United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division
G. Reinhard Judge.
reasons stated below, the court finds: 1) it is not divested
of subject matter jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine; 2) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights do
not create private rights of action so plaintiffs cannot
state a claim under them; and 3) res judicata bars
plaintiffs' other claims. All of plaintiffs' claims
are dismissed with prejudice. This case is terminated.
Bozena Lihter and Krunoslav Trsinski, bring this action
against defendant, Pierce & Associates, P.C.
(“Pierce”). Jurisdiction is alleged under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
is a law firm. CitiMortgage, Inc.
(“CitiMortgage”) was alleged, in a state court
mortgage foreclosure action against Lihter and Trsinski
(plaintiffs here), to be the plaintiff and the holder of the
note and the mortgagee under the mortgage which were the
subject of the state court action. The complaint in the state
court action concludes with a signature provision which
reads: “CITIMORTGAGE, INC. SUCCESSOR BY MERGER WITH ABN
AMRO MORTGAGE GROUP, By: Pierce & Associates, Its
Attorneys.” Thus, according to the face of the
complaint, Pierce was the attorney representing CitiMortgage
in the state court case.
state court case proceeded to judgment. Judgment was entered
in favor of the state-court plaintiff (recall CitiMortgage
was alleged to be the plaintiff in the state court complaint)
and against Lihter and Trsinski. A judicial sale was held. On
April 8, 2016, the sale was confirmed in the state court
March 28, 2016, eleven days prior to the state court entering
the order confirming the sale, plaintiffs filed the instant
suit here in federal court against Pierce. In the complaint,
plaintiffs refer to Pierce as “Wrongdoer” and
themselves as “Claimants”. The complaint alleges:
“Wrongdoer claims to be Citimortgage's law firm who
filed a foreclosure lawsuit against Claimants on February 13,
2013 in McHenry County Chancery Court. Wrongdoer signed the
lawsuit and not their alleged client, Citimortgage. Wrongdoer
contacted Claimants that they are a debt collector and that
this lawsuit (13-CH-340) was an attempt to collect a debt. In
court hearings Claimants have repeatedly required a contract
they had with this third party debt collector which they
never provided. Claimants also required the original contract
proving Wrongdoer was in fact hired by Citimortgage, also to
no avail. The court was presented with all these issues,
including this Wrongdoer violating FDCPA, but the court was
not interested in hearing the facts. Claimant does not have a
contract with this Wrongdoer and denied consent to one. When
the court granted foreclosure judgment and allowed the sale
of property, Claimant believes in error, this Wrongdoer then
fraudulently and unconscionably sold Claimant's property
by the auctioneer that is not licensed or bonded in Illinois.
It was the Wrongdoer who brought two robosigned affidavits to
the court, as well as a forged note pretending it was a
genuine document with Claimants' wet ink signatures
provided by their client. Claimants required the
Wrongdoer's attorney to be put on the stand under oath
under penalty of perjury because it is known that an attorney
cannot be a witness and attorney under Trinsey v. Pagliaro
D.C. Pa 1964 F.Supp. 647. It was denied by the court,
Claimants believe also in error. This gave Wrongdoers more
freedom to keep charging at Claimants using many tricks which
are nothing but fraud upon Court. Not one time have they
answered Claimants' requests for various documents to
verify the claim. Not one time have they offered a remedy or
relief and court never encourage it either, so Maxim of Law
that no one has to depart Chancery Court without remedy did
not hold true in McHenry County Chancery Court.”
complaint further alleges: “Wrongdoer breached trust
Claimants have in the attorney's position and profession.
They attempted to collect a debt which they do not own, which
Claimants do not owe them as the third party debt collectors.
This is a false claim on their part which Illinois
foreclosure practices do not allow. Wrongdoer came to court
with unclean hands, like their alleged client Citimortgage,
complaint goes on to assert defendant “used mail in
their deceptive debt collection attempts”and violated
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
their prayer for relief, plaintiffs ask for a
“declaratory judgment against Wrongdoer(s) for
violating International Covenants and Declarations against
Claimants.” They ask the court to “[a]ward
compensatory damages against Wrongdoer(s) for all the harm
they and their heirs endured for a minimum three years of
wrongful foreclosure proceedings in which their lives and
their health have been irreparably harmed.” Plaintiffs
also ask for punitive damages.
moves to dismiss  arguing the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and
that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Plaintiffs have not filed a response
to this motion.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts other
than the Supreme Court of the United States from reviewing
judgments entered by state courts in civil litigation.
Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 885 (7th
Cir. 2014). The “doctrine applies when the state
court's judgment is the source of the injury of which
plaintiffs complain in federal court.” Id. It
bars cases “brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Illinois law, the order confirming the sale is the final
judgment in a mortgage foreclosure case. EMC Mortgage
Corp. v. Kemp, 982 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ill. 2012). The
“judgment ordering the foreclosure of the
mortgage” is not a final judgment. Id. The
order confirming the sale was entered by the state court on
April 8, 2016. Since the instant federal case was filed on
March 28, 2016, before the final judgment in the
state court case, Rooker-Feldman does not preclude
plaintiffs' suit here. The Supreme Court expressly limits
the Rooker-Feldman bar to “state-court
judgments rendered, before the district court proceedings
commenced.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284.
“[A]n interlocutory ruling does not evoke the doctrine
or preclude federal jurisdiction.” TruServ Corp. v.
Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir.
2005). The state court judgment ordering the foreclosure of
the mortgage was such an interlocutory ruling. Kemp,
982 N.E.2d at 154. Since plaintiffs filed their federal
action prior to the entry of the final state court judgment,
Rooker-Feldman does not deprive this court of
subject matter jurisdiction over this suit.
federal district court determines Rooker-Feldman
does not deprive it of subject matter jurisdiction,
“[l]ogically, the district court's next inquiry is
whether the doctrine of claim preclusion (res
judicata) applies.” Iqbal v. Patel, 780
F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015). “[T]hat
preclusion differs from the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and comes to the fore once the federal court concludes that
it has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. A
federal court will “apply the same preclusive effect to
a state court judgment as the state court itself would apply.
28 U.S.C. § 1738.” Empress Casino Joliet Corp.
v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.
2014). “Under Illinois law, for the doctrine of res
judicata to apply, the following three requirements must
be satisfied: (1) there was a final judgment on the ...