United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
Anthony D. McNeal (K69007), Plaintiff,
Sgt. L. Palmer, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ST. EVE United States District Court Judge
Anthony D. McNeal, currently an Illinois prisoner confined at
Pontiac Correctional Center, brought this pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. Plaintiff alleges that, while
incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center, Defendants
Sergeant Lanel Palmer and Lieutenant Calvin Bell failed to
protect him from an assault by three other inmates that
occurred on March 27, 2013.
before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary
judgment . For the reasons stated herein, Defendants'
motion for summary judgment  is granted.
Local Rule 56.1
district court may insist on strict compliance with its local
rules regarding summary judgment. Koszola v. Bd. of Educ.
of City of Chi. , 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004). A
court may decide a motion based on the factual record
outlined in the parties' Local Rule 56.1 Statements of
Material Facts. Id. (internal citation omitted).
Although Plaintiff is pro se, he nonetheless must
comply with Local Rule 56.1. Coleman v. Goodwill Indus.
of Se. Wis., Inc., 423 Fed. App'x 642, 643 (7th Cir.
2011); see Cady v. Sheahan , 467 F.3d 1057, 1061
(7th Cir. 2006)(“even pro se litigants must
follow rules of civil procedure”).
filed a Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Material Facts
along with appropriate supporting documentation. Consistent
with the Local Rules, Defendants served Plaintiff with a
Local Rule 56.2 Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for
Summary Judgment.  That notice explained, among other
things, Plaintiff's need to respond to Defendants'
Statement of Material Facts with documentation supporting any
disagreement with the facts as presented by Defendants.
Notwithstanding this, Plaintiff has not submitted a response
to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material
Facts, nor has he submitted his own statement of additional
material facts. Accordingly, the facts set forth in
Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement are deemed
admitted to the extent they are supported by evidence in the
record. See Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d
877, 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, however, the Court has considered
the factual assertions he makes in his response to
Defendants' summary judgment motion , but only to the
extent he has pointed to evidence in the record or could
properly testify himself about the matters asserted.
Antonelli v. Sherrow , 02 C 8714, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20912, at *5-*6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2005); see
Boykin v. Dart , No. 12 C 4447, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
156010 (N.D. Ill. November 4, 2014) (“Although the
Court is entitled to demand strict compliance with Local Rule
56.1, it ordinarily affords pro se plaintiffs
significant leeway in responding to summary judgment
is an inmate currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional
Center. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Defendants Lanel Palmer and Calvin Bell
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect
him from other inmates with respect to an ncident that
occurred on March 27, 2013. [62 at ¶ 1]
current out-date from prison is 2093. Plaintiff was convicted
of aggravated robbery, attempted robbery, burglary,
residential burglary, robbery, residential burglary,
aggravated criminal sexual abuse with a weapon, armed
robbery, home invasion with armed force and two additional
convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault with a
weapon. [Id. at ¶ 2]
alleges that he used to be a Gangster Disciple, but renounced
his affiliation while incarcerated at Cook County Jail in
2004. Plaintiff did not inform anyone at the Illinois
Department of Corrections that he renounced his affiliation
and does not know whether any Cook County Officials informed
anyone at IDOC. [Id. at ¶ 3]
wrote a letter to Internal Affairs and Officer Clements
called him to Internal Affairs a few days later, on March 25,
2013. Plaintiff notified Internal Affairs of a “few
hits” by the Gangster Disciples on their own members.
[Id. at ¶ 4] When Plaintiff returned from
Internal Affairs, another inmate, Pee-Wee, asked him where he
just came from and Plaintiff told Pee-Wee that he had come
from the health care unit. Although Plaintiff alleges that
Sergeant Palmer told this other inmate that Plaintiff was
returning from Internal Affairs, Plaintiff testified that he
did not hear Sergeant Palmer say that Pee-Wee or anyone else.
Plaintiff also alleges that Pee-Wee told him that he had
checked the movement sheet and saw that Plaintiff was
returning from Internal Affairs. [Id. at ¶ 5]
one hour later, Pee-Wee told Plaintiff that he had to check
into protective custody pursuant to gang protocol. Plaintiff
did not try to check into protective custody at that time.
Plaintiff testified that, the following day, Correctional
Officer Griffin told him that protective custody did not have
any room for him. Plaintiff stayed in his cell the entire day
on March 26, 2013, and officers on the other two night shifts
also told him that there was no room in protective custody.
[Id. at ¶ 6] Plaintiff testified that on March
27, 2013, he told Correctional Officer Hopson that he needed
to check into protective custody and was told that protective
custody was full and that he had to fill out a form. At lunch
time that day, Plaintiff took all of his belongings out of
his cell and requested that he be either sent to protective
custody or segregation. [Id. at ¶ 7] Plaintiff
did not tell any of the security staff any specific names as
to who had threatened him. Instead, Plaintiff told them that
the “GDs organization” was threatening him.
[Id. at ¶ 8]
March 27, 2013, while Plaintiff was in the chow hall, three
individuals got up and walked toward him. According to
Plaintiff, he did not do anything because he did not know
what they were doing. Plaintiff thought they were walking to
the garbage can. [Id. at ¶ 9] According to
Plaintiff, one of these individuals hit him in the head with
a tray and the other two began punching and kicking him.
Plaintiff identified one of the individuals after the assault
because he continued hitting Plaintiff until security
arrived, but did not learn the identity of the other two
individuals. [Id. at ¶ 10]