Appellate court judgment affirmed.
Where an aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault defendant testified at trial, the 1977 judicial modification of the older rule limiting cross-examination to the subject matter inquired into on direct permitted him to be cross-examined about a pending unrelated sexual assault charge where this served to discredit his consent defense and to test his credibility--no violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination found.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Garman and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
[¶1] Defendant Mark Stevens was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault in the circuit court of Cook County and contended on appeal that his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when he was compelled to testify on cross-examination about a pending sexual assault charge. The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed defendant's conviction. 2013 IL App. (1st) 111075, 993 N.E.2d 62, 373 Ill.Dec. 62. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
[¶3] Prior to defendant's bench trial for the sexual assault of B.P., the State filed a motion in limine to admit other-crimes evidence pursuant to section 115-7.3(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(b) (West 2012)). The motion sought to admit evidence that defendant had sexually assaulted R.G. At that time, defendant had been arrested and charged with assaulting R.G., but the case had not yet proceeded to trial. The State alleged in the motion that the other-crimes evidence was relevant to show defendant's propensity to commit sexual assaults as well as to prove motive, intent, identity, the existence of a common plan or design, modus operandi, or lack of consent. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the evidence was relevant to show propensity, motive and identity. The court further determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial value.
[¶4] At trial, B.P. testified that defendant sexually assaulted her on October 1, 2002, when she was 13 years old. In the early evening hours on that day, B.P. was walking home alone when she heard a male voice say " come here." She ignored the voice but then heard someone running toward her. Defendant grabbed her from behind and forced her into the backseat of a nearby car. Defendant got in the driver's seat and she noticed an object on his hip that appeared to be the handle of a handgun. Defendant drove the car for about an hour before exiting the car and forcing B.P. out of the car. He grabbed her by the arm and led her to the basement of an apartment building. Defendant left her alone for about 10 minutes before returning. He then led B.P. to a landing between the first and second floors of the apartment building where the sexual assault occurred. He ordered her to perform oral sex and then forced her to have vaginal and anal sex. B.P. stated that she could not stop defendant or move from under his weight. B.P. heard someone enter the apartment building, which caused defendant to stop the assault and leave the building. B.P. then exited the building and rode the bus home. When she arrived home, she told her mother about the assault and shortly thereafter went to the hospital where doctors performed a pelvic exam. Subsequently, in 2008, B.P. identified defendant as her assailant in a photographic array and a lineup.
[¶5] On cross-examination, B.P. did not recall having told police officers on the night of the assault that defendant pointed a gun at her head, that there were two
other offenders who stood guard during the attack, and that the assault occurred in an apartment ...