Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Third Division
Summary judgment was properly entered for defendants in plaintiff’s action for the injuries she suffered when she fell while performing an exercise at defendant fitness club under the direction of her personal trainer, since the trial court properly found the liability release that was included in the plaintiff’s membership agreement governed her personal injury claim, and plaintiff did not provide any support for her claims that defendants’ failure to produce the supplemental personal training contract warranted the inference that the supplemental contract disavowed the exculpatory provision of the membership agreement, that the typographical errors in the membership agreement rendered that agreement void, and that the releases at issue were against public policy.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-L-1423; the Hon. Jeffrey Lawrence, Judge, presiding.
Corboy & Demetrio, PC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Dana Crowley & Associates, of Chicago, for appellees.
Justices Pucinski and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
HYMAN PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 Plaintiff Erin Cox filed suit against her gymnasium and personal trainer, defendants U.S. Fitness, LLC, and Zachary Beachler, after she fell and sustained a severe injury to her wrist during a personal training session. She alleged that defendants negligently instructed her to perform a dangerous exercise and used certain equipment in an unsafe manner, among other claims. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and Cox appealed.
¶ 2 Cox argues the trial court erred in three ways: (i) holding that the liability release in the parties' membership agreement governed her personal injury claim; (ii) ignoring issues of fact raised by a supplemental personal training agreement, which was not found in discovery; and (iii) failing to void the membership agreement as unconscionable or against public policy. Finding no error in the granting of summary judgment, we affirm the judgment.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant U.S. Fitness owns and operates a fitness club in Chicago named Fitness Formula Club. On March 4, 2009, plaintiff Erin Cox entered into a membership agreement with U.S. Fitness to use its club facilities. The agreement contained a waiver, which read:
"I have been informed that Fitness Formula Clubs (the Clubs) and its affiliated clubs and its owners, officers and employees will not be liable in lawsuits including negligence lawsuits brought against them by members or their guests. As material consideration for Fitness Formula Clubs and its affiliated clubs permitting members and guests to use the Club or its facilities, each member or guest agrees to specifically assume all risks of personal injury, property loss or other damages including risk associated with fitness classes and equipment, sports exercise, all locker room facilities and fitness advisory services and all other facilities. Further, all members and their guests waive any and all claims against any Fitness Formula Club, its affiliated clubs and the owners, officers, and employees of the Club for any personal injury, property loss or other damages connected to or arising out of any of the associated risks." (Emphases added.)
Desiree Buford, member services director for U.S. Fitness, enrolled Cox. She asked Cox to read the liability waiver and to sign if she understood. Cox did not read or ask any questions about the waiver and signed the agreement. Buford did not receive any training or instructions about how to answer questions about the waiver of liability, and she did not know what the term "fitness advisory services" meant.
¶ 5 As part of her membership, Cox received a complimentary personal training session with a trainer named Timi Wusu, an employee of U.S. Fitness. During the session, Wusu asked Cox about her fitness goals, but did not instruct her in any exercises. That day or the next, Cox purchased from U.S. Fitness a package of personal training sessions with Wusu. When Cox signed up for these sessions, she signed a second contract, though no second contract was produced during discovery nor is it part of ...