United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
ORDER AND OPINION
E. Shadid Chief United States District Judge
matter is now before the Court on Petitioner Adams'
§ 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.
For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's Motion 
Adams filed this § 2255 action seeking to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2251 (2015). Adams pled guilty
to a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on July 22, 2011.
Because he had at least one prior conviction for armed
robbery and two prior convictions for robbery, he qualified
for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (the “ACCA”). On December 2,
2011, Adams was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment
concurrent to his undischarged state sentences. He now argues
that after Johnson, because his convictions for
robbery are not enumerated in the ACCA, they fall under the
residual clause and are no longer deemed violent felonies
capable of supporting his sentence. The matter is fully
briefed, and this Order follows.
petitioner may avail himself of § 2255 relief only if he
can show that there are “flaws in the conviction or
sentence which are jurisdictional in nature, constitutional
in magnitude or result in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” Boyer v. United States, 55 F.2d 296,
298 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 268
(1995). Section 2255 is limited to correcting errors that
“vitiate the sentencing court's jurisdiction or are
otherwise of constitutional magnitude.” Guinan v.
United States, 6 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1993), citing
Scott v. United States, 997 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1993). A § 2255 motion is not, however, a substitute for
a direct appeal. Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693,
698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 205 (1995);
McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1177 (7th
Cir. 1996). Federal prisoners may not use § 2255 as a
vehicle to circumvent decisions made by the appellate court
in a direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 165 (1982); Doe, 51 F.3d at 698.
claims in his § 2255 Motion that his sentence is invalid
because the Court found that he was eligible for an enhanced
sentence as an armed career criminal based on robbery
convictions that no longer qualify under the ACCA. On June
26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of
the Armed Career Criminal Act violates due process because
the clause is too vague to provide adequate notice.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). In
Price v. United States, the Seventh Circuit held
that Johnson announced a new substantive rule of
constitutional law that the Supreme Court has categorically
made retroactive to final convictions. 795 F.3d 731, 732 (7th
Cir. 2015). That decision also made clear that
Johnson is retroactive not only to cases on direct
appeal, but also to cases on collateral review. Id.
penalty for an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is
normally up to 10 years' imprisonment. The ACCA provides
for this sentence to be increased to a mandatory term of 15
years to life if the defendant has three previous convictions
for a violent felony, serious drug offense, or both. 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); Welch v. United States, __
U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016). The Act defines
“violent felony” as:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year ... that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
§ 924(e)(2)(B); We l s h , 136 S.Ct. at 1261.
Subsection (i) of this definition is known as the
“elements clause.” The end of subsection
(ii)-“or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to
another”-is known as the residual clause. See
Johnson, supra, at __, 135 S.Ct., at 2555-2556. It
is the residual clause that Johnson held to be vague
Motion seeks to invoke Johnson, claiming that his
prior convictions for robbery fell within the residual clause
of the definition of “violent felony” under the
ACCA. The Government argues that the robbery convictions
qualified as violent felonies under the elements clause of
§ 924(e), as robbery “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another.” While Johnson
invalidated the residual clause of the ...