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Pierce v. Cook County Sheriff's Correctional Officer Jason Earl# 9136

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

June 11, 2015

JOSEPH PIERCE, Plaintiff,
v.
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JASON EARL #9136; COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ANTHONY PARKER #9337; COOK COUNTY SHERIFF; and COOK COUNTY, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge.

A Pavey hearing was held on February 26, 2015, to determine whether or not Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative process, as required by the Prisoner's Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, alleging federal and state claims stemming from an incident that occurred on July 21, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that he was beaten by several Cook County correctional officers. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Plaitniff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to suit. Judge St. Eve denied summary judgment without prejudice on the issue of administrative exhaustion and found that issues of fact remained to be resolved by a Pavey hearing.

The Pavey hearing was held on February 26, 2015. At the Pavey hearing, the Court admitted exhibits and heard testimony from three witnesses. Suzy Harris-Richardson works for the Cook County Sheriff's Office as a Correctional Rehabilitation Worker ("CRW") and was assigned to Division 8 Cermak in July of 2011 through August of 2011 on the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift. (Tr. 16:12-15, 17:6-18.)[1] Dr. John M. Roberts is an ophthalmologist who worked at Stroger Hospital and treated Plaintiff. (Tr. 109:9-16.) Plaintiff himself also testified. The parties submitted written closing arguments.

LEGAL STANDARD

Prisoners must exhaust all available administrative remedies, in accordance with prison procedural rules, before pursuing § 1983 actions in federal court. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006); and Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 88 (2006)). The Seventh Circuit has "a strict compliance approach to exhaustion." Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). However, to be available, a remedy must "be available in fact and not merely in form." Schultz v. Pugh, 728 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 2013). "Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving." King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015).

ANALYSIS

It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to file a grievance, the available administrative remedy. The parties dispute whether the grievance process was made available to Plaintiff between July 21, 2011 and August 5, 2011. Plaintiff argues that the grievance policy was not available to him within the meaning of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act because: (1) he was physically incapable of drafting and filing a grievance within the 15-day window; and (2) Jail correctional officers and staff members prevented him from filing a grievance.

Where exhaustion of administrative remedies is contested:

(1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he's not just being given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner's fault, in which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies.

Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).

An administrative remedy is unavailable when a deadline "could not possibly be complied with" due to physical incapacity. Hurst v. Hantke, 634 F.3d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff testified that he was beaten by Cook County correctional officers in Division 9 on July 21, 2011. (Tr. 137:1-6.) Plaintiff could not see or walk for the first fifteen days after he arrived at Cermak Hospital. (Tr. 137:21-24.) Plaintiff was taken to see the doctors at Cermak around 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning, three to four times a week. (Tr. at 139: 3-7, 140:1-3.) Plaintiff also testified that he could not read a standard sheet of paper with standard print on it from July 21, 2011 to August 5, 2011, and that he was not physically capable of filling out a grievance form. (Tr. 141:13-16, 142:5-7.)

Dr. John Roberts saw Plaintiff in the afternoon of July 21, 2011. (Tr. at 111:3-8.) Plaintiff had suffered two orbital fractures as a result of blunt head trauma. (Tr. at 111:21-24.) His left eye was swollen shut. (Tr. at 112:9-15.) Roberts examined Plaintiff again on August 10, 2011. (Tr. at 115:13-16.) At the second examination Plaintiff's left eye had not shown improvement and the vision in his right eye was 20/100. (Tr. at 117:13-14.) Plaintiff still had some swelling and some fluid in his left eye. (Tr. at 124:1-3.) Because Roberts did not know the quality of Plaintiff's eyesight before the incident on July 21, 2011, he could not conclude whether Plaintiff's vision was worse after the incident than before. (Tr. at 121:10-16.) Roberts testified that it may have been possible for Plaintiff to read a 10- to 12-point font at a near distance. (Tr. at ...


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