United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES B. ZAGEL, District Judge.
Kevin Dawson (hereinafter, "Dawson" or "Plaintiff"), presently in custody at the Cook County Jail, has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition while incarcerated at the Jail. Presently pending before the Court are Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) and Plaintiff's motions in response (Does. 45, 50, and 52). Plaintiff also filed a motion for attorney representation (Doc. 49). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has: (1) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (2) failed to establish a deliberate indifference claim; and (3) failed to establish an official capacity claim or to establish personal involvement of Defendants in any alleged constitutional violation; and (4) failed to establish a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
The record before the Court establishes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Thus, for the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff's motions are granted to the extent they seek to place materials before the Court in response to the motion for summary judgment and denied for all other purposes. The Court considers the materials as described herein.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LOCAL RULE 56.1 STATEMENT
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). All of the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Miller v. American Family Mutual Ins., 203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment may be granted when no "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, a party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying on unsubstantiated facts or by merely resting on its pleadings. See Hemsworth, II v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007); Greer v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 267 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001). Instead, the party that bears the burden of proof on an issue must affirmatively demonstrate, with admissible evidence, that a genuine issue of material fact exists that requires a trial. See Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490.
When Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, they included a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment" as required by Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); and Local Rule 56.2. This notice clearly set out the requirements of this Court's Local Rule 56.1. In particular, the notice explains that Calhoun's response must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Local Rule 56.1.
Plaintiff submitted several responses to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, but did not submit a response to Defendants' L.R. 56.1 statement of facts. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file:
a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain:
(A) a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and
(B) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.
L.R. 56.1(b)(3). The district court may require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Serv., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004); Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir 2000) (strict compliance with the local rules governing summary judgment is upheld given the importance of local rules that structure the summary judgment process); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs").
Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to lenient standards, compliance with procedural rules is required. Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[R]ules apply to uncounseled litigants and must be enforced"); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir.1994). Despite being given this notice, Plaintiff failed to submit a response to Defendants' Rule 56.1 statement of facts with references to the record. Instead, Plaintiff submitted multiple motions in response to the motion for summary judgment, including documents and making argument. Consequently, Defendants' facts contained in their Rule 56.1 statement, to the extent that they are material and adequately supported by the record, are deemed admitted.
A motion for summary judgment "requires the responding party to come forward with the evidence that it has-it is the put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit." Eberts v. Goderstad, 569 F.3d 757, 767 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). If the moving party meets its burden of showing that there are no issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to a judgment as a mater of law, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26. A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties, " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if a reasonable finder of fact could return a decision for the nonmoving party based upon the record. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Insolia v. Phillip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2000).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will consider the factual assertions he makes in his response to Defendants' motion, but only to the extent that they are adequately supported by reference to the record as required, or to the extent that Plaintiff could properly testify about the matters at trial - that is, ...