United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division
PHILIP G. REINHARD, District Judge.
For the reasons below, petitioner Andrew A. Chavis's motion for post conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255  is dismissed. See Rule 4(b), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. The court denies Chavis's request for appointment of counsel. The court also declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The case is closed.
STATEMENT - OPINION
On March 19, 2004, a jury found petitioner Andrew A. Chavis, a federal prisoner, guilty of two counts of illegal possession of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On June 24, 2004, this court sentenced Chavis to a term of imprisonment of 420 months followed by 10 years of supervised release. See United States v. Chavis, No. 03-CR-50028-3, . Chavis appealed the court's sentence. Before rendering an opinion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case back to this court for the limited purpose of determining whether the court would have decreased Chavis's sentence if it had known that the sentencing guidelines were advisory. See United States v. Chavis, No. 03-CR-50028-3, . After the court reviewed briefs from both parties, it determined that it would have imposed Chavis's original sentence even if it had known the sentencing guidelines were advisory. See id. at . Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Chavis's sentence. Id. at -. Subsequently, Chavis filed a variety of motions seeking post conviction relief. However, all of these were stricken as nonsensical, frivolous, or irrelevant. See id. at -.
On August 20, 2007, Chavis filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Chavis, No. 07-C-50163, . In his form motion, Chavis argued that he was entitled to relief because his attorney was ineffective. See United States v. Chavis, No. 07-C-50163,  at 4. Aside from his conclusory allegation that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, Chavis did not provide any facts to support his claim. Instead, he stated that he would be filing a supporting "[m]emorandum and brief..." upon further instruction from the court. Id. On August 28, 2007, the court granted Chavis 30 days to file a supporting memorandum. See United States v. Chavis, No. 07-C-50163, . However, 30 days passed without any filings from Chavis. Instead, on October 22, 2007, Chavis filed a motion seeking an extension of time. See United States v. Chavis, No. 07-C-50163, . The court granted this motion and gave Chavis until November 8, 2007 to file his supporting memorandum. See United States v. Chavis, No. 07-C-50163, . Despite the extension, Chavis failed to file any supporting materials or any other motions. As a result, on December 28, 2007, the court denied Chavis's Section 2255 motion and dismissed the cause in its entirety. See United States v. Chavis, No. 07-C-50163, . Chavis did not appeal.
On June 9, 2014, Chavis filed the instant petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See . In it, Chavis claims he is entitled to post conviction relief because of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (June 20, 2013). In his petition, he also asks for appointment of counsel. While Chavis argues the petition is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), the court disagrees.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996 added a one-year statute of limitations for prisoners to assert collateral attacks on their sentences under Section 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitations period begins to run from the latest of -
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4).
Chavis argues his petition here is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). He relies on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (June 20, 2013) as support. However, Chavis's arguments are misguided because Descamps did ...