Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District.
Appellate court judgment affirmed as modified.
In a case in which a guilty plea was entered and, years later, a motion for its withdrawal was made for the first time and the State participated actively in the proceedings with no untimeliness objection, the circuit court did not reacquire jurisdiction and should have dismissed for lack thereof where the State sought no alteration of the prior judgment--revestment doctrine inapplicable and its parameters clarified.
For Christopher B. Bailey, Appellant: Ms. Jaime L. Montgomery, Assistant State Appellate Defender, Elgin, IL.
For the People, Appellee: Ms. Retha Stotts, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, IL; State's Attorney DuPage County, Wheaton, IL; State's Attorneys App. Pros. Elgin, Second Judicial District, Elgin, IL.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
In this appeal, we are presented with an opportunity to clarify the parameters of the revestment doctrine that permits a court to be revested with jurisdiction despite the absence of a timely postjudgment filing. At the core of this dispute is whether a party may satisfy the doctrine's requirement that the subsequent proceeding be inconsistent with the prior judgment simply by failing to object on the basis of its untimeliness or the finality of the prior judgment. We conclude that the revestment doctrine requires more and that expressing opposition to alteration of the prior judgment bars application of the doctrine. Here, the State opposed the alteration of the prior judgment, precluding the circuit court from reacquiring jurisdiction over defendant's case under the doctrine of revestment. The circuit court should therefore have dismissed defendant's postjudgment motion to vacate his plea and sentence for lack of jurisdiction. Because the appellate court correctly concluded that revestment did not occur, we affirm its judgment, as modified herein.
In March 2007, the 17-year-old defendant pled guilty in the circuit court of DuPage County to criminal sexual abuse involving his 16-year-old girlfriend. He was sentenced to pay a $100 fine and serve 300 days in the county jail, with credit for time served. When asked whether there was " any sentence regarding [sex offender] registration?" the trial judge responded, " No." More than three years later, in October 2010, defendant filed a motion to vacate the plea and sentence, arguing they were void because the trial court was required to order him to register. The State filed a written response to defendant's motion to vacate, arguing only that the trial court's actions did not render the plea and sentence void. The trial judge denied defendant's motion on the merits.
On appeal, defendant argued that remand was necessary because defense counsel failed to comply with the mandatory certification requirement in Supreme Court Rule 604(d). The appellate majority dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2012 IL App (2d) 110209, 981 N.E.2d 1129, 367 Ill.Dec. 401. The dissenting justice maintained that the majority erred by relying on cases that misconstrued the revestment doctrine and were factually distinguishable. 2012 IL App (2d) 110209, ¶ 44, 981 N.E.2d 1129, 367 Ill.Dec. 401 (McLaren, J., dissenting). This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
Before this court, the parties raise three issues: (1) whether the appellate court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the revestment doctrine did not ...