United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MARK ORLANDO COOPER, No. 30181-424, Petitioner,
JAMES N. CROSS, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DAVID R. HERNDON, Chief District Judge.
Petitioner Mark Orlando Cooper is currently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution at Greenville, Illinois, serving a 155-month sentence based on armed robbery charges. United States v. Cooper, No. 07-cr-50058-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2008). On January 23, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Cooper argues that his First Amendment right to access the courts was denied when his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence was denied without an evidentiary hearing. United States of America v. Cooper, No. 12-CV-50284 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2012). He seeks reinstatement and/or reconsideration of his Section 2255 motion, complete with an evidentiary hearing as prescribed in Section 2255(b). Cooper does not otherwise attack his conviction, sentence, or the duration of his confinement.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts. Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court judge, "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas corpus cases, such as this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
As summarized by the Court of Appeals, "Cooper pled guilty to the robbery count pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and the firearm offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Cooper was sentenced to 71 months on the robbery offense and a consecutive 84 months on the firearms offense, for a total of 155 months." United States v. Cooper, 360 Fed.Appx. 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2010).
On direct appeal, Cooper challenged whether there had been an "abduction" during the robbery for purposes of applying a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4). The appellate court characterized this argument as "frivolous, " and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Cooper, 360 Fed.Appx. 657 (7th Cir. 2010).
In July 2012, Cooper filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, again attacking the "abduction" issue, since a codefendant's sentence had been vacated and remanded on appeal due to an error related to the "abduction enhancement." He also took issue with how his criminal history and a victim injury had been considered relative to his within-Guideline sentence. See Cooper v. United States of America, No. 12-CV-50284, Docs. 1, 3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2012). The district court summarily dismissed the Section 2255 motion without a hearing and without a response from the government, finding the motion untimely and otherwise without merit. Cooper, No. 12-CV-50284, Doc. 3. A subsequent appeal was denied after the appellate court concluded Cooper had not shown the denial of a constitutional right. Cooper v. United States, No. 13-2514 (7th Cir. Oct. 31, 2013) (viewing the Section 2255 motion as successive to begin with, because Cooper had, essentially, filed the motion twice in the district court).
Cooper has now filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 attacking the district court's denial of his Section 2255 petition without affording him a hearing.
Section 2241 as an Avenue for Relief
As a general matter, "28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provide federal prisoners with distinct forms of collateral relief. Section 2255 applies to challenges to the validity of convictions and sentences, whereas [Section] 2241 applies to challenges to the fact or duration of confinement. Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998).
Cooper does not attack the duration of his confinement, per se. Therefore, Section 2241 does not readily appear to be the appropriate avenue for relief. In effect, Cooper is attempting to use this court to allow him to present a successive, redundant Section 2255 petition attacking his conviction and sentence, skirting the requirements for bringing a successive petition ( see Section 2255(h), (e)), and ignoring the Seventh Circuit's most recent ruling.
Normally, this Section 2241 would be dismissed out of hand. However, in Gray-Bey v. United States, 209 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit cautioned: "a district court presented with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under [Section] 2241 should analyze that petition on its own terms, without assuming that whatever cannot proceed under [Section] 2255 also cannot proceed under [Section] 2241." In addition, in Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2011), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, under the gateway offered in Section 2255(e), Section 2241 can be utilized where a petition purportedly brought under Section 2241 is merely a "disguised" Section 2255 motion, and the petitioner has not secured a certificate of appealability (which is the scenario Cooper presents), if the petitioner claims actual innocence and "has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.'" Id. at 1047 (quoting Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Cooper seems to be arguing that he did not have an unobstructed opportunity to argue his Section 2255 petition. Therefore, the Court will provide what is probably ...