Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Manzo v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

July 14, 2014

Miguel Manzo, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated and aggrieved persons; and Omar Alsubbah, individually and on behalf of similarly situated and aggrieved persons, Plaintiffs,
v.
Uber Technologies, Inc.; Ahmad Abudayeh, individually, as representative of a class of similarly situated persons, and as an actual and/or apparent agent of defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.; and Lucky Livery, Inc., individually, as representative of a class of similarly situated persons, and as an actual and/or apparent agent of defendant Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SARA L. ELLIS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, taxi and livery drivers, sue Uber Technologies, Inc. ("Uber") and taxi and livery drivers who use Uber, alleging that Uber misrepresents its rates, misidentifies itself as a transportation company, and illegally operates in violation of Chicago Municipal Code provisions regulating the taxi and livery industries. Plaintiffs base their lawsuit on the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et. seq. and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("IUDTPA"), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/1 et. seq. The Court denies Uber's motion to dismiss [8] with regard to Count I because Manzo states a valid claim that Uber misrepresents the cost of its service, the nature of the gratuity, and its status as a transportation provider. Additionally, the Court denies Uber's motion to dismiss Count II with regard to the allegations that Uber misrepresents the cost of livery service procured via Uber relative to competing services. The Court dismisses the allegations in Counts II and III premised on violations of applicable taxi and livery ordinances. Finally, the Court dismisses the remainder of Count III because Manzo does not claim that he is harmed by the alleged misrepresentations.

BACKGROUND[1]

Plaintiff Miguel Manzo, a Chicago cab driver, brings Count I against Uber and Ahmad Abudayeh. In Count III, Manzo sues Lucky Livery, Inc. ("Lucky"). In both Counts, Manzo seeks to represent a class of similarly situated cab drivers. Plaintiff Omar Alsubbah, a livery driver in Chicago, brings Count II of the Complaint against Uber and Lucky. Likewise, Alsubbah seeks to represent a class of similarly situated livery drivers.

Uber provides a mobile phone application that connects drivers with customers who need a ride. Uber customers can request a ride via three types of vehicles: a medallion-bearing taxi, a livery vehicle, or a private vehicle driven by the car's owner. Drivers who subscribe to Uber use the application to pick up rides in their vicinity. The driver's mobile phone tracks the distance and duration of the ride and charges passengers accordingly. For rides in a taxi, customers pay the taxi's meter rate plus an automatic 20% "gratuity." The gratuity is split evenly between the driver and Uber.

Defendant Ahmad Abudayeh drives a taxi in Chicago and uses Uber to find passengers and collect payment. Defendant Lucky is a limousine company operating in the Chicago area; Lucky's drivers subscribe to Uber and they provide rides and accept payment via Uber. Plaintiffs sue Abudayeh and Lucky individually as agents of Uber and as representatives of classes of taxi drivers and limousine companies that use Uber.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Rule 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud to "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). This "ordinarily requires describing the who, what, when, where, and how' of the fraud, although the exact level of particularity that is required will necessarily differ based on the facts of the case." AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 615 (citation omitted). Rule 9(b) applies to "all averments of fraud, not claims of fraud." Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007). "A claim that sounds in fraud'- in other words, one that is premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct-can implicate Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements." Id.

ANALYSIS

Uber moves to dismiss the entire complaint based on Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transportation, Inc., which stands for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot use a Lanham Act claim to declare the defendant's conduct unlawful under a local taxicab regulation when the taxicab commission has not yet done so. 82 F.3d 484, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Uber contends that Dial A Car applies equally here because the Lanham Act is the federal equivalent to the ICFA and IUDTPA. Republic Tobacco L.P. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., No. 06 C 2738, 2007 WL 1424093, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007). Because Dial A Car relates primarily to Count II, the Court analyzes Uber's argument in Section II of this opinion. To the extent that Uber's Dial A Car argument relates to the other claims, the Court's analysis in Section II applies equally to all claims. Although Uber's motion to dismiss does not challenge the sufficiency of the elements of each claim, the Court analyzes the sufficiency of each count below.

I. Count I-Manzo v. Uber and Abudayeh

In Count I, Manzo sues Uber and Mr. Abudayeh pursuant to the ICFA and IUDTPA, alleging that Uber deceptively represented on its website that Uber taxis charge "standard taxi rates, " when, in fact, riders were charged the meter fare plus a 20% "gratuity." Plaintiffs also base Count I on the allegation that the "gratuity" was actually split between the taxi's driver and Uber. The claim against Abudayeh stems from his purported agency relationship with Uber and his concealment of the fact that he splits with Uber any "gratuities" he receives on Uber rides.

To state an IUDTPA claim that Uber misrepresented its livery rates and the nature of the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.