United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Stephen Douglas McCaskill, a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail, has brought more than a dozen lawsuits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conditions of his confinement at Cook County. In this lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, two dentists employed by Cermak Health Services of Cook County, were deliberately indifferent to his dental needs following the extraction of one of his wisdom teeth. Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), and have served Plaintiff with the notice called for by our Local Rule 56.2, explaining the requirements for responding to the motion and the consequences of failure to do so properly. As explained below, the motion is granted.
This court's Local Rule 56.1 sets forth the procedures for moving for summary judgment and for responding to such a motion. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is properly supported by a statement of facts citing relevant portions of the record. Plaintiff responded to the motion with a memorandum in opposition to the motion  and a response to certain of the movants' statement of material facts . Because Plaintiff failed to make specific references to record materials in support of his opposition to those statements he did respond to, the court accepts the assertions in Defendants' statements as true to the extent that the facts are supported in the record. See L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C); Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012). The court is not required to scour the record looking for factual disputes nor expected to manufacture Plaintiff's arguments for him. See Diadenko v. Folino, 741 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Herman v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1, however, does not result in an automatic grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Instead, the court still must evaluate all facts in the light most favorable to him, the non-moving party. See FED. R. CIV, P. 56(e)(2); Keeton, 667 F.3d at 884.
Plaintiff Stephen Douglas McCaskill was a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail during the relevant time period. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt.  ¶ 1.) Dr. Rabin and Dr. Liu are dentists for Cermak Health Services of Cook County, whose duties include examining, testing, diagnosing, and treating dental issues of detainees, including tooth extractions. ( Id. ¶¶ 2-4.)
Dr. Rabin first examined Plaintiff on January 4, 2013, and observed that Plaintiff was already missing three of his four wisdom teeth and two non-wisdom-tooth molars. ( Id. ¶ 16.) Dr. Rabin also noted that Plaintiff's remaining wisdom tooth (upper right) had irreversible pulpitis and needed to be extracted. ( Id. ¶ 17.) Dr. Rabin prescribed an antibiotic and Motrin and asked scheduling staff to have Plaintiff return to the clinic in one week. ( Id. ¶ 18.) Dr. Rabin treated Plaintiff two more times in January 2013, and continued the prescriptions for the antibiotic and Motrin. ( Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)
On February 5, 2013, after both Plaintiff and Dr. Rabin signed a consent form that describes the risks from the procedure, Dr. Rabin extracted Plaintiff's remaining wisdom tooth. ( Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) Dr. Rabin did not observe anything during the procedure that would suggest that the extraction was out of the ordinary. ( Id. ¶ 23.) Following the extraction, Dr. Rabin again prescribed an antibiotic and Motrin and put in an order for Plaintiff to return to the clinic in one week. ( Id. ¶ 24.) Dr. Rabin, who has completed between 500-600 tooth extractions in his 25 years of dental practice, believes that extraction of the upper right wisdom tooth presents minimal difficulty or complications. ( Id. ¶ 22.)
On February 19, 2013, Dr. Rabin again examined Plaintiff and gave him instructions regarding the prescription he was taking and ordered that he return to the clinic in one week to re-evaluate stiffness in Plaintiff's jaw. ( Id. ¶ 25.) Dr. Rabin did not observe any infection or swelling at the extraction site at this time. ( Id. ¶ 26.)
Dr. Liu examined Plaintiff on March 1, 2013, for his complaint that he could not open his mouth as wide as he could before the surgery. ( Id. ¶ 27.) Dr. Liu did not observe any swelling at the extraction site, but he prescribed a prescription-strength oral rinse to treat gingivitis, an antibiotic, and a pain reliever. ( Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Considering his own observations, Plaintiff's complaints and past medical history, and the objective findings, Dr. Liu concluded it was not medically necessary to prescribe anything else at that time. ( Id. ¶ 30.)
On March 5, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a Health Service Request Form, noting that his pain medication had run out the previous day. ( Id. ¶ 31.) Dr. Rabin examined Plaintiff the following day, wrote a refill for the prescription pain medication, and referred Plaintiff to an oral surgeon at John Stroger Hospital. ( Id. ¶ 32.) (The court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff's concerns regarding that later surgery are the subject of another lawsuit, Case No. 14 C 3149.) Dr. Rabin provided no further treatment of Plaintiff. ( Id. ¶ 33.) In his 25 years of dental experience, both in the institutional and private setting, Dr. Rabin has rarely prescribed anything beyond ibuprofen for a tooth extraction. ( Id. ¶ 34.) Based on his observations of Plaintiff, Plaintiff's subjective complaints and past medical history, and the objective findings, Dr. Rabin did not believe it was medically necessary to prescribe Plaintiff anything beyond a pain reliever and antibiotic. ( Id. ¶ 35.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On summary judgment, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). After "a properly supported motion for summary ...