United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
MICHAEL M. MIHM, District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, was housed at Pontiac Correctional at all times relevant to this cause of action. He pursues an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Godinez, Miller, Pfister, Lemke, and Reed based upon Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants denied him protective custody which made his susceptible to attack by fellow inmate Andre Sardin and inmates under Sardin's influence. Now before this Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [d/e 82, 89], which will be granted for the reasons set forth below.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a material dispute through specific cites to admissible evidence, or by showing that the nonmovant "cannot produce admissible evidence to support the [material] fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant clears this hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest on his or her allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to admissible evidence in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011). "In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary judgment." McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).
At the summary judgment stage, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, with material factual disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when a reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant. Id.
As of June 2013, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) for 20 years. He met fellow inmate Andre Sardin while the two were cellmates at Menard Correctional Center from January to March 2007. During that time, Sardin threatened Plaintiff's life. Plaintiff has not had any communication with Sardin since 2007. In August 2009, Plaintiff was transferred from Menard to segregation at Pontiac Correctional Center where he stayed until he was transferred to unapproved protective custody at Pontiac from January 2012 to May 2012. When Plaintiff refused a transfer in May 2012, he was returned to segregation where he remained as of June 2013.
In January 2012, Plaintiff asked for protective custody at Pontiac because of inmate Sardin, and the request was denied in March 2012. Plaintiff became cellmates with inmate Hardaway on May 1, 2012, and they remained cellmates for just two days. During their time as cellmates, Hardaway informed Plaintiff that Sardin issued a "kill-on-sight" order against Plaintiff. During that time, Hardaway also beat up Plaintiff because Hardaway wanted two of Plaintiff's tapes. As of April 2013, Plaintiff was in a one-man segregation cell which he believed to be a safe environment. On May 4, 2012, Plaintiff was provided a hearing on the question of whether he should be in protective custody and after that, he was offered a transfer out of Pontiac which he refused. On July 18, 2013, Plaintiff was released from IDOC and he refused to provide a current address. In his Complaint filed on May 25, 2012, Plaintiff only sought injunctive relief rather than monetary damages.
In Defendants' first Motion for Summary Judgment, they argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks because he cannot establish an ongoing risk of harm. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not had any contact with Sardin since 2007 and was attacked by Hardaway for reasons unrelated to any problems with Sardin. They also argue that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is overly broad in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in that he seeks a housing assignment of his choosing. In their second Motion for Summary Judgment, they argue that Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief became moot as of July 18, 2013, the date on which Plaintiff was released from IDOC.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference, in turn, requires a plaintiff to show that prison officials knew of an excessive risk to inmate safety and disregarded that risk. Id. at 837. In the context of a failure to protect claim, a substantial risk of serious harm is one in which the risk is "so great" that it is "almost certain to materialize if nothing is done." Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005).
While injunctive relief may be available to prevent a substantial risk of serious harm from turning into actual harm, a prisoner must show that at the time he filed his lawsuit and at the time of summary judgment, the defendant prison officials knew of and unreasonably disregarded a substantial, continuing risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845-46.
The PLRA provides, in relevant part:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall ...