United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
RONALD A. GUZMÁN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
motion to dismiss  is granted in part. Count IX
(malicious prosecution) stands. Count VIII (IIED) is
dismissed as time barred. Furthermore, because one of
Plaintiffs' amended complaints is duplicative , it is
Denese Friends-Smiley (“Mrs. Smiley”) claims that
on June 9, 2014, she was sitting at home with her two
children, niece, and nephew, when defendant Chicago Police
officers Zeyad Matlock, Gino Antoniazzi, Gabriel Campos,
Donnel Crenshaw, and Jeffery Mayer (collectively
“Defendants”) unjustifiably invaded her house, in
search of a suspected drug dealer. (Compl. at 2-3.)
Defendants knocked on the door and asked Mrs. Smiley's
younger daughter, Jada, whether they could search the home,
but she denied their request. (Id. ¶¶
10-12.) Soon after, Defendants broke into the Smileys'
basement - without identifying themselves - and proceeded to
“manhandle” Mrs. Smiley when she attempted to
stop them, despite the braces she was wearing on her arms and
legs (due to a recent car accident). (Id.
hearing the commotion, Jada ran downstairs to assist her
mother, but she was beaten by Defendants and tazed by Officer
Matlock. (Id. ¶¶ 35-45.) (Defendants also
threatened to taze the minor children present, id.
¶ 54.) Mrs. Smiley and Jada were then handcuffed to a
single chair in a painful position while Defendants proceeded
to berate them with offensive language, threatened to shoot
their dog, and pointed a gun at Mrs. Smiley's niece,
Micheaux. (Id. ¶¶ 45-57.)
everyone was secured, Defendants conducted an unauthorized
search of the residence. (Id. ¶ 58.) The search
was ultimately unfruitful, though, and the suspect was caught
elsewhere. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) Accordingly,
Defendants promptly left the Smiley house upon being informed
of the suspect's arrest, leaving Mrs. Smiley and Jada
still handcuffed to the chair. (Id. ¶ 60.) But
this was not the end of the ordeal for the two: after the
police took them to the hospital for their injuries, Mrs.
Smiley and Jada were brought the police station and charged
with resisting arrest, obstructing a peace officer, and
battery. (Id. ¶¶ 61-64.) Those charges
were eventually dismissed, however, thus prompting the
instant lawsuit. (Id.)
operative complaint alleges myriad misconduct on behalf of
Defendants, such as Fourth Amendment violations, excessive
force, and false arrest. But only two of the claims are
pertinent to the instant motion: Plaintiffs' state law
claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (“IIED”). Defendants
contend both are time barred by Illinois' statute of
limitations, which generally requires tort claims against
police officers to be brought within one year of their
accrual. See Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/8-101(a).
The Court will address each count in turn.
first contend that Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution
claim is untimely because the prosecutor struck the charges
against them with leave to reinstate on May 20, 2015, whereas
this case was filed on May 26, 2016 - five days after the
1-year limitations period. Defendants are right about the
facts, but miss the mark with respect to the accrual date.
of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the
criminal proceeding on which it is based has been terminated
in the accused's favor. Ferguson v City of Chi.,
820 N.E.2d 455, 650 (Ill. 2004). However, merely striking a
charge with leave to reinstate does not itself constitute a
favorable termination. Id. Rather, a malicious
prosecution predicated on “nonsuited charges”
accrues when the state is precluded from seeking
reinstatement, which is marked by either the statute of
limitations for that charge or the expiration of the
statutory speedy-trial period (after a demand for trial has
been made). Id.; see also 725 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/103-5(b) (instituting a 160-day period). In that respect,
the complaint does not specifically allege if or when a
demand for trial was made, but in any case, the Court need
not reach that issue because Defendants have since
“conced[ed] at this time” that Plaintiffs'
malicious prosecution claim is timely. (Defs.' Reply
[Dkt. # 26] at 3.)
similarly urge that Plaintiffs' IIED claim is untimely.
On this score, they are on solid ground. The Seventh Circuit
has broadly held “that a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the course of arrest and
prosecution accrues on the date of arrest.”
Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs were arrested on
June 9, 2014, which means their IIED should have been filed
no later than June 9, 2015 to be timely.
Plaintiffs contend that Bridewell is distinguishable
because (1) their present claim for IIED
“incorporates” the same facts as their malicious
prosecution claim (Defendants' filing of baseless
charges, among other things), and (2) Defendants' actions
were a “continuous course of conduct.” (Pls.'
Br. [Dkt. # 24] at 5.) But Bridewell's holding
was general - not fact intensive - and courts in this
district have consistently applied Bridewell
broadly, holding that IIED claims of this sort accrue on the
day of arrest, even where the distress alleged is
“intertwined” with a claim for malicious
prosecution. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Chi.,
No. 14 C 9372, 2015 WL 5675529, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
2015); Chatman v. City of Chi., 2015 WL 1090965, *9
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2015); Hill v. City of Chi.,
2014 WL 1978407, *3 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2014); Bamberg v.
City of Evanston, 2014 WL 1612710, *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
16, 2014). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs attempt to
characterize Defendants' actions a “continuing
tort” for limitations purposes, that route is similarly
foreclosed for ...