United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
For Yihao Pu, also known as Ben Pu, Defendant: Carolyn Pelling Gurland, LEAD ATTORNEY, Carolyn & Gurland Attorney at Law, Chicago, IL; Robert P. Greenspoon, William W. Flachsbart, Flachsbart & Greenspoon, LLC, Chicago, IL.
For USA, Plaintiff: Benjamin F Langner, Felicia Manno Alesia, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Lindsay C. Jenkins, Patrick Mark Otlewski, United States Attorney's Office (NDIL), Chicago, IL.
OPINION AND ORDER
Hon. CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Yihao Ben Pu's (" Pu" ) motion to dismiss the
Superseding Indictment. Also before the Court are Sahil Uppal's (" Uppal" ) motions to dismiss Counts Four through Nine and Count Twenty-Three of the Superseding Indictment, or alternatively for a bill of particulars. For the following reasons, the motions are denied.
On April 11, 2013, Pu was charged by Superseding Indictment of nine counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts One through Nine), ten counts of theft of trade secrets from Company A and Citadel, in violation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (" EEA" ), 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2)-(3) (Counts Ten through Nineteen), three counts of accessing Citadel's computer system without authorization and exceeding authorized access, in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (" CFAA" ) (Counts Twenty through Twenty-Two, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), and obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count Twenty-Three). Co-defendant Uppal was also charged by Superseding Indictment of six counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts Four through Nine), and one count of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count Twenty-Three). Pu and Uppal's motions to dismiss the Superseding Indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) are fully briefed and before the Court.
A. Standard of Decision
" Challenging an indictment is not a means of testing the strength or weakness of the government's case, or the sufficiency of the government's evidence." United States v. Moore,563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, it is a means to allege a defect in the indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B). An indictment is legally sufficient if it: (1) states the elements of the crime charged; (2) adequately informs the defendant of the nature of the charges; and (3) allows the defendant to plead the judgment as a bar to future prosecutions of the same offense. United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). " [A]n indictment that 'tracks' the words of a statute to state the elements of the crime is generally acceptable, and while there must be enough factual particulars so the defendant is aware of the specific conduct at issue, the presence or absence of any particular fact is not dispositive." Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 925 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, " [t]o successfully challenge the sufficiency of an indictment, a defendant must demonstrate that the indictment did not satisfy one or more of the required elements and that he suffered prejudice from the alleged deficiency." Id. (citing United States v. Dooley, 578 F.3d 582, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, " [t]he test for validity is not ...