United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
SAMUEL L. DICKERSON, # K-99284, Plaintiff,
WARDEN OF PINCKNEYVILLE, ZACHARY ROECKEMAN, KAY LOWERY, and C/O MILLER, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STACI M. YANDLE, District Judge.
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center ("Pinckneyville"), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff now sues the Warden of Pinckneyville; Zachary Roeckeman (warden at Big Muddy Correctional Center); Kay Lowery (mental health staff member); and C/O Miller (mental health staff member) in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff raises a number of claims, but the gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint is that Defendants have denied him access to mental health services. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and immediate declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 7. Subsequent to filing the complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 4). Both the complaint (Doc. 1) and the motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 4) are now before the Court.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief will be considered in conjunction with the requisite preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross "the line between possibility and plausibility." Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
This complaint follows another complaint filed by Plaintiff on June 6, 2014. See Dickerson v. Schuler, 14-cv-00742-NJR (Doc. 1). In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants (mostly different than the present defendants) wrongfully punished him for writing a threatening letter after his request to be moved away from a dangerous cellmate was denied. On July 21, 2014, that complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Dickerson v. Schuler, 14-cv-00742-NJR (Doc. 12).
The present complaint, while related to the previous complaint, raises separate claims. The Court finds the following facts most salient to its review: Plaintiff is severely mentally ill and has received mental health treatment for several years. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff reports that he suffers from auditory and visual hallucinations and that he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar mania. Id. Plaintiff asserts that prior to July 2013 he had been on Seroquel for the past seven years and that it is the "only medication that has been proven effective to treat my disorder." Id. at 5. On July 30, 2013, Dr. Philip Pan, a psychiatrist employed by Wexford Health Services, evaluated Plaintiff and noted that given Plaintiff's "complicated prior course of tx re antipsychotics, " he would make a "non-formulary request for Seroquel." Id. He further noted, "If this can't be accomplished, anticipate pt will likely need a transfer to Dixon STU to be switched over to different medication." Id. According to the complaint, Dr. Pan's request that Plaintiff be prescribed Seroquel was denied and Plaintiff was never transferred to Dixon. Id. Instead, Plaintiff was prescribed a different course of medications and seen by a mental health professional periodically. Id. at 13.
At an evaluation on February 25, 2014, Dr. Lifchitz, another psychiatrist, reported that Plaintiff was exhibiting signs of paranoia and delusional thinking. Id. Shortly thereafter, on April 9, 2014, Plaintiff wrote a letter that resulted in disciplinary charges and his placement in segregation. Id. at 12. In a letter to Clinical Services, Plaintiff wrote, "I will raise money once released to form an Army of suicidal soldiers to do bombings, shoot-outs or anything possible to kill as many U.S. citizens as possible and bring down this government of unjustice." Id. Plaintiff admitted that he wrote the letter, but in his defense asserted that the only reason he wrote the letter was to get attention so that he could talk to the warden, because his requests for protection from another inmate had thus far elicited no response. Plaintiff was found guilty and he was punished with six months in segregation, the loss of one month of good conduct credit, and a disciplinary transfer. Id. His punishment also included a demotion to C-Grade and restriction from commissary, gym, and yard, all for six months. These disciplinary actions formed the basis of Plaintiff's prior complaint. See Dickerson v. Schuler, 14-cv-00742-NJR (dismissed July 21, 2014).
Subsequently, Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville and placed in segregation. Since being transferred, Plaintiff has authored a number of additional threatening letters. In early August, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the counseling staff that stated, "I try to be nice, peaceful and respectful to all but under all that I am and can be very murder of house n****** and stupid crackers. I wish well on all and I would hate to successfully complete my MSR in IDOC or on the streets in rehabilitation center and then go and kill IDOC Director because of PNK CC staff conduct." (Doc. 1, p. 15). On August 16, 2014, Plaintiff authored a letter stating, "If I test positive for HIV I swear in the name of God Almighty I will find the nurse and get revenge. If I can't find the nurse I swear by the one who has my soul in his hand, S.A. Godinez will suffer the consequences." Id. at 11. On September 5, 2014, he sent a letter to the Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives stating, "I stay in Springfield, IL and I Strongly believe that I will leave this torcher chamber and go back to Springfield and kill several state workers and then blow my brains out." Id. at 10. Each of these letters has resulted in a disciplinary report, hearing, and further punishment.
At the heart of his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he has been denied mental health treatment since his transfer into segregation at Pinckneyville. Id. at 5. In addition, Plaintiff mentions several other potential claims for relief in his complaint. For example, he states that he has been without eyeglasses since early August 2014; that he has been denied adequate mental health services because of his race; that he has been denied adequate mental health services because of his disability; that he has been tortured by prison officials; and that he has been denied access to the law library. However, as currently drafted, the claims are vague and insufficient to support a viable claim against any of the named Defendants.
Plaintiff is currently serving a three-year sentence for aggravated battery. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Presently, Plaintiff is scheduled to be released from the Illinois Department of Corrections' custody on November 15, 2014 and will serve one year on mandatory supervised release ("MSR").
Count 1: Eighth Amendment Claim
To establish an Eighth Amendment medical needs claim, Plaintiff must show that: (1) the medical condition was objectively serious; and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. See Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). The complaint satisfies the objective prong of this test. The Seventh Circuit has held that a medical need is objectively "serious" where it has either "been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment" or where the need is "so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). The complaint alleges that Plaintiff is severely mentally ill. (Doc. 1, p. 5). In fact, Plaintiff's diagnosis is well-documented by IDOC's own staff. Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that he is being denied mental health treatment at Pinckneyville. These allegations meet the threshold requirement for a "serious" medical need. Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's severe mental illness, but nonetheless recommended actions that they knew would exacerbate Plaintiff's ...