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The Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 25, 2014

THE MEDICINES COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
MYLAN INC., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., and BIONICHE PHARMA USA, LLC, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge.

This is a patent infringement action by The Medicines Company ("TMC") against Defendants Mylan, Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Bionche Pharma USA, LLC alleging infringement of United States Patent No. 7, 582, 727 (the "'727 patent"), [1] a product patent. In advance of trial, Defendants move to exclude the commercial success opinion of non-retained employee expert Anthony Flammia. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a patent infringement case involving the 727 Patent. The 727 patent "relates to a compounding process for preparing a pharmaceutical batch(es) of a drug product or a pharmaceutical formulation(s) comprising bivalirudin as an active ingredient." (727 patent at col. 2 ll. 29-32) Bivalirudin is the active ingredient in Angiomax®, which is an anticoagulant drug used in patients with unstable angina who are undergoing percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty. (R. 1, Comp. at ¶¶ 11, 13.) TMC markets Angiomax®. ( Id. ¶ 13.)

In this case, TMC alleges that Mylan, before the expiration of the patent-in-suit, submitted Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") No. 202471 to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), seeking approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, sale, offer for sale, and/or importation of its generic Angiomax® product. TMC contends that Mylan's ANDA No. 202471 infringes certain claims of the 727 patent. Specifically, TMC asserts that Mylan has infringed claims 1-3, 7-10 and 17 of the 727 patent. Claim 1 is an independent claim, and the remaining asserted claims depend on Claim 1. Claim 1 states:

Pharmaceutical batches of a drug product comprising bivalirudin (SEQ ID NO: 1) and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier for use as an anticoagulant in a subject in need thereof, wherein the batches have a maximum impurity level of Asp9-bivalirudin that does not exceed about 0.6% as measured by HPLC.

Each asserted claim in the '727 patent contains a limitation requiring the pharmaceutical batches at issue to have "a maximum impurity level of Asp9-bivalirudin that does not exceed about 0.6%." No claims in the '727 patent explicitly refer to "efficient mixing" or any other steps in the bivalirudin compounding process.

LEGAL STANDARD

"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)." Lewis v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009). Rule 702 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact[, ]... a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion...." Id . See also Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2010).

Under the expert-testimony framework, courts perform the gatekeeping function of determining whether the expert testimony is both relevant and reliable prior to its admission at trial. See id.; Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013); United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2009) ("To determine reliability, the court should consider the proposed expert's full range of experience and training, as well as the methodology used to arrive [at] a particular conclusion."). In doing so, courts "make the following inquiries before admitting expert testimony: first, the expert must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; second, the proposed expert must assist the trier of fact in determining a relevant fact at issue in the case; third, the expert's testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and methods; and fourth, the expert must have reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Lees v. Carthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013); Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1373; Pansier, 576 F.3d at 737.

The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly stated that "genuine expertise may be based on experience or training." United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996)). "[W]hile extensive academic and practical expertise in an area is certainly sufficient to qualify a potential witness as an expert, Rule 702 specifically contemplates the admission of testimony by experts whose knowledge is based on experience." Trustees of Chicago Painters & Decorators Pension, Health & Welfare, & Deferred Sav. Plan Tr. Funds v. Royal Int'l Drywall & Decorating, Inc., 493 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted). As such, courts "consider a proposed expert's full range of practical experience, as well as academic or technical training, when determining whether that expert is qualified to render an opinion in a given area." Id. (quoting Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000)).

In assessing the admissibility of an expert's testimony, the Court's focus "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.'" Winters, 498 F.3d at 742 (quoting Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002)). See also Stollings, 725 F.3d at 765. "The goal of Daubert is to assure that experts employ the same intellectual rigor' in their courtroom testimony as would be employed by an expert in the relevant field." Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). "A Daubert inquiry is not designed to have the district judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate issues of credibility and accuracy." Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2012).

ANALYSIS

I. Anthony Flammia

Mr. Flammia has worked for TMC since 2003. He currently serves as TMC's Vice President of New Business Ventures. When TMC implemented the new manufacturing process at issue in this case, Mr. Flammia served as TMC's Vice President of Global Manufacturing Supply. In this position, Mr. Flammia had responsibility for contract manufacturing, the commercial clinical supply chain for Angiomax®, attempts to solve Angiomax® batch failures, and the implementation of the new and improved manufacturing process for Angiomax®.

TMC has disclosed Mr. Flammia as its non-retained employee expert on commercial success. In its initial disclosure, TMC provided that "Mr. Flammia may testify regarding the commercial success of The Medicines Company's bivalirudin product, Angiomax®, as a result of commercial reliability from consistently minimized ...


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