United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Johnson Coleman United States District Judge
Amir Jakupovic, filed a four-count Complaint against Mark C.
Curran, Jr., Terrence Barrett, Christine Hecker, and Joseph
Fusz, individually, for their alleged roles in his pretrial
detention in Lake County Jail. Defendants move to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim . For the reasons stated
below, this Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Amir Jakupovic, is a Cook County, Illinois, resident who
claims he was wrongfully detained in Lake County Jail from
November 17, 2015, until November 23, 2015. (Dkt. 1, Compl.
at ¶ 5). Defendant, Mark C. Curran, was the Lake County
Sheriff and director of the Lake County Jail. (Id.
at ¶ 6). Defendant, Terrence Barrett, was the Lake
County Pretrial Unit Manager at the Lake County Jail
responsible for pretrial detainees and electronic monitoring.
(Id. at ¶ 7). Defendant, Christine Hecker, was
the Lake County Principal Probation Officer. (Id. at
¶ 8). Defendant, Joseph Fusz, was a Lake County
Assistant State’s Attorney. (Id. at ¶ 9).
The Complaint alleges that each defendant had the power and
authority to transfer Jakupovic to Cook County for electronic
September 2015, Jakupovic’s girlfriend filed a domestic
battery report in the Circuit Court of Cook County and her
mother filed a telephone harassment report in the Nineteenth
Circuit Court of Lake County. (Id. at ¶ 10). On
September 25, 2015, Jakupovic was charged with telephone
harassment in the Nineteenth Circuit Court of Lake County.
(Id. at ¶ 11). Jakupovic’s brother posted
bond on his behalf and Jakupovic was released. (Id.
at ¶ 12). On October 15, 2015, the domestic battery
charge was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Cook County with
a voluntary one-year Plenary Order of Protection.
(Id. at ¶ 13).
October 22, 2015, Jakupovic appeared for arraignment before
the Honorable Raymond Collins of the Nineteenth Circuit Court
of Lake County and entered a plea of not guilty on the
telephone harassment charge. (Id. at ¶ 14).
Judge Collins ordered Jakupovic to undergo an Ontario
Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (“ODARA”)
pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-5(f) (amended). (Id.). On
November 17, 2015, Jakupovic appeared before the Nineteenth
Circuit Court of Lake County for pre-trial. (Id. at
¶ 15). Assistant Lake County State’s Attorney,
Joseph Fusz, requested the Court place Jakupovic on
electronic surveillance. (Id.). Jakupovic’s
counsel objected based on the plenary order and the fact that
Jakupovic had not been in contact with the victim or her
Hecker prepared the ODARA report, which indicated that
Jakupovic was a Cook County resident and that, pursuant to
“Diane’s Law, ” Jakupovic may be subject to
GPS monitoring. (Id. at ¶ 17). At the next
hearing on November 17, 2015, Hecker was not present, but
both the Court and the ASA Fusz had an advance copy of the
ODARA report. (Id. at ¶ 16). Judge Collins
ordered Jakupovic to be taken into custody and placed on
electronic surveillance, allegedly without argument from his
counsel who was present. (Id. at ¶ 18).
According to the Complaint, the Lake County Sheriff’s
Department requires any pretrial detainee provide them with a
Lake County address to begin electronic surveillance.
(Id. at ¶ 19). If a pretrial detainee, like
Jakupovic, does not have a Lake County address, he cannot be
November 18, 2015, Jakupovic’s counsel filed an
emergency motion because the electronic monitoring condition
of Jakupovic’s bond could not be satisfied and he would
then be held in Lake County Jail indefinitely. (Id.
at ¶ 22). Judge Collins denied the emergency motion and
refused to reconsider his order. (Id.). The
Complaint alleges that Judge Collins found
“Defendant’s inability to meet the conditions of
his bond, one of which is his lack of a Lake County address
for the purposes of electronic monitoring, is not sufficient
grounds for reconsideration.” (Id.). According
to the Complaint, all of the defendants were aware that under
730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(f) convicted defendants electronically
monitored as a condition of probation or parole may be
transferred to the county of their residence for purposes of
electronic monitoring. (Id. at ¶ 23). Jakupovic
alleges that Lake County was capable of transferring him to
Cook County for electronic monitoring and refused.
(Id. at ¶ 24). After six days in Lake County
Jail, Jakupovic pled guilty to telephone harassment.
(Id. at ¶ 26). He filed the Complaint now
before the Court, asserting that the Lake County Sheriff, the
Pretrial Unit Manager, the Principal Probation Officer, and
ASA Fusz violated his constitutional rights by keeping him in
Lake County jail instead of transferring him to Cook County
for electronic monitoring.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510,
1520 (7th Cir. 1990). When considering the motion, the Court
accepts as true all well pleaded facts in the
plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.
AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th
Cir. 2011). To survive dismissal, the complaint must not only
provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim’s
basis, but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d
868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging facts
that defeat the claim. Atkins v. City of Chicago,
631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011).
move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failing to
state a claim. Defendants argue that Count I must be
dismissed because the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
pretrial detainees, and Jakupovic has not stated a claim for
deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause. Defendants assert that Counts II and III
should be dismissed because the allegations are conclusory
and each defendant is entitled to immunity. Count IV for
false imprisonment must fail because Jakupovic was detained
pursuant to court order and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars this Court’s review of Judge
Collins’ order imposing pretrial bond conditions. This
Court will address each Count in turn, though the crux of the
claim is whether the defendants had the authority to transfer
Jakupovic to Cook County for electronic monitoring.
Count I - Eighth Amendment
outset, Jakupovic cannot state a claim for an Eighth
Amendment violation because he was a pretrial detainee.
Although the same standard applies to determine whether a
pretrial detainee has suffered a deprivation of his rights,
the appropriate vehicle for asserting those rights is the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause. See Board v.
Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 ...