Submitted August 26, 2016
from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin. No. 15-CV-1384-PP - Pamela Pepper,
Manion, Rovner and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.
Bradley appeals the dismissal of her civil-rights lawsuit
alleging that employees of the Wisconsin Department of
Children and Families and Lutheran Social Services played a
role in the improper revocation of her license to operate a
childcare center. We affirm.
Bradley's third appeal from lawsuits alleging
improprieties with her license revocation. See Bradley v.
Wis. Dep't of Children & Families, 528
F.App'x 680 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of suit
against department, a state agency, which is not subject to
§ 1983 liability); Bradley v. Sabree, 594
F.App'x 881 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of
§ 1983 suit against department officials and
social-service workers for failure to state a claim). In the
complaint here, Bradley again alleged that her license was
improperly revoked because of actions by six people-five of
whom she had sued in her second suit. As she asserted, two
department employees, without permission, photographed the
space in her home where she operated the daycare program and
was in the process of reorganizing; they then falsely accused
her of child abuse and neglect and forced her to surrender
her license. Bradley further alleged that an employee
interviewed her adopted son without her consent and did not
fix an incorrect report accusing her of child abuse. Besides
the five defendants she had sued earlier, Bradley named one
other state employee, Kari Kerber, who she alleged had
investigated her for child neglect-thereby contributing to
the daycare's closure. All of the defendants, Bradley
asserts, violated the "Federal Right to Privacy
Act" (most likely referring to the Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552a), the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a), the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985(3). The state defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint as being barred by claim preclusion and
for failure to state a claim.
district court dismissed the claims against all of the
defendants. The court first concluded that claim
preclusion barred the claims against the five who had been
defendants in the second lawsuit because the claims there
were based on the same events as the current suit. As for the
sixth defendant, Kerber, the court concluded that the
complaint failed to state a claim under any constitutional
provision or federal statute identified by Bradley.
appeal Bradley does not meaningfully challenge the district
court's application of claim preclusion and instead
maintains that her complaint stated a claim. But the court
properly concluded that claim preclusion bars her claims here
because they involved the same parties (five of the
defendants, not including Kerber) as well as the same core of
operative facts, and the litigation in the prior suit had
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Bernstein
v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 226 (7th Cir. 2013); Ross
ex rel. Ross v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist.
Ill. 486 F.3d 279, 283-84 (7th Cir. 2007). Bradley does
not try to clarify her claims against Kerber, the defendant
who was not involved in the prior suit, and we see no basis
to disturb the court's decision that Bradley failed to
state a claim against Kerber or any of the other defendants.
reviewed all of Bradley's remaining contentions, and none
has merit. We warn Bradley that submitting further frivolous
appeals to this court may result in sanctions. See
Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186
(7th Cir. 1995).
 The court dismissed Bradley's
claims against the two unserved non-DCF defendants based on
the belief that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a provision
within the statute governing in forma pauperis proceedings,
required it to screen complaints filed by self-represented
plaintiffs, and dismiss any complaint that failed to state a
claim. Although we have stated that 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) applies to fee paying plaintiffs like Bradley,
see Rome v. Shake,196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir.
1999), other circuits have disagreed, see Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp.,293 F.3d 103, 109 n.10 (3d Cir.
2002); Stafford v. United States,208 F.3d 1177,
1179 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000); Benson v. O'Brian,179 F.3d 1014, 1016-17 (6th Cir. 1999); Bazrowx v.
Scott,136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). We need not
reconcile any possible conflict because it makes no
difference in this case. The district court has authority to
dismiss defective claims, and the procedural protections that
we have outlined-notice and opportunity to respond, see
Dawson v. Newman,419 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. ...