United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MICHAEL P. WHITE Plaintiff,
J. FOLEY and T. QUINN, officers of the Chicago Police Department, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Johnson Coleman Judge
Michael P. White filed a complaint alleging Defendants James
Foley and Timothy Quinn wrongfully entered his home and
wrongfully arrested him without probable cause in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants now move for summary
judgment, arguing they had probable cause to arrest White or
at least arguable probable cause sufficient for qualified
immunity. They also assert White's claim for wrongful
entry is barred by collateral estoppel. The Court grants in
part and denies in part the motion for summary judgment.
following facts are undisputed except where a dispute is
noted. On April 3, 2010 Detective Luis Otero of
the Chicago Police Department was assigned to assist in the
investigation of an armed robbery that occurred on April 2,
2010 at La Fiesta Flower Shop. (Dkt. 91 ¶¶ 4, 7.)
Adriana Mateo was the only employee working at the flower
shop at the time of the robbery. (Id. ¶ 12.)
She gave a statement to the police which provided that a
white male wearing a black White Sox jersey, a black baseball
cap, and blue jeans entered the store, displayed a knife, and
told Mateo to open the register. (Id. ¶¶
9, 10.) Mateo complied and the offender took approximately
$160.00 in cash and left the store. (Id. ¶ 10,
12.) Using Mateo's description and video footage from the
security cameras, Otero searched a law enforcement database
for individuals matching the physical description of the
robber and identified White as a suspect. (Id.
¶¶ 15, 16.)
to the defendants, Otero conducted a photo array with Mateo
on April 14, 2010 and she identified White as the robber.
(Id. ¶ 19.) The defendants also assert that
after White was arrested on April 23, Mateo identified White
again in an in-person lineup, again conducted by Otero.
(Id. ¶ 26.) White disputes that the photo array
occurred before his arrest because Mateo in her deposition
testified that she was only asked to identify White after he
was “caught” and that she participated in the
photo array and the in-person lineup during a single visit to
the police station. (Dkt. 98 ¶¶ 36-40.)
April 23, Foley and Quinn were told by a fellow officer that
Mateo had identified White as the robber and were assigned to
go speak to White. (Dkt. 91 ¶ 20.) Prior to going to
speak with White, Foley and Quinn reviewed an incident report
containing Mateo's previous statements to the police
describing the robbery and reviewed White's photograph
and criminal history report. (Id. ¶ 21.) Foley
and Quinn contend that when they arrived at White's
apartment, his wife invited the officers inside and led them
to the bedroom where White was located. (Id. ¶
24.) Foley and Quin observed in plain view clothing matching
those of the robber on the day of the robbery and arrested
White and seized his clothing. (Id.)
disputes that his wife gave the officers consent to enter the
apartment. (Id. ¶ 25.) In White's criminal
case, he filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Foley and
Quinn had unlawfully entered his home and therefore the
seized clothing should be suppressed. (Id. ¶
28.) White's wife testified at the hearing that she did
not give Foley and Quinn consent to enter the apartment.
(Id. ¶ 29.) Foley testified to the contrary.
(Id. ¶ 32.) The judge denied the motion to
suppress and White thereafter pled guilty to armed robbery
and was sentenced to forty-five years in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections. (Id.
judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that there is
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The party seeking summary judgment has the
“initial responsibility” to show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), but the Court must
view all facts and make all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). The Court may enter summary judgment only if the
record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost
Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.
Immunity for False Arrest
Foley and Quinn assert they had probable cause to arrest
White based on the incident report they reviewed that
described the robbery and based on their fellow officer's
statement that Mateo had identified White as the robber.
White argues that Mateo's deposition testimony creates a
factual dispute as to whether her identification of White
occurred before or after White was arrested and therefore the
question of probable cause cannot be resolved on summary
a single identification from a credible eyewitness can supply
probable cause, Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587
(7th Cir. 2015), it was reasonable for Foley and Quinn to
believe probable cause existed upon hearing Mateo had
identified White. If probable cause did not in fact exist
because Otero fabricated the pre-arrest identification, Foley
and Quinn are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity
because their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was
reasonable. See Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine,
Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 2010). Police officers
are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably rely
on information provided by fellow law enforcement officials,
Spegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 726 (7th Cir.
1999), and there is nothing in the record to suggest Foley
and Quinn should have questioned the veracity of the
information they were provided regarding the eyewitness
identification. Collateral Estoppel Foley and Quinn
also argue they are entitled to summary judgment on
White's claim for unlawful entry because he is
collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of
consent, which was already decided at the hearing on his
motion to suppress. However, Illinois appellate courts have
found that a ruling on a motion to suppress does not have a
preclusive effect where the defendant pleads guilty because
the defendant lacks an opportunity to appeal. People v.
Griffin, 117 Ill.App.3d 177, 181(1983); People v.
Stiles, 95 Ill.App.3d 959, 964(1981). Courts in this
district have applied the same rule in Fourth Amendment
§1983 cases. See e.g., Kyle v. Patterson, No.
95 C 137, 1996 WL 420277, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 25,
1996)(Gettleman, J.) Mars v. Mormann, No. 92 C 7941,
1993 WL 211368, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1993) (Williams,
J.) Persuaded by this line of cases, the Court applies the
rule here. White is not collaterally estopped from litigating
whether Foley and Quinn had consent to enter his apartment.
reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in
part Foley and ...