United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DAVID R. HERNDON, Chief District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint brought by defendant Progressive Northern Insurance Company (Progressive) (Doc. 6). Progressive seeks dismissal of plaintiffs Adrian Will and Maria Yourglass' (collectively, plaintiffs) complaint, pursuant to FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).
Progressive removed plaintiffs' complaint from Madison County, Illinois to this Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, on February 18, 2014 (Doc. 2). Plaintiffs' complaint brings four counts arising from an alleged insurance policy Progressive issued plaintiffs covering, "[a] loss not caused by collision including... malicious mischief or vandalism; theft of larceny..." (Doc. 2-2, p. 3, ¶ 5). Plaintiffs allege their motor vehicle was stolen on or about the night of May 19, 2012, or morning of May 20, 2012. Plaintiffs bring: Count I, Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count II, Fraud; Count III, Breach of Contract; and Count IV, Section 155. Progressive argues plaintiffs' allegations do not withstand dismissal and this Court agrees.
III. Legal Standard
Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint provide, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which a court can grant relief. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is warranted if the complaint fails to set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Even though Twombly (and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)) retooled federal pleading standards, notice pleading remains all that is required in a complaint. "A plaintiff still must provide only enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and, through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.'" Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
In making this assessment, the district court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Rujawitz v. Martin, 561 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2009); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007).
a. Count I: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
It is well-settled in Illinois that, "no fiduciary relationship exists between an insurer and an insured as a matter of law." Greenberger v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fichtel v. Bd. of Dirs. of River Shore of Naperville Condo. Ass'n, 389 Ill.App.3d 951, 330 Ill.Dec. 90, 907 N.E.2d 903, 912 (2009)). When, as here, the relationship alleged does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law, the party asserting the existence of the fiduciary relationship must plead facts alleging, "special circumstances of the parties' relationship, where one party places trust and confidence in another, thereby placing the latter in a position of influence and superiority over the former." Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 348 Ill.App.3d 846, 283 Ill.Dec. 497, 808 N.E.2d 47, 52 (2004). Plaintiffs allege that Progressive, "had a fiduciary duty to [p]laintiffs to handle and adjust [p]laintiffs' claim with the utmost honesty, good faith, and fair dealing" (Doc. 2-2, ¶ 9). In reviewing plaintiffs' Count I, it is clear that plaintiffs' allegations do not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that is plausible and thus Count I is dismissed.
b. Count II: Fraud
Under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 9(b), allegations of fraud require assertion of supporting facts with particularity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Under Illinois law, a claim of fraud must allege that defendant: "(i) made a false statement of material fact; (ii) knew or believed the statement to be false; (iii) intended to and, in fact, did induce the plaintiff to reasonably rely and act on the statement; and (iv) caused injury to the plaintiff." Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill.2d 171, 65 Ill.Dec. 411, 441 N.E.2d 324, 331 (1982)). As to the false statement of material fact at issue, plaintiffs merely allege ...