United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
CHRISTOPHER L. PARKER, #S07242, Petitioner,
JEFF KORTE, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
R. HERNDON DISTRICT JUDGE.
Christopher Parker, who is currently incarcerated in Western
Illinois Correctional Center, brings this habeas corpus
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), in order
to challenge his 2009 conviction and sentence for criminal
sexual assault in Jersey County Circuit Court (Doc. 1, pp.
1-20). He was sentenced to five years and three months in the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),
followed by mandatory supervised release (“MSR”)
for a term of three years to life (id.). Parker
claims that he has now served more time than he
“a[g]reed to, ” but he remains incarcerated
because of a statewide “turnaround policy” that
requires parole-eligible inmates with no suitable host site
to serve out their MSR term in prison (id. at 7, 9).
In connection with this claim, Parker now asks this Court to
declare 730 ILCS § 5/5-8-1(d)(4) unconstitutional, terminate
his remaining MSR term, and order his release from custody
(id. at 8).
matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of
the § 2254 Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.
Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the
district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must
dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” After carefully reviewing the § 2254
Petition and exhibits filed by Parker,  the Court
concludes that he is not entitled to relief, and the instant
§ 2254 Petition shall be DISMISSED.
was charged with two counts of criminal sexual assault,
predatory criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual abuse
in Jersey County Circuit Court. He ultimately pleaded guilty
to one count of criminal sexual assault in violation of 720
ILCS § 5/12-13(a)(2) on June 24, 2009 (Doc. 1, pp.
1-19). Parker was sentenced to a term of five years and three
months of incarceration, followed by a mandatory supervised
release term of three years to life (id. at 1-2,
23). He did not file a timely motion to withdraw this guilty
plea or appeal the judgment of conviction (id. at
he filed other post-conviction petitions and motions
(id. at 3). On June 29, 2010, for example, Parker
filed a post-conviction petition, which the trial court
denied on July 13, 2010. See Parker v. Roeckman, No.
13-cv-0206-DRH-CJP (S.D. Ill. 2013) (Doc. 60, pp. 2-3)
(summarizing post-conviction proceedings). Parker appealed
this decision but voluntarily dismissed the appeal on April
1, 2011 (id. at 3).
2010 and 2011, Parker filed a second post-conviction
petition, a motion to reconsider the same, a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and a motion for relief from
judgment, each of which was denied. Parker appealed the
denial of two of these motions but, again, sought voluntary
dismissal of his appeals. In November 2012, he sought leave
to file a habeas petition in the Illinois Supreme Court, but
this request was also denied (id.).
instead filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this District on February 18,
2013. See Parker v. Roeckman, No. 13-cv-0206-DRH-CJP
(S.D. Ill. 2013) (Doc. 1) (“first § 2254
Petition”). He raised a single claim in the first
§ 2254 Petition, i.e., Parker's
statutorily-imposed MSR term was unconstitutional
(“Claim 1”) (Docs. 1, 8, first § 2254
Petition). He was later granted leave to bring a second
claim, i.e., Parker's constitutional rights were
violated when he was questioned at the age of seventeen
outside the presence of a parent, legal guardian, or lawyer
(“Claim 2”) (Docs. 24, 29, first § 2254
Petition). He was also granted leave to raise a third claim,
i.e., Parker's constitutional rights were
violated when he was forced to serve his term of MSR in
prison because a suitable host site was
unavailable (“Claim 3”) (Docs. 33, 40,
first § 2254 Petition).
Court granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss the
first § 2254 Petition on July 14, 2014 (Docs. 36, 60,
first § 2254 Petition). The Court concluded that Claims
1 and 2 were time-barred under § 2244(d)(1)(A) and
dismissed both of these claims with prejudice (Doc. 60, pp.
4-9, first § 2254 Petition). The Court concluded that
Claim 3 was unexhausted and dismissed the third claim without
prejudice (id. at 9-13). The Court declined to issue
a certificate of appealability (id. at 13-14).
days later on July 24, 2014, Parker filed a petition for
relief from judgment with the state trial court (see
Doc. 7-2, p. 8). In it, Parker claimed that he was not
informed at the time of entering a guilty plea “that if
[he] could not find a ‘host site' [he] would not
have an outdate from IDOC'” (id.). Parker
requested permission to withdraw his guilty plea and also
asked that the state trial judge recuse himself from the
post-judgment proceedings. Both requests were denied one week
later (id. at 9). Parker filed a motion to
reconsider on August 27, 2014, arguing that he was “not
getting the bargain on [his] plea” because he remained
incarcerated with no definite release date after serving
seven years (id.). His motion was denied the same
filed an appeal, which is now pending. In it, he raises two
claims. First, Parker asserts that the trial court's
sua sponte dismissal of his petition for relief from
judgment less than thirty days after its filing was
premature, and the trial court committed reversible error
when it denied Parker's motion for substitution of judge
(id. at 10-16). Parker's court-appointed
appellate counsel filed the opening brief in the appeal on
July 22, 2016. Less than one month later, Parker filed his
second § 2254 Petition in this District.
second § 2254 Petition, Parker again challenges the
constitutionality of his MSR term, in light of the
“turnaround policy, ” on due process grounds
under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds under the Sixth Amendment, and
as constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 11, 17). In doing so, Parker
attempts to revive Claim 1 (i.e., that his
statutorily-imposed MSR term was unconstitutional) and Claim
3 (i.e., that his constitutional rights ...