United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge.
Plaintiff Amory King filed a Complaint against Defendants Chicago Police Officers Danny Riley, Mark Rosciani, Richard Mackert, William Skehan, and unknown officers (collectively, "Defendant Officers"), and the City of Chicago (the "City"), alleging four claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (I) illegal search and seizure; (II) false arrest; (III) failure to intervene; and (IV) conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights against Defendant Officers; one count (V) of Indemnification, pursuant to 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9-102 (2002), against the City; and one count (VI) of malicious prosecution, pursuant to Illinois state law, against Riley, Rosciani, Mackert, and Skehan. King was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in which he substituted Officers Silvana Giannini, Maria Zapata, Brook Glynn, and Chris Marzano for the previously named unknown officers.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was denied on August 28, 2014. Defendants' filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on July 28, 2014. Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
LOCAL RULE 56.1
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the party contends there is no genuine issue for trial." Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C), the nonmovant may submit additional statements of material facts that "require the denial of summary judgment." To the extent that a response to a statement of material fact provides only extraneous or argumentative information, this response will not constitute a proper denial of the fact, and the fact is admitted. See Graziano v. Vill. of Oak Park, 401 F.Supp.2d 918, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Similarly, to the extent that a statement of fact contains a legal conclusion or otherwise unsupported statement, including a fact that relies upon inadmissible hearsay, such a fact is disregarded. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997).
On October 23, 2011, Defendant Officers received reports of an armed robbery in the vicinity of 21st Street and Prairie Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. (Def. 56(a)(1), ¶ 13.) The robber was described as a male in dark clothing. The victim, Rebecca Zambrano, called 911 to report the robbery and described her attacker. ( Id. at ¶ 15.) At approximately 9:06:45 p.m., a dispatcher relayed Zambrano's description of the robber as "a male, thin build with red hoodie and pants." ( Id. at ¶ 15.). Riley and Skehan observed two subjects and stopped them for an interview. ( Id. at ¶ 28.) The two individuals were Plaintiff and his friend, Eric Jenkins. ( Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34). Riley and Skehan asked Plaintiff and Jenkins from where they were coming and to where they were going. ( Id. at ¶ 36.) Plaintiff told the officers that they were coming from Jenkins' house and going to a grocery store. ( Id. at ¶ 37.) The two were patted down by the police officers. ( Id. at ¶ 38.) The officers then conducted separate interviews with Plaintiff and Jenkins. ( Id. at ¶ 39).
At some point, Officers Rosciani and Mackert stopped their vehicle in close proximity to Riley and Skehan and exited their vehicle. ( Id. at ¶ 46.) Rosciani asked for Zambrano to be brought to the scene for a possible identification. ( Id. at ¶ 49). At some point after his interview, Plaintiff was handcuffed. ( Id. at ¶ 51.) When Zambrano was brought to the scene, she identified Plaintiff as the individual who robbed her. ( Id. at ¶ 57.) After this identification, Plaintiff was taken to the police station. ( Id. at ¶ 62.) Zambrano was also brought to the police station and interviewed. ( Id. at ¶¶ 64-65.)
On June 28, 2012, in the First Division for the Circuit Court of Cook County, King was found not guilty of armed robbery. (Compl. at ¶ 34.)
Summary judgment is proper if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012). The facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn from them, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reget v. La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010). But, the nonmoving party is given "the benefit of the doubt" only when the record reflects adequate evidence on both sides of a factual issue. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Patel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1997)). At the summary judgment stage, the court may not "make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 505 (7th Cir. 2010).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 2011). The nonmoving party must then present specific facts, establishing the existence of a genuine issue requiring a trial. Id. at 496. This means providing more than a scintilla of evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Chaib v. Ind., 744 F.3d 974, 981 (7th Cir. 2014). Both parties must support their position by citing "to particular parts of materials in the record" or by demonstrating that the "adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence in support of the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A summary judgment motion is defeated where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson 477 U.S. at 248).
Count I - Illegal Search and Seizure