United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Jose Lopez, by his wife and next best friend, Sandra Cardiel, Plaintiff
Stevan Vidljinovic, Star No. 4051, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey United States District Court Judge
Jose Lopez, by his wife and next best friend Sandra Cardiel,
sued Chicago Police Officers Stevan Vidljinovic, John
Guettler, Jose Valdovinos, Antonio Valenzuela, Manuel
Gonzalez, Armando Alamillo, Joseph DeMonica and Daniel Lopez,
Supervising Sergeant Mark Kearns, Watch Commander Robert
Dubiel, Paramedics Sandra Cheatam and Julio Mendoza, and the
City of Chicago. Plaintiff alleges five causes of action: (1)
unlawful seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)
excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3)
failure to intervene in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(4) assault and battery; and (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Fourth Am. Compl.  ¶¶
91-128. Defendant Watch Commander Robert Dubiel
(“Dubiel”) moved for summary judgment on all
counts. Dubiel Mot. For Summ. Judg. . That motion is
granted in full.
22, 2011, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Plaintiff Jose Lopez
began having chest pains. CSOF  ¶ 4. Lopez’s
friend, Guadalupe Guzman, called 911 shortly thereafter. PSOF
 ¶ 1. Firefighters and paramedics arrived on the
scene at approximately 3:30 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 1,
3. Paramedics Sandra Cheatam and Julio Mendoza attempted to
administer medical treatment to Lopez. DSOF  ¶ 8.
Personnel at the scene determined that the situation was a
medical emergency and called the Chicago Police Department
(“CPD”) for assistance. Id. Defendant
CPD Officers Stevan Vidljinovic, John Guettler, Antonio
Valenzuela, Manuel Gonzalez, Jose Valdovinos, Armando
Alamillo, Joseph De Monica, Daniel Lopez, and Mark Kearns
(“Defendant CPD Officers”) all responded to the
call for CPD assistance. Id. ¶¶ 10-13.
parties dispute what happened after the Defendant CPD
Officers arrived. Lopez asserts that the Defendant CPD
Officers ignored his refusals of medical treatment. CSOF
 ¶ 5. CPD Officer Vidljinovic asserts that Lopez
moved towards him with his fists clenched, in an aggressive
manner. DSOF  ¶ 31. The parties do not dispute that
Officer Vidljinovic eventually tased Lopez. Id.
¶ 13. After he was tased, Lopez was transported to Mt.
Sinai Hospital. Id. ¶ 14.
time of the tasing, Robert Dubiel was the Watch Commander
working inside the 10th District CPD station. Id.
¶ 15. Dubiel was not at the scene of the tasing and did
not personally witness the incident. Id.
¶¶ 16-17. At approximately 3:45 a.m., Dubiel heard
a call over the radio about a taser deployment. By the time
Dubiel heard the call regarding the incident with Lopez, the
taser had already been deployed. Id. Ex. L at 70.
Pursuant to CPD policy, as a Watch Commander, Dubiel was
required to interview the officer involved, download the
taser information from the device, ensure the officer
involved completed a tactical response report, interview the
person tased if available, ensure compliance with the
CPD’s use of force policy and approve of the tactical
response report. Id. ¶ 23. Consistent with that
policy, after the incident, Dubiel interviewed Officer
Vidljinovic (the tasing officer) and Sergeant Kearns (the
on-site supervising officer). Id. ¶ 26-27.
Dubiel recalls that Officer Vidljinovic told him that Lopez
was not responding to verbal commands, was not making sense
and eventually clenched his fists and moved at the officers
in an aggressive manner. Id. ¶ 29-31. Officer
Vidljinovic also told Dubiel that he had mistakenly filed a
battery report but was not touched in any way by Lopez. PSOF
 ¶ 26. Dubiel did not seek to interview Lopez,
given that he was hospitalized after he was tased. DSOF 
on the information he received from the officers who were
present, Dubiel believed that Lopez was under the influence
of drugs or alcohol and therefore unable to accept or refuse
medical treatment. Id. ¶ 38. As part of his
duties, Dubiel also downloaded the information from the
taser; at that time, Dubiel was not aware of any other
alleged excessive force incidents involving Officer
Vidljinovic and had no reason to suspect any red flags about
the incident. Id. ¶¶ 41-43. Dubiel
then approved the tactical response report completed by
Vidljinovic and concluded that Vidljinovic’s actions
complied with the CPD’s use of force policy.
Id. ¶ 45. Dubiel was not required to (and in
fact did not) check to see if the incident had been recorded
on any available dashcams. Id. ¶ 23.
judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spurling v. C
& M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th
Cir.2014). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, this Court must construe all facts and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland
School District, 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014).
has brought claims for: (1) unlawful seizure in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) excessive force in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (3) failure to intervene in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) assault and battery; and (5)
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fourth Am.
Compl.  ¶¶ 91-128. Lopez argues that Dubiel is
liable for all five counts pursuant to a theory of
supervisory liability, given that: (1) he was the active
Watch Commander at the time of the incident; (2) he approved
Officer Vidljinovic’s use of force report; and (3) he
failed to adequately investigate the incident. The Court
addresses each argument in turn.
liable under § 1983 for the conduct of subordinates, a
supervisor must be personally involved in that conduct.
Lanigan v. Vill. of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d
467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997). Supervisory liability will be found
if the supervisor has knowledge of the conduct and approves
of it and the basis for it. Chaves v. Illinois State
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). However,
proof of negligence or even gross negligence is insufficient
to impose liability. Mayes v. City of Hammond, Ind.,
442 F.Supp.2d 587, 634 (N.D. Ind. 2006). Liability may also
attach where a supervisor knows of unconstitutional acts, but
fails to take corrective measures. Id. at 635.
However, isolated instances of unconstitutional conduct
ordinarily are insufficient to establish the
supervisor’s knowledge. Id. Ultimately, the
supervisor must “know about the conduct and facilitate
it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they
might see. They must either act knowingly or with deliberate,
reckless indifference.” Jones v. City of
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1998).
Liability as ...