United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, District Judge.
Plaintiff William Cruz ("Cruz"), who is proceeding with the assistance of recruited counsel, filed an amended complaint on April 16, 2014, against Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart ("Sheriff Dart"), the Office of the Sheriff of Cook County ("Sheriff's Office"), and three individual corrections officers. Cruz alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and denied him adequate medical care that resulted in Cruz enduring excruciating pain, undergoing two avoidable surgical procedures, and suffering tissue damage, impotence, and psychological harm. Defendants Sheriff Dart and the Sheriff's Office (collectively, "Defendants") seek to: (1) strike the claim against the Sheriff's Office on the grounds that it is duplicative, (2) dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and, (3) strike Cruz's request for punitive damages made against Sheriff Dart in his official capacity. For the reasons stated below, the court grants and denies the motion in part.
The court draws the following facts from Cruz's amended complaint and accepts them as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2013).
Cruz entered Cook County Jail ("CCJ") on February 20, 2012 and was housed in Division X (Ten). Cruz claims that on April 19 and April 25, 2012, he suffered from two episodes of priapism, each lasting more than fourteen hours, while he was a pre-trial detainee.
Cruz's first priapism occurred at approximately 10:00 P.M. on April 18, 2012. Correctional Officer Michael Burkhart ("Burkhart") was assigned to guard inmates in the division that housed Cruz during the time Cruz experienced priapism. During Burkhart's shift, Cruz allegedly asked Burkhart to send him to the infirmary or otherwise obtain medical attention for Cruz. According to Cruz, Burkhart refused to send Cruz to the infirmary and failed to contact any health care providers for several hours.
On April 25, 2012, Cruz suffered another priapism beginning at 4:00 A.M. Correctional Officer P. Martin ("Martin") was assigned to guard inmates in Cruz's division until 7:00 A.M. Cruz asked Martin to be sent to the infirmary or obtain medical attention for Cruz. Martin denied Cruz's requests. At 7:00 A.M., Correctional Officer Sharon Cox ("Cox")'s shift in Cruz's division began. During Cox's shift, Cruz asked Cox to send him to the infirmary or otherwise obtain medical attention. Allegedly, Cox refused for several hours.
On both April 19 and April 25, 2012, Cruz was eventually taken to the Cermak Hospital Health Care Unit. Once he arrived, he alleges, he was forced to wait for hours behind other inmate patients who did not have obvious urgent medical problems. He claims that as a result of this alleged policy of seeing patients in the Cermak Hospital Health Care Unit on a first-come, first-served basis, doctors failed to promptly attend to his condition. He alleges that as a result of the delay he endured excruciating pain, underwent two surgical procedures that could have been avoided, and suffered injuries including tissue damage, impotence, and psychological harm.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"A motion under 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 2012). A complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. This means that a complaint must contain sufficient factual content "to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Charleston v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Put differently, a complaint "must provide enough details about the subject matter of the case to present a story that holds together." Mehta v. Beaconridge Improvement Ass'n, 432 Fed.Appx. 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)); Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)). The court asks "whether the story could have happened, not whether it did." Swanson at 404.
A. The Claims Against The Sheriff's Office
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that the court should dismiss the Sheriff's Office from the complaint. Cruz has sued both the Sheriff's Office and Sheriff Dart in his official capacity, and Defendants argue that this is duplicative.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against "[e]very person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Suing a "government employee in his official capacity is akin to suing the entity that employs him and the standard for liability is the same." Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, No. 10-CV-4257, 2012 WL 4464900, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 25, 2012). Thus, "naming the official capacity defendants in addition to the [government entity], the true party in interest, is redundant and fails to state a separate claim for relief." ...