintiff's discovering his
mistake impaired the new defendant's ability to defend
Joseph, 638 F.3d at 559-60.
in this district disagree on whether lack of knowledge of a
defendant's identity counts as a mistake
post-Krupski. Compare Vandenburgh v. Bannockburn
Police OfficerRobert Ogden, No. 15 C 6191,
2016 WL 403663, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2016) (holding that,
even after Krupski, plaintiff's lack of
knowledge of the proper defendant does not allow for relation
back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)'s mistake requirement)
with White v. City of Chicago, No. 14 CV 3720, 2016