United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
WAYNE D. KELLY, Plaintiff,
HEALTH BENEFITS PAIN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, JOHN D. KIM and MARK SALLEE, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Wayne Kelly sued defendants Health Benefits Pain Management Services, LLC ("Health Benefits"), John Kim ("Kim"), and Mark Sallee ("Sallee") for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., (Count I), common law conspiracy to defraud (Count II), breach of contract (Count III), breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV), and conversion (Count V). Counts I and II are brought against Kim and Sallee; Counts III, IV, and V are brought against Health Benefits. Kim and Sallee have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Counts I and II for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Count I is the only basis for federal jurisdiction. Health Benefits has moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Counts II, IV, and V for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss Count I is granted. The court declines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law counts (II, III, IV, and V).
Plaintiff is a neurologist. Defendant Health Benefits, which defendant Kim owns, manages medical clinics. Defendant Sallee is a Health Benefits employee.
In November 2009, plaintiff and Health Benefits allegedly entered a Management Services Agreement ("Services Agreement"). Under the Services Agreement, Health Benefits assumed certain responsibilities regarding patients that plaintiff saw at Health Benefits' facilities. These duties included: billing the patients and insurers; collecting accounts receivable; receiving payments; and paying plaintiff the amount collected, minus Health Benefits' fee.
Plaintiff alleges that Health Benefits breached the Services Agreement by failing to arrange billing services for more than a year. Health Benefits also allegedly failed to remit more than $250, 000 in payments it collected on plaintiff's behalf.
Plaintiff further alleges that Kim and Sallee commingled funds collected by Health Benefits with funds collected by another Kim-owned company, Illinois Physicians Network, LLC ("IPN"). IPN is not a defendant in the instant case. IPN, which also employs Sallee, coordinates care for and provides administrative services to health care providers. Additionally, IPN handles the billing and collection for the providers. Plaintiff alleges that, after commingling the funds, Kim and Sallee used them to pay the obligations and debts of Health Benefits and IPN as they became payable.
Defendants have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and V of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Gibson v. City of Chicago , 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990). To survive such a motion, the complaint must allege sufficient facts which, if true, would raise a right to relief above the speculative level, showing that the claim is plausible on its face. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555. To be plausible on its face, the complaint must plead facts sufficient for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In addition to these requirements, Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) also requires that fraud be pled with particularity by setting forth "the who, what, when, where, and how." DiLeo v. Ernst & Young , 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
Count I, plaintiff's RICO claim, fails to specify which subsection of the statute Kim and Sallee allegedly violated, but seems to be based on 18 § U.S.C. 1962 (c). Plaintiff alleges in his RICO count that Kim and Sallee schemed to defraud plaintiff out of money collected on his behalf by Health Benefits. Plaintiff further alleges that they commingled funds from Health Benefits and IPN and then used the funds to pay each company's obligations as they became due. Kim and Sallee also allegedly misappropriated money collected by Health Benefits and IPN. Some of the misappropriated funds were allegedly owed to plaintiff under the Services Agreement.
"[T]o state a claim for a RICO violation, a plaintiff must allege  a cognizable injury to its business or property resulting from the  conduct  of an enterprise  through a pattern  of racketeering activity." Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Barr , 912 F.Supp.2d 671, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. , 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed in Count I to sufficiently allege an injury, a pattern of racketeering activity, and an enterprise. Plaintiff has offered no responsive arguments.
Defendants are correct in their assertion that plaintiff has not properly alleged an injury proximately caused by defendants' RICO violation. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. , 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006) (noting proximate cause is required for a RICO claim). Plaintiff's only specific allegation of harm in Count I is in paragraph forty-two, which states: "[plaintiff] has been harmed by Kim and Sallee's misappropriation of payments which should have been remitted to [plaintiff]." This injury stems solely from Health Benefits alleged failure to remit the $250, 000 collected on plaintiff's behalf. The Services Agreement allegedly required this remittance. Therefore, the alleged breach of contract, not the RICO violation, is the proximate cause of this harm. Plaintiff's breach of contract claim "cannot be transmogrified into a RICO claim by the facile device of charging that the breach was fraudulent, indeed criminal." Carr v. Tillery , 591 F.3d 909, 918 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff also fails to explain how Kim and Sallee's scheme might have compounded any breach of contract injury. Plaintiff's failure to allege an injury proximately caused by Kim and Sallee's RICO violation is, in and of itself, grounds for dismissing Count I. James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co. , 453 F.3d 396, 404 (7th Cir. 2006).
Defendants' second argument is that plaintiff fails to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. This element of a RICO claim requires "the commission of at least two predicate acts of racketeering." Patel v. Mahajan, 2012 WL 3234397, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2012). Both mail and wire fraud are acts of racketeering. McDonald v. Schencker , 18 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz , 976 F.2d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1992)). Allegations of mail and wire fraud must be made "with some specificity and state the time, place, and content of the alleged communications perpetrating the fraud." Martinek v. Diaz, 2012 WL 2953183, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2012) (quoting Midwest Grinding , 976 F.2d at 1020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, plaintiff's only allegations in Count I that relate to racketeering activity are contained in paragraphs thirty-eight through forty-one. In paragraph forty, plaintiff alleges that "Kim and Sallee on multiple occasions engaged in telephonic communications, computer communications, wire transfers and/or U.S. Postal Service communications." In the subsequent paragraph, plaintiff alleges these instances of mail and wire fraud constituted racketeering activity. These allegations are general, conclusory, and lack any factual support. Simply making general claims about a group of predicate acts is insufficient. See Martinek, 2012 WL 2953183, at *11 (explaining that predicate acts cannot simply be grouped together, but, rather, a complaint must identify and describe specific instances). ...