United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
DONITA J. STUBBS, on behalf of herself and a class, Plaintiff,
CAVALRY SPV I, LLC; and CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC; Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge.
Plaintiff Donita J. Stubbs filed a Complaint against Defendants, Cavalry SPV I, LLC ("Cavalry SPV") and Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC ("CPS") (collectively, the "Defendants"), asserting violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Illinois Collection Agency Act ("ICAA"), 225 ILCS 425/9. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
LOCAL RULE 56.1
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the party contends there is no genuine issue for trial." Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C), the nonmovant may submit additional statements of material facts that "require the denial of summary judgment." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) further permits the nonmovant to submit a statement "of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment...." To the extent that a response to a statement of material fact provides only extraneous or argumentative information, this response will not constitute a proper denial of the fact, and the fact is admitted. See Graziano v. Vill. of Oak Park, 401 F.Supp.2d 918, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Similarly, to the extent that a statement of fact contains a legal conclusion or otherwise unsupported statement, including a fact that relies upon inadmissible hearsay, such a fact is disregarded. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997).
The following facts are taken from the parties' statements of undisputed material facts submitted in accordance with Local Rule 56.1.
CPS is a limited liability company chartered under Delaware law. (Dkt. 180-2, ¶ 1.) CPS and Cavalry SPV are affiliates. ( Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff opened a credit card account with Bank of America ("BOA") in June 2006. ( Id. at ¶ 6.) The cardholder agreement states that it is governed by the laws of Delaware. ( Id. at ¶ 15.) At some point, Plaintiff stopped making payments; and the account went into default. ( Id. at ¶ 9.) The account was charged-off by BOA in August 2009. ( Id. at ¶ 10). At that time, the interest rate on the account was 19.99 percent, and the principal balance was $4, 504.65. ( Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.)
BOA sold Plaintiff's account to Cavalry SPV on August 23, 2011. (Dkt. 187, ¶ 23.) Cavalry SPV filed suit against Plaintiff to collect the account on March 16, 2012. (Dkt. 180-2, ¶ 44.) Cavalry SPV included interest for the period between the charge-off date and the date BOA sold the account to Cavalry SPV. (Dkt. 187, ¶ 27). Attached to the state court collection suit was an Affidavit of Claim executed by Stephanie Cappelli. (Dkt. 180-2, ¶ 62.) The affidavit stated a $6, 539.98 balance comprised of $4, 504.65 of principal balance and $2, 035.33 of other costs. (Dkt. 187, ¶ 23.) The affidavit states, "I am informed and believe the above statements are true and correct." (Dkt. 45, Exh. F.) The lawsuit sought the amount of $4, 504.65. (Dkt. 187, ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff went to file an appearance on August 27, 2012, by taking public transportation. (Dkt. 180-2 at ¶¶ 52, 56). Plaintiff obtained a waiver of the appearance fee. ( Id. at ¶¶ 52-53.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Courts deciding summary judgment motions must view facts "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, "[t]he nonmoving party must point to specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). The evidence must be such "that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Count I alleges that Defendants engaged in deceptive collection practices in violation of the FDCPA by providing fraudulent affidavits to consumers. Count II alleges the addition of unauthorized interest to debts as both a deceptive collection practice and an unfair collection practice under the FDCPA. Count III alleges the addition of unauthorized interest as a ...