United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge.
The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss . Status hearing set for 5/8/14 is stricken and reset to 4/23/14 at 8:30 a.m.
On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff Gianni Gibbs filed the present ten-count Complaint against Defendants Village of Flossmoor and Flossmoor police officers Freeman and Kamleiter alleging constitutional violations, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims pursuant to the Court's original and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a). Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, V, VI, VIII, and IX of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion. Specifically, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Count IX with prejudice. The Court denies the remainder of Defendants' motion.
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true." Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). "[A] plaintiff is not required to plead facts in the complaint to anticipate and defeat affirmative defenses, " but "when a plaintiff's complaint nonetheless sets out all of the elements of an affirmative defense, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate." Independent Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Serv. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012).
On or about December 18, 2012, at approximately 3:35 p.m., Defendant Freeman stopped Plaintiff Gianni Gibbs (hereinafter "Gianni" or "Plaintiff") for traffic violations. (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 6.) Defendant Kamleiter then arrived in his own squad car to assist Defendant Freeman. ( Id. ¶ 8.) Thereafter, Plaintiff's mother, Sandra Gibbs (hereinafter "Sandra"), arrived at the scene in a separate car and attempted to ask Defendants about her son's arrest. ( Id. ¶ 9.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter refused to speak to Sandra. ( Id. ¶ 10.) Fearing for her son's safety, Sandra continued to ask about her son's arrest, which infuriated Defendants. ( Id. )
Plaintiff alleges that thereafter Defendant Freeman took Gianni to the police station without probable cause to "punish" Sandra. ( Id. ¶ 11.) More specifically, Defendants placed Gianni in handcuffs and put him in the back of Defendant Freeman's squad car without fastening his seatbelt. ( Id. ¶ 12.) According to Plaintiff, on the way to the station, Defendant Freeman, who was irritated that Plaintiff questioned him about the mistreatment of his mother, slammed on the brakes unnecessarily with the intent to harm and punish Plaintiff sending him flying into the screen separating the front and rear compartments of the squad car. ( Id. ¶ 13.)
At the Flossmoor police station parking garage, Defendant Freeman opened the rear passenger door while Defendant Kamleiter stood four feet away near the trunk of Defendant Freeman's squad car. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that after Defendants required him to get out of the car without assistance, they unreasonably slammed him onto the trunk of the squad car while he was still handcuffed. ( Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)
Further, Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants falsely claimed that he resisted arrest and committed a battery on Defendant Freeman. ( Id. ¶ 17.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter communicated their false version of the December 18, 2012 incident with malice to prosecutors, which prompted the Cook County States Attorney's Office to charge Gianni with two counts of aggravated battery to a police officer on January 23, 2013. ( Id. ¶ 18.) A Cook County Circuit Court judge acquitted Gianni of resisting arrest and aggravated battery charges after a bench trial in 2013. ( Id. ¶ 20).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) two Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter (Counts I and II); (2) a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter (Count III); (3) a claim pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), against the Village of Flossmoor (Count IV); (4) a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter (Count V); (5) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter (Count VI); (6) a common law malicious prosecution claim against Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter (Count VII); (7) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Defendants Freeman and Kamleiter (Count VIII); (8) a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendant Freeman (Count IX), and (9) and indemnification claim against the Village of Flossmoor pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Count X).
In Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, they seek dismissal of the following claims: (1) the Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim as alleged in Count III; (2) the Monell claim as alleged in Count IV; (3) the Fourth Amendment false arrest claim in Count V; (4) the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim in Count VI; (5) the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due ...