United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division
SYLVIA JONES, INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF EMANUEL HOSKINS, DECEASED, Plaintiff,
DAN WILLIAMS, AMY DAMM, ADEYAMI O. FATOKI, and CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, INC., Defendants.
JONATHAN E. HAWLEY U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is the Defendants', Dan Williams, Amy Damm,
Adeyami O. Fatoki, and Correctional Healthcare Companies,
Inc., Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, and V of the
Plaintiff Sylvia Jones' Fifth Amended Complaint (Doc.
175), and the Plaintiff's response (Doc. 180) along with
the Defendants' reply (Doc. 183). For the reasons set
forth below, the Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
7, 2013, Plaintiff Emmanuel Hoskins filed his pro se
Complaint, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that
arose from his medical treatment in Henry County Jail.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that while awaiting trial on
federal charges in Henry County Jail, he sought medical care
for various complaints, including back pain, chest pain, and
stomach pain. The Defendants' actions related to his
requests for medical care form the basis of his Complaint.
Plaintiff was eventually diagnosed with prostate cancer and
passed away on February 8, 2016.
pro bono counsel was appointed by the Court (Doc.
31), counsel filed a Third Amended Complaint on July 16,
2015, alleging six counts: 1) deliberate indifference to a
serious medical condition; 2) failure to intervene; 3) a
§ 1983 conspiracy claim; 4) an official capacity claim
against Henry County and Correctional Healthcare Companies,
Inc.; 5) a state law indemnification claim; and 6) a state
law medical malpractice claim against Doctors Fatoki and
Williams. Defendants included employees of Henry County Jail
(“jail defendants”), and employees of
Correctional, Healthcare Companies, Inc. (“medical
defendants”). The jail defendants moved for summary
judgment for all related counts (Doc. 120), which the
District Court granted (Doc. 133), leaving the medical
defendants in the case.
21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Fifth Amended
Complaint (Doc. 174), alleging several counts,
including: COUNT III: conspiracy to violate constitutional
rights against all individual defendants; COUNT IV:
Monell Policy of Deprivation against Defendants
Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., Correct Care
Solutions, LLC, and Henry County; COUNT V: state law
indemnification. These counts of the Fifth Amended Complaint
are identical to those same counts alleged in the Third
Amended Complaint considered by the Court on summary
judgment. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts III,
IV, and V of the Fifth Amended Complaint on July 25, 2016
Court may grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the complaint fails to set
forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court reviews all
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir.
2013). When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim, well-pleaded facts are taken as
true, but legal conclusions and conclusory allegations only
reciting the elements of a claim are not entitled to be
presumed true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009); see
also Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp, 176 F.3d 971 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“[a] complaint which consists of conclusory
allegations unsupported by factual assertions fails even the
liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6)”). While there is no
specific degree of specificity, “the plaintiff must
give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to
present a story that holds together.” McCauley v.
City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011),
quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404
(7th Cir. 2010).
Defendants argue that Count III should be dismissed because
the remaining defendants are members of the same corporate
entity, and a corporation cannot conspire with itself under
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Defendants also argue
that under the “law of the case” doctrine, the
Court has already granted summary judgment on Count III.
Plaintiff responds that Defendants' Motion is untimely
because they failed to raise this defense when they answered
Count III of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. (Doc.
180, p.4). Plaintiff also argues that in the Seventh Circuit,
the doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy generally does not
apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases.
initial matter, the Defendants' Motion to dismiss is not
untimely. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine issue did
not arise until the jail defendants were dismissed by the
Court. The first opportunity for the Defendants to move to
dismiss arose after the Plaintiff brought his Fifth Amended
Complaint, alleging conspiracy between the current Defendants
does the “law of the case” doctrine require
dismissal. The doctrine does not apply here because the Court
specifically applied summary judgment to the jail defendants
and not the medical defendants. (Doc. 133, p. 33, 37).
of the case doctrine posits that “when a court decides
upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506 (2011),
quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618
(1983). When the Court made its determination in the Summary
Judgment to dismiss the jail defendants on Count III, the
Court found that the Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence
was insufficient to meet his burden. (Doc. 133, p. 33). In
the Summary ...