United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DAVID R. HERNDON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc.'s motion to dismiss plaintiff's "concert of action" and conspiracy claims (Doc. 20) and defendant Imerys Talc America Inc. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc.'s motion to dismiss plaintiff's concert of action and conspiracy claims (Doc. 28). Specifically, defendants move for dismissal of Counts VI and VII of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) arguing that the complaint does not plead sufficient facts. Naturally, plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing defendants' motions lack merit (Doc. 44). For the reasons stated below, defendants' motions to dismiss are DENIED.
I. Introduction and Background
On May 14, 2012 plaintiff Lynne Cebulske was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Plaintiff alleges the cause of the cancer was the result of her use of Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to Shower (hereinafter "J&J products") to "dust her perineum for feminine hygiene purposes from approximately 1992 to 2014" (Doc. 3-1, ¶ 16). Plaintiff further alleges that her prolonged use of the J&J products caused her ovarian cancer, as she did not possess any of the risk factors commonly associated with the disease. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that women face an increased risk of ovarian cancer due to prolonged use of these talc based products in the genital area. Plaintiff supports these allegations by citing to various national studies dating back to the 1960s, many of which plaintiff claims defendants were aware of (Doc. 3-1, ¶ 18-23).
On May 14, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint before the Circuit Court of St. Clair County alleging eight counts of tort liability recognized under the laws of Illinois (Doc. 3-1). Count I alleges strict liability for failure to warn against Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. (hereinafter collectively "J&J") and Imerys; Counts II and III allege negligence against J&J and Imerys; Count IV alleges breach of express warranty against J&J; Count IV alleges breach of express warranty against J&J; Count V alleges breach of implied warranties against J&J; Count VI alleges civil conspiracy against all defendants; Count VII alleges concert of action against all defendants; and Count VIII seeking a punitive damages award against all defendants.
On June 3, 2014, defendants J&J removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction (Doc. 3). Thereafter, defendants J&J and Imerys filed the pending motions to dismiss plaintiff's concert of action and conspiracy claims for failure to state a claim.
II. Motion to Dismiss
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is warranted if the complaint fails to set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
In making this assessment, the district court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Rujawitz v. Martin, 561 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2009); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007).
Even though Twombly (and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)) retooled federal pleading standards, notice pleading remains all that is required in a complaint. "A plaintiff still must provide only enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and, through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief." Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals offers further guidance on what a complaint must do to withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Court in Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) reiterated the premise: "surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires more than labels and conclusions;" the complaint's allegations must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." A plaintiff's claim "must be plausible on its face, " that is, "the complaint must establish a non-negligible probability that the claim is valid..." Smith v. Medical Benefit Administrators Group, Inc., 639 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir.2011).
Furthermore, a civil conspiracy claim that is "premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct can implicate Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements." Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.2007). Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." Generally, pleading "with particularity" requires that a plaintiff describe the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the alleged fraud. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 441-42 (7th Cir. 2011); See also Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir.2006) ("Rule 9(b) requires that facts such as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff be alleged in detail.") (internal quotations omitted). However, the pleading's structure for fraud claims may be modified, as facts may vary with a particular case. A civil conspiracy claim under Illinois law that is founded upon fraudulent conduct may implicate the arduous pleading requirements applicable to fraud claims ( Id. ).With these standards in mind, the Court turns to plaintiff's complaint.
a. Conspiracy ...