United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES B. ZAGEL, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Andrew Erickson, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that correctional officers at the Kendall County Jail used excessive force on him, failed to intervene during the excessive force, and then denied him medical care for his injuries. He also alleges that he was housed under unconstitutional living conditions while in disciplinary segregation. This matter is before the court for ruling on Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, a court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Weber v. Universities Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court does not "judge the credibility of the witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. The only question is whether there is a genuine issue of fact." Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
However, Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Sarver v. Experian Information Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
"[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc. v. A & E Oil, Inc., 503 F.3d 588, 594-595 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The inquiry is essentially "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
Defendants filed statements of uncontested material fact pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (N.D. Ill.). Defendants also provided Plaintiff a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment, " as required by circuit precedent and Local Rule 56.2. That notice clearly explained the requirements of the Local Rules and warned Plaintiff that a party's failure to controvert the facts as set forth in the moving party's statement results in those facts being deemed admitted. See, e.g., Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff did file an opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment but did not address the statements of undisputed material fact. Accordingly, the facts presented by Defendants that are supported by their exhibits included with their motion are deemed admitted. See, e.g., Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff was detained at the Kendall County Jail from December 7, 2010, through November 17, 2011. (Defs.' 56.1(a)(3) Statement ¶ 1.) During his detention, the Jail maintained an inmate handbook containing rules, regulations, and procedures that inmates are required to follow. ( Id., at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff received a copy of the handbook on either December 7 or 8, 2010. ( Id., at 3.)
The inmate handbook describes the grievance procedure that inmates must follow at the Jail. (Defs.' 56.1(a)(3) Statement ¶ 4.) Inmates are required to submit their complaints in writing on an inmate request form. ( Id., at ¶ 5.) The forms are available upon request from a cell pod correctional deputy and must be submitted to the correctional deputy. ( Id. ) The complaint must be submitted within ten days from the date of the complained of incident and must include the date of the offense, the individuals involved, and details of the alleged incident. ( Id., at ¶ 6.) Once submitted, the correctional deputy attempts to resolve the inmate's complaint at his or her level within 24 hours of receiving the inmate request from. ( Id., ¶ at 7.) If the correctional deputy is unable to resolve the complaint, the deputy is required to sign and date the inmate request form and refer the complaint to his or her supervisor. ( Id. ) The supervisor is required to respond in writing to the complaint within 72 hours of receiving the documentation, noting the decision and reason for that decision. ( Id., at ¶ 8.)
If the inmate is not satisfied with the response of the correctional deputy or supervisor to his complaint, the inmate may submit a written grievance to the Corrections Commander on an inmate grievance form along with all of the original paperwork pertaining to the issue. (Defs.' 56.1(a)(3) Statement 9.) The Corrections Commander is required to respond to the grievance within five business days of receiving the grievance and required documentation. ( Id., at ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff was familiar with the Jail's grievance procedure. (Defs.' 56.1(a)(3) Statement ¶ 14.) Plaintiff used the grievance procedure on June 6, 2011, when he submitted a grievance to Commander Jennings about being charged for a haircut that he did not receive. ( Id., at ¶¶ 15-18.) Plaintiff met with Commander Jennings in person at least twice after the January 2011, incident, including once in her office and once while in segregation. ( Id., at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff did not complain to Commander Jennings about the alleged unsanitary living conditions or being denied hygiene and cleaning supplies. ( Id., at ¶ 28.)
The alleged excessive force, failure to intervene and failure to provide medical care took place on January 13, 2011. (Defs.' 56.1(a)(3) Statement ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Craig used excessive force on him after he asked for a grievance form when he was denied proper prison attire. (Plaint.'s Second Amended Complaint; Plaint.'s Deposition, Pgs. 25-28.) He also alleges that other Defendants failed to intervene or provide medical care for his injuries. ( Id. ) Plaintiff did ...