United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
June 17, 2015
Joseph A. Rosen, Plaintiff,
Spirit Airlines, Inc., Defendant
Joseph Rosen, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff: Larry Paul Smith, LEAD ATTORNEY,
SmithMarco, P.C., Chicago, IL; Thomas J Lyons, PRO HAC VICE,
Consumer Justice Center, P.A., Vadnais Heights, MN.
Spirit Airlines, Inc., Defendant: Scott A. Meyers, LEAD
ATTORNEY, Eric J Gribbin, Jeffrey Charles Sharer, Julia Renee
Lissner, Kasey Folk Dunlap, Akerman LLP, Chicago, IL; Jason S
Oletsky, PRO HAC VICE, Akerman LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
Valerie B Greenberg, PRO HAC VICE, Akerman LLP, Miami, FL.
OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey, United States District Judge.
a purported nationwide class action brought under the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (" FACTA" ),
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). Section 1681c(g) requires, among
other things, that no credit or debit card receipt contain
" more than the last 5 digits of the card number."
Plaintiff Joseph Rosen, the putative class representative
here, alleges that Defendant Spirit Airlines violated Section
1681c(g) on August 15, 2014, when Mr. Rosen made a credit
card purchase at Chicago O'Hare International Airport and
received a receipt containing more credit card information
than allowed by the statute. Mr. Rosen alleges that his
experience is typical of Spirit Airlines customers
now moves to transfer  this case to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida ("
Southern District of Florida" ), where Defendant has its
headquarters and a similar class action is pending. Plaintiff
initially opposed the motion  but then withdrew its
opposition  after the Southern District of Florida
granted nationwide class certification in the case pending
following reasons, Defendant's motion to transfer  is
is an airline carrier incorporated in Delaware and with its
headquarters in Miramar, Florida, Rosen Complaint
¶ 5, which is within the Southern District of Florida.
In August 2014, Defendant was sued both in the Northern
District of Illinois and the Southern District of Florida for
violating FACTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). There is no
dispute that these two purported class actions are similar,
see, e.g., 4/28/15 Hr'g Tr. [56-1] at 10; 
at 14, and with good reason.
The Northern District of Illinois Action
August 20, 2014, Mr. Rosen, an Illinois resident, brought
this lawsuit as the putative class representative.
Rosen Complaint ¶ ¶ 3-4. Mr. Rosen alleges
that, in his case, on August 15, 2014, he made an in-person
purchase from Defendant at Chicago O'Hare International
Airport. Rosen Complaint ¶ 23. The receipt
contained more information than allowed by FACTA, that is,
" more than the last 4 digits of his credit card, his
full name and the date and time of transaction."
Rosen Complaint ¶ 24.
Rosen brings a single count under FACTA, 15 U.S.C. §
1681c(g). He alleges that his experience is typical of a
nationwide class who also received receipts from Defendant
that contained more credit card information than permitted by
FACTA. Rosen Complaint ¶ 30. Mr. Rosen, for
this and other reasons, seeks to certify the following class:
All persons nationwide to whom, within 2 years from the date
of filing this Complaint (the " Class Period" ),
Defendant provided an electronically printed receipt that
included more than the last four digits of the person's
Rosen Complaint ¶ 27.
The Southern District of Florida Action
days after this lawsuit was filed, on August 29, 2014,
Christopher Legg, a Florida resident, brought a similar class
action lawsuit against Defendant as the putative class
representative. Legg Complaint ¶ 4. Mr. Legg
brought suit in the Southern District of Florida, and his
case is captioned Legg v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,
Case No. 14-61978. Mr. Legg alleges that, in his case, on
August 28, 2014, he paid a $45 baggage fee by credit card at
an automated Spirit Airlines kiosk at the Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. Legg
Complaint ¶ 25. The kiosk printed a credit card receipt
that displayed the last four digits of Mr. Legg's card
and, in violation of FACTA, the first seven digits too.
Legg Complaint ¶ 25.
Rosen did, Mr. Legg also brings a single count under FACTA,
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). Mr. Legg further alleges that his
experience is typical of a nationwide class who also received
receipts from Defendant that contained more credit card
information than permitted by FACTA. Legg Complaint
¶ ¶ 43, 46. Mr. Legg, for this and other reasons,
seeks to certify the following class:
(i) All persons in the United States (ii) who, when making
payment to Spirit Airlines, (iii) made such payment using a
credit or debit card (iv) and were provided with a point of
sale receipt (v) which displayed shall print more than the
last 5 digits of said credit or debit card (vi) within the
five (5) years prior to the filing of the complaint.
Legg Complaint ¶ 40. The Southern District of
Florida granted nationwide class certification on June 10,
2015. Legg, No. 14-61978, DE 64.
on having its headquarters in the Southern District of
Florida and the similar class action pending there, Defendant
moves to transfer this case to the Southern District of
Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a)
provides: " For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, and in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." The decision
to transfer venue under Section 1404(a) requires a weighing
of factors for and against transfer. Coffey v. Van Dorn
Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986); see
also Research Automation, Inc. v.
Schrader-Bridgeport International, Inc., 626 F.3d 973,
977-78 (7th Cir. 2010). This weighing " involves a large
degree of subtlety and latitude, and, therefore, is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial judge."
Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219; see also
Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978. As the moving
party, Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
Southern District of Florida is " clearly more
convenient." Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219-20;
Jaramillo v. DineEquity, Inc., 664 F.Supp.2d 908,
913 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
factors must be met for an action to be transferred to
another venue: (1) venue is proper in this District; (2)
venue and jurisdiction are proper in the transferee district;
(3) the transferee district is more convenient for both the
parties and witnesses; and (4) transfer would serve the
interest of justice. Gueorguiev v. Max Rave, LLC,
526 F.Supp.2d 853, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Neither party
disputes that the first and second factors are met. So this
Court considers only the convenience of the parties and
witnesses (Subsection A) and the interest of justice
Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses
evaluate the convenience of one venue over another, this
Court must consider four factors: (1) Mr. Rosen's choice
of forum; (2) the situs of the material events; (3) the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; and (4) the
convenience of the parties and witnesses. Research
Automation, 626 F.3d at 978; Jaramillo, 664
F.Supp.2d at 913-14. This Court addresses each factor in
turn, and concludes, after considering them all, that these
factors collectively favor transfer. See
Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219-20; Jaramillo, 664
F.Supp.2d at 915.
Mr. Rosen's Choice of Forum
plaintiff, Mr. Rosen's choice of forum usually is given
substantial weight, particularly when, as here, the forum
also is Mr. Rosen's home forum. Jaramillo, 664
F.Supp.2d at 914. That choice, however, is given less
deference when, also as here, another forum has a stronger
relationship to the dispute. Id. In this regard,
this case parallels Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 914,
where the Illinois Court found that the District of Kansas
had a stronger connection to the dispute. The named plaintiff
resided in the Northern District of Illinois, but the lawsuit
centered on the corporate decisions a Kansas company
(Applebee's) made when misrepresenting the nutritional
information of certain items on its menus nationwide.
Id. Likewise, the dispute here focuses on the
corporate decisions made by Defendant in its headquarters in
the Southern District of Florida, that is, printing more
credit card information on receipts than allowed by FACTA.
some Courts in this District--but not all--also would
discount Mr. Rosen's choice of forum because this is a
putative class action. Those Courts find that if
certification of a nationwide class occurs, then Mr.
Rosen's (as the putative class representative) choice of
venue will not be the home venue for all class members and
any venue selected is bound to be inconvenient for some of
them. See, e.g., Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d
at 914. But other Courts in this District disagree. See,
e.g., AL & PO Corp. v. American Healthcare Capital,
Inc., No. 14-1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
19, 2015). For example, the Court in AL & PO stated
its hesitance to discount the putative class
representative's choice of forum because a class had yet
to be certified and thus may not ultimately be certified, and
unnamed class members benefit from the class representative
being able to aggressively litigate without significant
inconvenience due to travel. 2015 WL 738694, at *3. This
Court need not weigh in on this split at this time.
these reasons, and given the agreed nature of the motion to
transfer at this point in the proceedings, Mr. Rosen's
original choice of forum is given less deference in this
case--even setting aside the question of what deference a
putative class representative's choice of forum warrants.
Situs of the Material Events
material events in this case concern Defendant's policy,
procedure and intent to issue credit and debit card receipts
to customers containing more information than allowed by
FACTA. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ ¶ 16, 18,
20-22, 29, 37-40. The relevant decisions likely were made by
Defendant's employees at its headquarters in Miramar,
Florida. See  at 5. As a corollary, the material
events are not where customers made their purchases--a
similar factual pattern that may have repeated itself across
airports nationwide, in light of the multiple pending class
actions. See Complaint ¶ 16, 27-30, 36.
factor weighs in favor of transfer, as other Courts have
found under analogous fact patterns. E.g.,
Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 914;
Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858. Indeed,
Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858, also involved a
motion to transfer a putative class action under FACTA, and
the Court concluded, as here, that the focus under the
statute will be Defendant's corporate conduct and not the
fact that the class representative received an offending
receipt. See also Klingensmith v. Paradise
Shops, Inc., No. 07-322, 2007 WL 2071677, at *2-3 (W.D.
Pa. July 17, 2007) (also considering the situs of material
events in a FACTA case).
Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
location of records typically has no impact on the transfer
analysis unless extraordinarily voluminous or otherwise
difficult to ship. AL & PO, 2015 WL 738694, at *3;
Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858. That is not the
case here. Defendant--who appears to bear the production
burden given the issues involved--has identified three
general categories of responsive documents within its
possession: (1) electronic mail messages; (2) lists of
potential class members; and (3) Defendant's contracts
and communications with IBM. Sturisky Decl. [41-6] ¶ 6.
IBM, a third-party, may also have relevant documents,
Sturisky Decl. [41-6] ¶ 11; and, to that point, Mr.
Rosen already served a subpoena on IBM at its headquarters in
New York, 2/17/15 Subpoena [56-3].
has not shown that there is a material difference in
producing these documents whether the litigation is pending
in the Northern District of Illinois or the Southern District
of Florida. The identified documents either already are in
electronic format or appear easily convertible into an
electronic format for production. In fact, the record before
this Court reveals that substantial document production
already has occurred, diminishing the remaining hardship (if
any) of producing documents in litigation pending in the
Northern District of Illinois. See 5/18/15 Document
Production Cover Letter [55-1] (showing that Defendant has
produced 26,812 pages of documents). As for IBM, if its
documents come from its New York headquarters, then both the
Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of
Florida will be foreign Districts and thus neither may be
more convenient than the other. See
Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858.
these reasons, the ease of access to documents is essentially
a venue neutral factor.
Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses
parties focus on the convenience of the witnesses. This
often, but not always (as shown in this case), is the most
important factor in determining whether to grant a motion to
transfer. Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858. There
are two categories of witnesses to consider: party and
non-party witnesses. The convenience of non-party witnesses
should be given more consideration than party witnesses (and
their employees) under this factor, since party witnesses
normally must appear voluntarily as part of their employment.
Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 915;
Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858; see also
AL & PO, 2015 WL 738694, at *4. The geography of
witnesses generally is more important for trial than during
deposition discovery. Given the 100-mile radius of this
Court's subpoena power, the parties can take depositions
outside the Northern District of Illinois, but face a greater
challenge if they wish to secure live, in-person trial
testimony from Florida witnesses in this District.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(1); see also Jaramillo,
664 F.Supp.2d at 915.
this Court must identify the prospective witnesses. This
Court must go beyond just tallying their numbers in each
District, and instead examine the nature and quality of their
testimony with respect to the issues in the case. AL &
PO, 2015 WL 738694, at *4; Gueorguiev, 526
F.Supp.2d at 858. Duplicative testimony is discounted. AL
& PO, 2015 WL 738694, at *4. All this, in turn, requires
the moving party to provide specific information about the
witness testimony. See, e.g., AL & PO, 2015
WL 738694, at *4; Sunrise Bidders, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group,
Inc., No. 09-2123, 2011 WL 1357516, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
April 11, 2011); Landis v. Warner Chilcott (U.S.),
LLC, No. 10-5283, 2010 WL 5373664, at *4 (N.D. Ill.Dec.
15, 2010); American Casualty Co. of Reading v.
Filco, No. 09-2167, 2009 WL 1766728, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
June 22, 2009); Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 858 &
Defendant has identified 20 current employees and 15 former
employees as having relevant testimony. Sturisky Decl. [41-6]
¶ ¶ 4, 8. All the current employees live in Florida
and work at Defendant's headquarters while, " [t]o
the best of [Defendant's CIO's] knowledge," at
least five of the former employees presently reside in
Florida. Sturisky Decl. [41-6] ¶ ¶ 4-5, 8-9. In
addition to employees, Defendant also identified two IBM
witnesses who were involved in the development and
maintenance of Defendant's airport kiosks. Sturisky Decl.
[41-6] ¶ 10. Defendant's CIO states that to the best
of his knowledge, one of the IBM witnesses resides in Pompano
Beach, Florida, which is in the Southern District of Florida.
Sturisky Decl. [41-6] ¶ 10. Defendant's CIO does not
state where the other IBM witness resides. Sturisky Decl.
[41-6] ¶ 10. Defendant identifies just 5 of these 37
witnesses by name; they were disclosed in Defendant's
initial Rule 26(a) discloses dated November 21, 2014.
Sturisky Decl. [41-6] ¶ ¶ 5, 9; Defendant's
Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures [55-1].
on this limited record, this Court doubts that testimony from
all 35 current and former employees truly would be required
at any trial, or even during deposition discovery. Indeed,
Defendant proffers identical descriptions for the relevant
testimony from the 20 current and 15 former employees:
Current employees: Specifically,
Former employees: Specifically,
Spirit anticipates that these
anticipates that these employees will
employees will testify regarding
testify regarding the software
the software programs utilized
programs utilized at Spirit's
at Spirit's airport kiosks and
airport kiosks and Spirit's
Spirit's actions and, more directly,
actions and, more directly, the
the actions of third-parties that
actions of third-parties that
resulted in both plaintiff Rosen
resulted in both plaintiff Rosen
and plaintiff Legg receiving the
and plaintiff Legg receiving the
receipts on which their duplicative
receipts on which their duplicative
claims are based. Sturisky Decl.
claims are based. Sturisky Decl.
[41-6] ¶ 4.
[41-6] ¶ 8
Defendant explained why any trial testimony from any of the 5
former employees who still live in Florida is required in
light of 20 current employees covering the same topic areas.
The other 10 former employees may no longer reside in the
Southern District of Florida and, thus, the parties may face
the same challenges to procure their appearance in any trial
in that District or this one.
summary, the four factors under the convenience of the
parties and witnesses favor transfer. See
Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219-20; Jaramillo, 664
F.Supp.2d at 915. In particular, transferring the case to the
Southern District of Florida may be the best, if only, way to
secure live trial testimony from the one IBM witness who
still resides in Florida and perhaps some of Defendant's
former employees if their testimony is truly required. The
Southern District of Florida also is the situs of the
material events. Considering all factors, those interests
outweigh Mr. Rosen's original choice of forum in this
case (especially where, as here, he has no objection to the
Interest of Justice
decision to transfer venue under Section 1404(a) relies
heavily on consideration of the interest of justice, which
" may be determinative in a particular case, even if the
convenience of the parties and witnesses might call for a
different result." Coffey, 796 F.2d at 220;
accord Research Automation, 626 F.3d at
978; Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 915. The interest
of justice warrants transfer here.
considering the interest of justice, this Court does not
consider the merits of the underlying claim, but rather the
public's interest in conserving scarce judicial resources
by " efficient administration of the court system."
Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978. In determining
which venue is more likely to result in the swift
administration of justice, Courts in this Circuit analyze
such factors as: (1) trying related litigation together; (2)
having the trial before a judge who is familiar with the
applicable law; and (3) the desire of communities to
adjudicate matters that affect them directly. Research
Automation, 626 F.3d at 978; Jaramillo, 664
F.Supp.2d at 915-17 (listing these and other factors to
consider). This Court considers these factors in turn.
Trying Related Litigation Together
transfer to the Southern District of Florida may not be
warranted by looking to the convenience of the parties and
witnesses alone, transfer is warranted to enable this case to
be coordinated or consolidated with the similar Legg
class action. There is no dispute that the Rosen and
Legg class actions are similar, see 4/28/15
Hr'g Tr. [56-1] at 10;  at 14, and with good reason.
Both cases arise from the same pattern of facts: customers of
Spirit Airlines made credit or debit card purchases at
airports, and the customers received receipts containing more
credit card information than allowed by FACTA. From these
facts, Mr. Rosen and Mr. Legg each bring a single claim under
FACTA and seek to certify nationwide classes that overlap in
scope. Transfer thus is warranted based on the common factual
and legal issues that will arise in these two cases.
this Court's conclusion, the apparent trend among Courts
in this District is to grant transfer motions under the key
geographic factors present here: the defendant is located in
the transferee district, two similar class actions are
pending in different federal districts and one of the class
actions is pending in the transferee district.
exemplary case is Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d 908. In
that case, similar to here, there were two pending class
actions, with one in this District and the other in the
District of Kansas. Id. at 911-13. The principal
defendant (Applebee's) had its headquarters in Kansas;
the other two defendants did not. Id. at 914 & n.3.
At issue in both class actions was whether Applebee's had
misrepresented nutritional information for its WeightWatchers
menu items in its 1,900 restaurants nationwide. Id.
at 911-13, 916. Thus, while the class representatives were
Illinois residents, the operative facts--a misleading
Applebee's menu--remained constant nationwide.
Id. at 912, 916.
Court in Jaramillo found that the convenience of the
parties and witnesses weighed in favor of transfer but not by
enough to tip the scales in favor of granting the motion. 664
F.Supp.2d at 915. What did tip the scales, however, was the
interest of justice (as in this case). Id. at
915-16. The Court found it a waste of scarce judicial
resources to have two similar class actions proceed in
separate courts. Proceeding separately foreclosed the
possibility of coordinating or consolidating the cases so
that, for example, discovery is jointly supervised or common
issues of fact or law are briefed together and considered by
the same court. Id. at 915-17. Whether or not the
cases are consolidated, proceeding separately meant that two
courts would have to learn the same facts and same law.
Id. And proceeding separately precluded the same
appellate court from deciding the same issues once.
Id. at 916. Thus, the Court granted the motion to
transfer. Id. at 918.
similar fact pattern was present in Qurio Holdings, Inc.
v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, No. 14-7488, 2015
WL 535981, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2015). The Court there
also granted the motion to transfer.
comparison, Mr. Rosen has cited two cases from this District
where there were two similar class actions pending in
different federal districts, but, unlike here, the defendant
was not located in the transferee district.  at 4-6
(citing Taylor v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 14-9277,
94 F.Supp.3d 941, 2015 WL 1456442, at *3 (N.D. Ill. March 20,
2015); Gueorguiev, 526 F.Supp.2d at 857-59). The
Courts did not grant the transfer motion in those cases. The
cases show that the benefit of having two similar class
actions proceed in the same district may not be strong enough
to warrant transfer where the defendant is not located in the
transferee district. When the defendant is not located in the
transferee district, the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, and the situs of the material events, may not
as in Jaramillo and Qurio Holdings,
allowing the Rosen and Legg class actions
to proceed in the same District enables the Florida court to
coordinate or consolidate the cases to the extent it deems
appropriate to shepherd them to an efficient resolution. For
o Fact and expert discovery has not closed in either case,
and the Florida court could, to the extent it finds
appropriate, impose a joint schedule or, short of that, craft
a schedule for either case mindful of the other. See
Rosen, No. 14-6446, DE 62 (fact discovery deadline of
September 30, 2015); Legg, No. 14-61978, DE 61 (fact
discovery deadline of July 28, 2015).
o The single Florida court also would be mindful of discovery
issues common to both cases, such as whether the Joint
Prosecution Agreement between counsel for Legg and
Rosen is discoverable. That Agreement is presently
the subject of a motion to compel in this case.
Rosen, No. 14-6446, DE 57.
o It would be possible to hold a joint settlement conference,
which is a significant advantage in this case given its
coordinated prosecution with the Legg class action
and Defendant's stated position that the cases be settled
together or not at all. 4/28/15 Hr'g Tr. [56-1] at 3-5.
o It would be inefficient for two Courts to invest the time
learning the facts common to both Rosen and
Legg and then applying FACTA to those facts.
granting the motion to transfer enables these efficiencies,
denying the motion forecloses them and further creates the
prospect of inconsistent rulings on discovery and dispositive
motions. Some of these very considerations, in fact, also
supply the rationale for class actions, as Mr. Rosen himself
argues in his Complaint and in moving for class
certification. See Complaint ¶ 32;  at
Rosen had previously argued that Defendant delayed in moving
to transfer. That is not a procedural bar to transfer,
see Handler v. Kenneth Allen & Associates,
P.C., No. 10-3728, 2011 WL 1118499, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
March 24, 2011), and, to the extent it matters,
Defendant's delay has been incorporated into this
Court's analysis of the prospective benefits of transfer.
For example, had discovery already closed in both cases (and
it has not), then transfer at that stage would not capture
the benefits of a single Court overseeing discovery in both
cases--even if that benefit had been available had Defendant
moved to transfer earlier.
Rosen also had previously argued that the first-to-file rule
warrants maintaining venue here because this lawsuit was
filed nine days before the Legg class action. 
at 13-14. In this Circuit, the first-filed rule is not a
mechanical rule but rather defers to the convenience and
interest of justice factors under the transfer analysis.
Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 980-82. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit has upheld the use of the transfer analysis
without giving the first-filed case any supplementary weight.
Id. at 982. Here, this Court declines to impose the
first-filed rule under circumstances where its application
impedes the efficient and consistent resolution of the
Rosen and Legg class actions. The nine-day
head start this case enjoyed does not justify delaying
resolution of both cases for a longer period of time.
these reasons, trying related litigation together weighs
heavily in favor of transfer.
Familiarity with Applicable Law
applicable law is federal statutory law under FACTA. Neither
the Northern District of Illinois nor the Southern District
of Florida begin with an advantage when it comes to applying
federal statutory law. Nonetheless, as stated above, it would
be inefficient for two Courts to invest the time learning the
facts common to both Rosen and Legg and
then applying FACTA to those facts. See
Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 917. That effort could
be made just once by one Court. This factor thus weighs in
favor of transfer.
Relation of the Community to the Occurrence
final factor is often given a great deal of weight. See,
e.g., Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 917. However,
because the putative class here is national in scope, there
is no compelling community interest that would be preserved
by the selection of one venue over another.
Jaramillo, 664 F.Supp.2d at 917. As such, this
factor is venue neutral.
summary, transfer to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida is warranted here because the
interest of justice strongly favors venue there and the
convenience of the parties and witnesses does not oppose
transfer. Defendant's motion to transfer  this case
to the Southern District of Florida is granted.
Plaintiff's motion to withdraw response  also is
granted. Civil case terminated.