Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Hoke v. Abrams

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 8, 2016

RITA HOKE, an individual, Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL J. ABRAMS, and ASHWINI SHARAN, individuals Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs
v.
CAMERON C. HORAN, an individual, Third Party Defendant

          Stephen E. Csajaghy Condit Csajaghy LLC., Christina D. Hatzidakis Hatzidakis Law, Attorneys for Defendants/ Third Party Plaintiffs.

          MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

          THOMAS M. DURKIN JUDGE.

         Defendants Daniel J. Abrams and Ashwini Sharan (“Defendants”), through their undersigned counsel and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), file this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint and in support thereof, state as follows:

         I.INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiff Rita Hoke’s claim against the Defendants is based on her allegation that she did not receive certain wages and other compensation from Integrated Care Pharmacy, LLC (“ICP”). She has sued the individual Defendants, Daniel Abrams and Ashwini Sharan, members of ICP, for alleged violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“Wage Act”). Defendants Abrams and Sharan - also members of the limited liability company - asserted a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty against Plaintiff which has been dismissed by this Court. The basis for the Court’s decision was that Delaware law applied to the relationship between the members of ICP and Delaware law permits members of a limited liability company to modify or completely eliminate fiduciary duties between members in the company’s Operating Agreement.

         Based on the Court’s ruling, Defendants Abrams and Sharan now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims asserted against them because: (a) the very same Operating Agreement that Plaintiff relied upon in her Motion also bars the claims she has asserted against the two individuals defendants; and (b) the relationship between the members of ICP is governed by Delaware law pursuant to the Operating Agreement and Delaware law does not recognize the wage claim Plaintiff has asserted against the two individuals.

         II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

         A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment after the parties have filed the complaint and answer. N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). Courts review Rule 12(c) motions under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Id.; Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7th Cir.1996). Like Rule 12(b) motions, courts grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.” Craigs, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir.1989)). The court views the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

         In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim’s basis and must contain sufficient factual matter, that, when accepted as true, is plausible on its face. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550. U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In this case, Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard and the Court should grant Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismiss the complaint. Delaware law applies to the relationship between the parties, thus barring the claims Plaintiff has asserted against Defendants.

         III.ARGUMENT

         A. The Language of the Operating Agreement Bars Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Abrams and Sharan.

         Plaintiff sued Defendants Abrams and Sharan for alleged violations of the Illinois Wage Act and seeks to impose personal liability against her co-members in the limited liability company for allegedly failing to pay salary and other benefits. Putting aside the factual inaccuracies of that claim (which will be raised, if necessary, in subsequent pleadings), her claim fails as a matter of law.

         The Wage Act provides that officers of a corporation or agents of an employer may be deemed to be the “employers” of the employees of the company if they “knowingly permit” violations of the Act, such as failing to pay wages. See 820 ILCS 115/13. Thus, rather than sue ICP, Plaintiff has instead sued the individual Defendants (her fellow members in the limited liability company) as if they were her “employer” and seeks to impose liability upon them individually. Plaintiff seeks this recovery against the Defendants by attempting to have them deemed “employers” under the Wage Act. See Complaint at § 27.

         The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement, signed by the members of ICP, bars Plaintiff’s claims. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.