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In re Commitment of Mitchell

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District

September 17, 2014

In re COMMITMENT OF PAUL MITCHELL (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Paul Mitchell, Respondent-Appellant)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County. No. 10-MR-145. Honorable Rosemary Collins, Judge, Presiding.

SYLLABUS

In proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, respondent had no statutory right to a jury, even though his demand was made promptly upon the State's withdrawal of its jury demand, since respondent's demand was made more than 10 days after the probable-cause hearing.

For APPELLANT: Patrick E. Braun, Law Office of Patrick E. Braun, Rockford, IL.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Sameena Mohammed, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McLaren and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

JORGENSEN, JUSTICE.

Page 573

[¶1] In September 2013, following a bench trial, the court found respondent, Paul Mitchell, to be a sexually violent person pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2010)). The court committed respondent to a secure facility for treatment. Respondent appeals, arguing that the court improperly denied his late jury demand and that, therefore, he is entitled to a new trial. Respondent concedes that he has no constitutional right to a jury trial, and he makes no argument concerning the trial court's discretionary powers. Rather, he argues only that, where his request was " promptly" made after the State withdrew its own jury demand, section 2-1105(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) statutorily entitles him to a jury trial. 735 ILCS 5/2-1105(a) (West 2010). We reject respondent's argument, because the Act provides different guidelines for the timeliness of jury demands. The Act requires that a respondent request a jury trial within 10 days of the probable-cause hearing. Respondent did not do that. Therefore, he has no statutory right to a jury trial, and we affirm.

[¶2] I. BACKGROUND

[¶3] In March 2010, the State petitioned to commit respondent under the Act. On March 3, 2010, respondent, through counsel, stipulated that there was probable cause to believe that he was a sexually violent person. He waived his right to a speedy trial. Respondent remained detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services.

[¶4] On March 8, 2010, the State filed a jury demand pursuant to section 35(c) of the Act. That section states:

" The person who is the subject of the petition, the person's attorney, the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may request that a trial under this Section be by a jury. A request for a jury trial under this subsection shall be made within 10 days after the probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act. If no request is made, the trial shall be by the court. The person, the person's attorney[,] or the Attorney General or State's Attorney, whichever is ...

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