MEMORANDUM and ORDER
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS, MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Plaintiff Jefferson, a prisoner of Illinois at Lawrence Correction Center in Lawrence, IL, (“Lawrence”) filed a complaint alleging various deprivations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1), seeking redress for wrongs rooted in what Mr. Jefferson alleges throughout the filings is a mostly-soy diet (see, e.g. Doc. 1, pp. 1, 6; Doc. 49-4, p. 1; Doc. 41-2, p. 10:13-25). Currently, there are two dueling Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 40) (Doc. 49), which the Court takes up at this time. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Findings of Fact
The only claim before this Court is Mr. Jefferson’s allegation of deliberate indifference to his medical needs precipitated by Dr. Fenoglio’s failure to order a thyroid blood test. (Doc. 12, p. 8). Both parties have moved for summary judgment on this count.
Mr. Jefferson was transferred to Lawrence in April of 2009. (Doc. 49-1, p. 6). On February 18, 2010, Mr. Jefferson was seen by the LPN, who recorded that he was experiencing cold feet and hands, and discomfort. (Doc. 49-1, p. 7). Mr. Jefferson requested a thyroid test at this time. (Doc. 49-1, p. 7). On March 11, 2010, Mr. Jefferson was diagnosed with hyperlipidemia. (Doc. 41-3, p. 1). Mr. Jefferson was scheduled for hyperlipidemia labs on September 14th and August 21st during that visit. (Doc. 41-3, p. 1). A June 17, 2010 doctor’s note also indicates that Mr. Jefferson requested a thyroid test; his symptoms included cold feet and hands and poor short term memory. (Doc. 49-1, p. 8). Dr. Fenoglio conducted a physical examination on that date. (Doc. 49-1, p. 8). Mr. Jefferson was seen by the LPN on July 13, 2010. (Doc. 49-1, p. 9). He again requested a thyroid test and commented that he had already been denied several times. (Doc. 49-1, p. 9). He denied current complaints. (Doc. 49-1, p. 9). Dr. Fenoglio examined Mr. Jefferson on September 13, 2010. (Doc. 49-2, p. 1). He noted hyperlipidemia and that Mr. Jefferson continued to ask for a thyroid test due to his memory loss and irregular bowels. (Doc. 49-2, p. 1). Follow-up labs were for his hyperlipidemia were again ordered. (Doc. 41-3, p. 4). Plaintiff refused medication for hyperlipidemia. (Doc. 41-3, p. 5). He did so again on March 15, 2011. (Doc. 41-3, p. 6). Plaintiff refused medication again on September 13, 2011 and March 1, 2012. (Doc. 41-3, pp. 7-8). Dr. Fenoglio swore out an affidavit stating that he did not test Mr. Jefferson for thyroid function during his tenure at Lawrence because Mr. Jefferson’s symptoms did not clinically indicate that test. (Doc. 49-2, p. 12). Dr. Fenoglio left Lawrence in October of 2012. (Doc. 49-2, p. 11).
On March 13, 2013, Plaintiff had a thyroid test at the University of Illinois Medical Center. (Doc. 49-1, p. 10). The test results showed that his thyroid was functioning within a normal range. (Doc. 49-1, p. 10). He discussed these results with a Licensed Practical Nurse, who explained to Mr. Jefferson that “[his] thyroid levels are normal, ” and whose professional judgment in light of his symptoms was to “educate [Mr. Jefferson] on proper diet and exercise.” (Doc. 49-7, pp. 7-8).
Mr. Jefferson has no medical training (Doc. 41-2 pp. 4-5) and no dietary training sufficient to make him competent to testify about causal relationships between a soy diet and health conditions. (Doc. 41-2 pp. 4-5).
Conclusions of Law
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment, which is governed by Federal Rule of Procedure 56, is proper only if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating, based on the pleadings, affidavits and/or information obtained via discovery, the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, courts may “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant's position is insufficient; a party will successfully oppose summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ummary judgment is . . . the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is “no genuine issue of material fact when no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party.” Van Antwerp v. City of Peoria, 627 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 2010); accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (finding material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party).
At summary judgment, the Court’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge witness credibility, or to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. Nat’l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008).
B. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Medical Needs
An inmate’s dissatisfaction with medical care he receives in prison does not state a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, even if the care was substandard to the point of negligence or malpractice. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Sanville v. MacCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). But in certain circumstances, a constitutional claim may lie if a prison official’s actions amount to a failure to treat a serious medical condition. Whether a prison official has been deliberately indifferent depends on a 2-part test: “the plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition was objectively serious, and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, which is a subjective standard.” Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). The first prong of the test is a threshold inquiry: inmates without objectively serious medical conditions under the law cannot have been treated with deliberate indifference to their medical needs actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Seventh Circuit considers the following to indicate a serious medical need: (1) where failure to treat the condition could “result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;” (2) the “[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;” (3) the “presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;” or (4) “the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). Alternatively, a ...