United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Defendant Pierce & Associates, P.C.'s (Pierce) motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Lisa Beth Kobialko (Kobialko) allegedly purchased a home located at 16050 Golfview Drive in Lockport, Illinois (Property) through a May 14, 2008 mortgage agreement (Mortgage) with the mortgage company Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. In August of 2011, Kobialko allegedly defaulted on the Mortgage. The Mortgage was subsequently assigned to Defendant Cenlar FSB (Cenlar), a mortgage company. Cenlar allegedly hired attorneys from Pierce to file a foreclosure complaint on its behalf against Kobialko in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois (Will County Circuit Court).
On December 13, 2011, Pierce allegedly filed a Complaint To Foreclose Mortgage (Foreclosure Complaint) on behalf of Cenlar, Cenlar FSB v. Lisa Kobialko, et al, Will County Circuit Court Case # 2011 CH 5877 (Foreclosure Action), in which Cenlar sought a deficiency judgment and possession of the Property. Kobialko alleges that on May 14, 2013, an order approving sale and granting possession (Order of Possession) was entered in the Foreclosure Action in favor of Cenlar. In addition, a deficiency judgment in the Foreclosure Action was also entered for the amount of $124, 795.10.
Kobialko alleges that on August 20, 2013, an order was entered in the Foreclosure Action that provided that the Order of Possession may not be placed for service with the sheriff until September 19, 2013. Kobialko alleges that an extension order in the Foreclosure Action (Extension Order) was entered on September 24, 2013 which provided that the "[O]rder of [P]ossession shall not be placed with the Sheriff until October 25, 2013." (Compl. Par. 15)(emphasis in the original).
Kobialko alleges that on October 1, 2013, Pierce and Cenlar obtained a certified copy of the Order of Possession and placed the copy with the Will County Sheriff (Sheriff) sometime between October 1, 2013 and October 7, 2013. According to Kobialko, on October 7, 2013, the Sheriff posted a final eviction notice on the Property which warned that eviction from the Sheriff could be performed on the Property as early as October 8, 2013. (Compl. Par. 18). Kobialko alleges that when she came home to the Property on October 7, 2013, she saw the final eviction notice and began to panic and "melt down." (Compl. Par. 20-21). Kobialko allegedly hired an attorney who contacted the Sheriff and notified the Sheriff of the Extension Order. Kobialko alleges that the Sheriff then postponed the eviction date of the Property to October 25, 2013.
Kobialko filed a complaint against Pierce and Cenlar and includes in her complaint claims alleging a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count I), and claims alleging a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFDPA), 815 ILCS 505/2 et seq. (Count II). Cenlar has not answered or otherwise pled to the complaint. Pierce now moves to dismiss the claims brought against it.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that "plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level'" and "if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court." E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at 622 (stating that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, " and that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged")(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))(internal quotations omitted).
Pierce has attached two exhibits to its memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss and four exhibits to its reply in support of its motion to dismiss. (Mem. Ex. A, B; Reply Ex. A, B, C, D). Generally, a court "may only consider the plaintiff's complaint when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2013). However, Federal Rule of Procedure 10(c) permits certain documents attached to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss to be considered. Id. Such documents "are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to his claim." McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir.2006)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir.2002)). Accordingly, "[t]hese documents may be considered by a district court in ruling on the motion to dismiss without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment." Burke, 714 F.3d at 505. However, the court "is not bound to accept the pleader's allegations as to the effect of the exhibit, but can ...