United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
For Tempest Horsley, Plaintiff: Thomas G. Maag, LEAD ATTORNEY, Maag Law Firm, LLC, Wood River, IL.
For Jessica Trame, in her official capacity as Chief of the Firearms Services Bureau, Defendant: Joshua Ratz, LEAD ATTORNEY, Illinois Attorney General's Office - Springfield, Springfield, IL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL, United States District Judge.
Tempest Horsley (" Plaintiff" ) brings this action against the Chief of the Firearms Service Bureau of Illinois, Jessica Trame (" Defendant" ), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her Second Amendment right to bear arms is violated by the Firearm Owners Identification (" FOID" ) Card Act, 430 ILCS § § 65/0.01-65/16-3. The parties have stipulated that the legal issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the age requirement under the FOID Card Act is constitutional. (Doc. 21). If this Court finds the Act unconstitutional, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant to process her FOID Card application without the signature of a parent or guardian.
The parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment, and a hearing was held on July 7, 2014. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted, and Plaintiff's motion is denied.
When she was 18 years old, Plaintiff sought to purchase a double barrel shotgun for use in home protection. In Illinois, most persons are required to possess a Firearm Owners Identification Card to lawfully acquire or possess a firearm. 430 ILCS § 65/2. Under the FOID Card Act, an applicant must provide evidence to the Department of State Police that, " [h]e or she is 21 years of age or older, or if he or she is under 21 years of age that he or she has the written consent of his or her parent or legal guardian to possess and acquire firearms and firearm ammunition...." 430 ILCS § 65/4.
Plaintiff, unable to obtain written consent from her parent or guardian, applied for a FOID Card, but her application was returned to her as " incomplete." Plaintiff alleges that the return of her application is a constructive denial of the application. The FOID Card Act provides for appeal of denials to the Director of State Police for a hearing, see 430 ILSC § 65/10, but Plaintiff did not appeal.
Summary Judgment is appropriate where " the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels International-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). A material fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate, when " the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Cross motions for summary judgment are treated separately under the standards applicable to each. See McKinney v. Cadleway Properties, Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 504 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2008).
The parties have no dispute as to a material fact in this case and, in fact, they have stipulated to the legal issue presented by ...