United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey, United States District Judge.
and 2005, Defendant Village of Bridgeview
(“Defendant”) or (“the Village”)
passed Ordinance Nos. 04-54 and 05-11, respectively.
Together, the ordinances impose alcohol and location
restrictions on new adult establishments, but exempt PoleKatz
Chicago Gentleman's Club (“PoleKatz”), the
only existing adult establishment in the Village. Unable to
open an alcohol-serving adult cabaret, Plaintiff 7421 West
100th Place Corporation (“Plaintiff”) seeks a
declaratory judgment that Ordinance Nos. 04-54 and 05-11 are
unconstitutional under the First Amendment (Count I), as well
as other relief, including an injunction enjoining Defendant
from further enforcement (Count II).
October 21, 2015, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on
Count I. Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. . On February 22, 2016,
Defendant responded in kind by cross-moving for summary
judgment on Counts I and II. Def.'s Cross Mot. Summ. J.
. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion
 is granted in part and denied in part; Defendant's
cross-motion  is denied.
judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spurling v. C
& M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
2014). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). A court “is not required to grant summary
judgment as a matter of law for either side when faced with
cross-motions for summary judgment.” Crespo v. Unum
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 294 F.Supp.2d 980, 991 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (citing Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v.
Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1991)).
Rather, the court must “evaluate each motion on its
merits, resolving factual uncertainties and drawing all
reasonable inferences against the movant.” Id.
The Applicable Ordinances
Ordinance No. 04-54
September 15, 2004, Defendant enacted Ordinance No. 04-54.
DSOF  ¶ 12. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 04-54
amended the Village of Bridgeview's Municipal Code in two
material respects. Id. Ex. H at 6. First, Article
10-52-3 of Section 1 prohibited the “sale, use, or
consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises of an
adult use” (hereinafter the “Ordinance No. 04-54
alcohol restriction”). Id. Second, Article
10-52-4 mandated that no “adult use may be located
within 1, 000 feet of any premises licensed to serve alcohol
beverages” (hereinafter the “Ordinance No. 04-54
location restriction”). Id.
Preamble of Ordinance No. 04-54, the Village proclaimed that
the alcohol and location restrictions were necessary to
ameliorate “the adverse secondary effects of adult
uses.” Id. at 3. These feared secondary
effects included, inter alia, “an increase in
crime, ” the “diminution of property values in
the surrounding area, ” and an “increase in
incidents of public indecency[.]” Id. at 3-4.
The Village grounded its conclusions in, among other
authorities, three published federal cases: Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), Ben's
Bar, Inc. v. Village Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir.
2003), and G.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph
Wisconsin, 350 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2003). Id. at
the new restrictions, Section 2 of Ordinance No. 04-54 carved
out an exemption for “any person or entity”
granted a special use permit on or before September 15, 2014.
Id. at 6. Only one adult establishment, PoleKatz,
qualified for this exclusion. PoleKatz commenced operations in
May 2005 and serves alcohol to patrons. DSOF 
¶¶ 8-9; PSOAF  ¶¶ 5-6, 9-10, 12.
Ordinance No. 05-11
April 20, 2005, the Village enacted a companion adult use
ordinance, Ordinance No. 05-11. DSOF  ¶ 15. Like
Ordinance No. 04-54, Ordinance No. 05-11 aimed at
ameliorating the secondary effects of adult establishments.
Id. Ex. I at 2. Ordinance No. 05-11 amended the
Village's Zoning Ordinance in two material respects.
First, it restricted adult establishments to “I-2A
Intensive Industrial District” zones only (hereinafter
the “Ordinance No. 05-11 zoning restriction”).
Id. at 7. Second, it imposed four additional
location restrictions prohibiting adult establishments (1)
within 1, 000 feet of a religious institution; (2) within 500
feet of another adult use; (3) within 1, 000 feet of a public
park or recreation area, public or private school, nursery or
child daycare center; or (4) within 500 feet of any
residential use or district zoned for a residential use
(hereinafter the “Ordinance No. 05-11 location
restrictions”). Id. at 7-8. Given the
nonconforming use previously established on September 15,
2004, the passage of Ordinance 05-11 did not impact
Plaintiff's Efforts to Open an Adult
7421 West 100th Place
April 18, 2013, Plaintiff entered into an agreement to
acquire real property located at 7421 West 100th Place,
within one block of PoleKatz. PSOF  ¶ 7. Plaintiff
intended to use the 7421 West 100th Place property to open an
adult cabaret. Id. ¶ 8. According to Plaintiff,
its purchase agreement was contingent upon Plaintiff's
ability to obtain a liquor license. Second Am. Compl. 
¶ 11. On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff applied to the
Village for a Class G adult entertainment liquor license for
the premises. PSOF  ¶ 12, Ex. 7. On May 1, 2013,
the Village denied Plaintiff's application. Id.
¶ 13, Ex. 8. In the denial, the attorney for the Village
cited the Ordinance No. 04-54 alcohol restriction.
Id. Ex. 8.
15, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a second application for a
Class G liquor license. DSOF  ¶ 22. On June 5,
2014, the Village denied the second application, again citing
the Ordinance No. 04-54 alcohol restriction. Id.
¶ 23; PSOF  Ex. 3. On June 14, 2013,
Plaintiff's contract to purchase 7421 West 100th Place
was canceled. PSOF  Ex. 10.
9800 Industrial Drive
on September 8, 2014, Plaintiff entered into a new purchase
agreement to acquire real property located at 9800 Industrial
Drive in Bridgeview. PSOF  ¶ 21. 9800 Industrial
Drive is not located in the I-2A Intensive Industrial
District; rather, the property falls in the “I-2
General Industrial District, ” which, under the
Ordinance No. 05-11 zoning restriction, is not zoned for
adult use. DSOF  ¶¶ 26-29. Like 7421 West
100th Place, Plaintiff intended to use the 9800 Industrial
Drive property to open an adult cabaret. PSOF  ¶
22. On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff submitted its third
application for a Class G liquor license. DSOF  ¶
24, Ex. N.; PSOF  ¶ 23. The third time was not a
charm; citing the Ordinance No. 05-11 zoning restriction, the
Village Attorney denied the application. DSOF  ¶
25; PSOF  ¶ 27.